Postracial Remedies by Darby, Derrick & Levy, Richard E.





University of Michigan 
Richard E. Levy 
University of Kansas School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Law and Philosophy Commons, Law and Race 
Commons, and the Legal Remedies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Derrick Darby & Richard E. Levy, Postracial Remedies, 50 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 387 (2016). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol50/iss2/4 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
POSTRACIAL REMEDIES
Derrick Darby* & Richard E. Levy*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is decidedly postracial. The
Court has restricted the Equal Protection Clause to intentional discrimination by
the government, concluding that the Constitution does not prohibit private acts of
discrimination and rejecting challenges based on disparate impact, even when rig-
orous statistical analysis indicates that race is likely a factor. It has held that
remedying the effects of past societal discrimination is an insufficient basis for race-
specific remedies such as affirmative action. It has also ended remedies of this sort
designed to combat previous state-sponsored racial discrimination, such as court-
ordered desegregation measures in the schools and the preclearance provisions of the
Voting Rights Act. Constitutional litigation currently provides little or no recourse
to address racial disparities in outcomes that are not demonstrably caused by inten-
tional governmental racial discrimination, and race-specific remedies face a level of
judicial scrutiny that is especially difficult to satisfy.
This Article asks what can be done under these circumstances to ameliorate
racial inequality in a manner that is politically feasible and does not run afoul of
constitutional limits. It argues that “postracial remedies” are a necessary compo-
nent of an effective strategy to combat racial disparities in areas such as wealth,
incarceration, education, and housing. Postracial remedies seek pragmatic solu-
tions for the economic, social, and structural problems that disproportionately
burden blacks in the United States. These remedies are not race specific because they
do not treat people differently based on race, but they are race sensitive because they
target the manifestations of racial inequality and recognize the salience of race in
today’s political and legal environment. This approach, which seeks legally achiev-
able remedies, is also consistent with “antibalkanization” perspectives associated
with “race moderates” whose civil rights equal protection jurisprudence is moti-
vated, in part, by a concern with preserving social cohesion.
Although postracial remedies are necessary within this postracial ethos, pursu-
ing them does not require acceptance of the postracial narrative or the
abandonment of advocacy to combat ongoing racial discrimination.
* Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. We are grateful to
Pamela Karlan, Martha Nussbaum, Richard Posner, Reva Siegel, and workshop participants
at the Stanford University Political Theory Workshop, the University of Chicago School of
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INTRODUCTION
Talk of a “postracial” America was widespread after Barack
Obama won the White House. To many, electing a black man to the
nation’s highest office signified that the days of slavery, Jim Crow,
and the Civil Rights movement were behind us and that race was no
longer a barrier to achieving the American Dream. Although it is
certainly premature to celebrate the passing of race in America, this
postracial narrative is both prominent in our political discourse and
deeply entrenched in United States Supreme Court doctrine. We
must take this fact seriously, along with the reality of stark polariza-
tion about race matters, to pursue politically feasible and
constitutionally sound remedies for racial inequality. In this Article,
we argue that “postracial remedies,” as we shall call them, are essen-
tial tools for realizing egalitarian aspirations in our racially
exhausted society.
By “postracial remedies,” we mean remedies that seek pragmatic
solutions for the economic, social, and structural problems that dis-
proportionately burden African Americans without treating people
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differently because of their race.1 Postracial remedies are “race sen-
sitive” but not “race specific.”2 They are race sensitive because they
recognize the salience of race in American society, including both
the existence of racial disparities and the reality of racial polariza-
tion. They are not race specific, however. Instead, they operate with
the faith that effectively targeting underlying problems such as low
wages, underperforming schools, and impoverished neighborhoods
will benefit all Americans. Even if such interventions are motivated
in part by the desire to ameliorate racial disparities, they are not
mere proxies for race-specific benefits if they genuinely address
such problems without regard to race.3 Creating a rising tide to lift
all boats can help mitigate racial disparities in America.
Postracial remedies encompass, but are broader than, some
other approaches that have been advocated to combat racial ine-
quality. For example, one type of postracial remedy may substitute
class (or “place”) for race,4 such as a recent initiative in New York
City that establishes admission preferences at seven elementary
schools for students who qualify for free and reduced lunch, En-
glish Language Learners, or students in the child welfare system.5
Another type of postracial remedy is universalistic, insofar as it aims
to protect all citizens rather than a particular group of them.6 En-
hanced investments in public education or free college tuition
would be examples of universalistic responses to educational dispar-
ities. Many other pragmatic approaches that do not neatly fall into
these categories may help to improve educational achievement for
students or schools that lag behind, including improved early child-
hood education or before and after school programs, programs to
enhance parental involvement or encourage students to take more
1. In this Article we focus on the black-white race case. We do not explore implications
of our proposal for women, Native Americans, aliens, Latinos/as, and other historically disad-
vantaged groups.
2. We use the terms “race specific” and “race sensitive” to avoid confusion with other
commonly used terms, such as “race conscious” or “race targeted,” which have connotations
we wish to avoid.
3. For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 407–410 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., SHERYLL CASHIN, PLACE, NOT RACE: A NEW VISION OF OPPORTUNITY IN
AMERICA (2014).
5. NYC DEPT. OF EDUC., Chancellor Farin˜a Announces New Admissions Pilot at Seven Elemen-
tary Schools Designed to Promote Diversity (Nov. 20, 2015), http://schools.nyc.gov/Offices/
mediarelations/NewsandSpeeches/2015-2016/Chancellor+Farina+Announces+New+Admis
sions+Pilot+at+Seven+Elementary+Schools+Designed+to+Promote+Div.htm.
6. Postracial remedies resemble so-called “universalist” remedies, which eschew target-
ing specific groups of individuals, whether defined by race, ethnicity, class, disability, or some
other classification. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting
Rights after Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838 (2014). We compare and contrast postracial remedies
with universalist remedies in part V.A. of the Article. See infra notes 398–401 and accompany-
ing text.
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responsibility for their own education, or changes in curriculum or
teaching methods. We are agnostic as to whether such remedies
come from the progressive Left or the conservative Right, whether
they emphasize public or private initiatives, and whether they rely
primarily on public assistance or personal responsibility or some
combination of the two. The question of greatest importance is,
“What works?”7
It is tempting, though mistaken, to assume that advocating pos-
tracial remedies implies acceptance of the premises of the
postracial narrative. To the contrary, it is precisely because we are
conscious of the ways in which race still matters, and pessimistic
about overcoming the postracial narrative, that we advance a non-
race-specific (not race-blind) approach to addressing racial inequal-
ity. Relatedly, we propose postracial remedies out of a genuine
concern with minimizing the social divisiveness shaped by the ideo-
logical polarization over race matters in America. Thus, this view is
also consistent with “antibalkanization” perspectives associated with
“race moderates” whose civil rights equal protection jurisprudence
is motivated, in part, by a concern with preserving social cohesion.8
The United States is hardly a postracial nation. Tragic police en-
counters with blacks in Baltimore, Ferguson, New York, South
Carolina, Texas, and elsewhere remind us that race still matters and
that we have a long way to go to achieve the goal of having a pos-
tracial society.9 So, too, does evidence that job applicants with black
7. A postracial remedy “works” if it remedies the problem that it is meant to address
and consequently helps those in society who are adversely affected by the problem. Thus, for
example, a remedy that targets underperforming schools “works” if it improves achievement
by the students at such schools. A central premise of our approach is that pragmatic solutions
that work to ameliorate the underlying social and economic problems that disproportion-
ately burden blacks will, over time, reduce racial disparities. See infra notes 333–336 and
accompanying text (Part IV.A.1); see also infra notes 343–347 (Part V.B.1). Our pragmatic
commitment to what works is not merely strategic. It is also principled, in the sense that it is
rooted in a normative objective of promoting social consensus, or at least minimizing social
divisiveness, in pursuit of effective ways of realizing our common aims as a community. For
instance, if a particular remedy such as a higher minimum wage is proposed to address in-
come inequality, low wage workers of various races and ethnicities may form a consensus in
support of it. Similarly, if a particular remedy such as a civilian review board is proposed to
address police discretionary stops and arrests, persons of various races, ethnicities, and class
may achieve consensus in favor of it. See infra notes 403–410 and accompanying text.
8. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Deci-
sion in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011). Although Siegel is focused on the
jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy, who seems to occupy the middle ground on a divided
Court, he is representative of a broader group whose views on race are mixed. See infra notes
395–396 and accompanying text. In addition, we are concerned with both the political and
legal manifestations of postracialism, and so seek an approach that both facilitates coalition
building across racial lines and is capable of surviving constitutional scrutiny.
9. See generally DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, ARE WE ALL POSTRACIAL YET? (2015); Ta-Nehisi
Coates, There is No Post-Racial America: The United States needs more than a good president to erase
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sounding names like Jamal and Lakisha get fewer callbacks than
ones with white sounding names such as Emily and Greg,10 as well
as reports that banks are still discriminating against black communi-
ties in the home loan lending market even though redlining is
illegal.11 More broadly, as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., once ob-
served, “Of all the good things in life, the Negro has approximately
one half those of whites. Of the bad he has twice that of whites.”12
While the numbers may have changed a bit since Dr. King made
this observation in 1967, his point still rings true today: substantial
disparities endure between whites and blacks on a wide variety of
indicators.13
Although the reality of racial disparities is undeniable, their im-
plications for racial justice are matters of deep disagreement. This
discord, and its intractability, is consequential for understanding
our argument. For most blacks and their allies on the Left, these
disparities are compelling evidence of racial injustice. From this
perspective, while blacks have enjoyed formal legal equality since
the middle of the twentieth century, generations of oppression, and
its intergenerational effects, have exacted a heavy toll on black soci-
ety that has not dissipated. Notwithstanding the hard-fought gains
of the Civil Rights Era, moreover, intentional discrimination is an
ongoing problem, even if it has been driven largely underground
and is therefore difficult to document. Furthermore, aside from
overt discrimination, implicit biases and systemic barriers also pre-
vent blacks from achieving genuine equality. In view of these
considerations, the Left often concludes that race-specific remedies
centuries of violence, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2015/07/post-racial-society-distant-dream/395255/.
10. See generally Alan B. Krueger, Economic Scene; Sticks and Stones Can Break Bones, but the
Wrong Name Can Make a Job Hard to Find, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2002), http://www.nytimes.
com/2002/12/12/business/economic-scene-sticks-stones-can-break-bones-but-wrong-name-
can-make-job-hard.html; William A. Darity Jr. & Patrick L. Mason, Evidence on Discrimination in
Employment: Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, 12 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 63 (1998); Marianne Ber-
trand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A
Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2004); Devah Pager et
al., Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field Experiment, 74 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV.
777 (2009).
11. Rachel L. Swarns, Biased Lending Evolves, and Blacks Face Trouble Getting Mortgages, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/nyregion/hudson-city-bank-
settlement.html?hp&actionclick&pgtypehomepage&modulesecond-column-region&region=
top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0.
12. Martin Luther King, Jr., Address to Hungry Club of Atlanta Speech (May 10, 1967),
http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/americas-chief-moral-dilemma.
13. For convenience, we will use the terms “black” and “white” as racial designations,
with the full knowledge that neither term accurately captures the complex construct that is
race. For an insightful philosophical discussion of race and its complexities, see generally
LAWRENCE BLUM, I’M NOT A RACIST, BUT. . . THE MORAL QUANDARY OF RACE (2002).
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such as affirmative action—and perhaps even black reparations—
are necessary to mitigate enduring racial inequality and to achieve
racial justice in America.14
This perspective contrasts sharply with the postracial narrative
that is advanced by politicians and commentators on the Right and
embraced by many whites and some conservative blacks.15 The pos-
tracial narrative acknowledges past racial wrongs, but emphasizes
racial progress. Slavery was abolished after the Civil War, racial seg-
regation has been unconstitutional since Brown v. Board of
Education, and civil rights laws in the 1960s outlawed racial discrimi-
nation. So, racial disparities can no longer be attributed to
America’s lamentable history of racial oppression. In short: “That
was then, this is now.” Under the postracial narrative, even if some
intentional discrimination, implicit bias, or systemic barriers re-
main, racism is no longer a major obstacle to opportunity and
success. Nowadays, its proponents argue, unequal outcomes have
more to do with personal factors like will, effort, and discipline than
with race. Thus, they conclude, it is time for black Americans to
take personal responsibility for their own successes and failures and
to work their way up the socioeconomic ladder like other minority
groups before them. From the postracial perspective, race-specific
remedies for racial inequality are not only unnecessary, but are also
pernicious, insofar as they breed a culture of dependency, foster
racial balkanization, and undermine the ultimate goal of a color-
blind society. Thus, as Chief Justice Roberts sums up this
perspective in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
14. See generally Derrick Darby, Reparations and Racial Inequality, 5 PHIL. COMPASS 55
(2010) (documenting the link between racial inequality and reparations in progressive
arguments).
15. In general, to describe a society as “postracial” (also post-racial) means that it is a
society in which race no longer matters. Postracialism is generally associated with a political
narrative whose advocates assert that America has achieved, or has nearly achieved, its pos-
tracial ideal. Although the term has become sufficiently common to warrant its own
Wikipedia page. See Post-racial America, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-racial_America
(last visited Nov. 15, 2016). Because there is no authoritative definition, however, the pos-
tracial narrative described in this paragraph is our own distillation of what we perceive as the
common elements of the postracial position, gleaned from a variety of sources, ranging from
popular media to scholarly articles. See, e.g., infra note 17 (citing exchange between Jon Stew-
art and Bill O’Reilly on the Daily Show); Derrick Darby and Argun Saatcioglu, Race, Justice,
and Desegregation, 11 DUBOIS REVIEW 87 (2014); Lawrence D. Bobo, Somewhere Between Jim Crow
& Post-Racialism: Reflections on the Racial Divide in America Today, 140 DAEDALUS 11 (2011).
Indeed, postracialism has also been the focus of considerable legal commentary, most of it
from the Left and most of it critical of the notion that we have come close to achieving our
postracial aspirations. See, e.g., Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589 (2009); Andre
Douglas Pond Cummings, Post Racialism?, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 601 (2011); Girardeau
A. Spann, Postracial Discrimination, 5 MOD. AM. 26 (2009); Sheila Thomas, Debunking The Myth
of a Post-Racial Society, 37 HUM. RTS. 22 (2010).
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District. No. 1, “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race
is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”16
As is the case in other aspects of social and public policy, these
diverging accounts suggest that Americans are polarized on matters
of race.17 Blacks and whites, the Left and the Right, and Democrats
and Republicans disagree about the causes, meaning, and remedies
for racial inequality. Insofar as these divisions have deep philosoph-
ical and psychological roots connected with how our social
identities shape our perception of race matters, they are unlikely to
be overcome in the near future. Notwithstanding this reality, which
must be taken seriously in our democratic society, progress can be
pursued in a manner that minimizes racial polarization and works
toward building coalitions to achieve solutions that work. Of
course, getting beyond polarization over race is no guarantee that
we can avoid it on other matters such as class. Still, given the
fraught history of race in America, sensitivity to racial exhaustion
and disagreements about race is an obvious place to begin our
search for less contentious common ground so as to curtail the so-
cial divisiveness that obstructs the mutual cooperation required for
social progress within a democracy.18
Those who, like us, believe that we must take steps to alleviate the
sobering reality of racial inequality, and are not naı¨ve about the
depth and significance of polarization about race matters, face diffi-
cult—if not insurmountable—obstacles to race-specific remedies
for this purpose. Such remedies are politically divisive and face
gridlock at all levels of government. Even when dealing with well-
meaning people, they elicit defensive psychological reactions as
well as efforts to avoid collective guilt that can undermine finding
16. 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
17. For an illuminating conversation between Jon Stewart and Bill O’Reilly on the “Daily
Show” that highlights these competing perspectives, see The Daily Show—Bill O’Reilly Extended
Interview, YOUTUBE (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8raaT7SRx18.
18. See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U.L. REV. 917
(2009).  The most recent presidential election, which took place during the final stages of
the editorial process on this article, underscores this point, as well as the necessity of finding
postracial remedies to address racial inequalities. People will be dissecting Donald J. Trump’s
Electoral College victory for years to come and it is clear that a variety of factors contributed
to this outcome, Nonetheless, anyone who has been paying attention will recognize that po-
larization on race played a major role in his political ascendency and eventual victory. It is
especially noteworthy in this regard that one of President-elect Trump’s first policy sugges-
tions was a public works program for infrastructure development—a postracial remedy—and
that this suggestion received broad support. See Steven Mufson, Trump’s call for new roads,
bridges and other public works finds wide support, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/business/economy/big-pending-on-roads-bridges-and-other-projects/2016/
11/11/6a58d150-a821-11e6-ba59-a7d93165c6d4_story.html?utm_term=.7380b39d8701. In
short, there is every reason to think that race-specific remedies will continue to face political
and legal obstacles.
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common ground and forging productive political coalitions to miti-
gate racial inequality. Race-specific remedies presume a
philosophically contested understanding of the relationship be-
tween past racial discrimination and current racial disparities.19 In
addition, and perhaps most significantly, pursuing race-specific
remedies for racial inequality faces stiff odds in the courts.
The Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is decid-
edly postracial, in the sense that decision after decision from the
Court rests on postracial doctrinal principles and factual prem-
ises.20 This situation must be acknowledged. The Court has
restricted the Equal Protection Clause to intentional discrimination
by the government, concluding that the Constitution does not pro-
hibit private acts of discrimination and rejecting challenges based
on disparate impact, even when statistical analysis indicates that
race is likely a factor.21 It has held that remedying the effects of past
societal discrimination is an insufficient basis for race-specific reme-
dies (i.e., affirmative action).22 And it has ended remedies of this
sort put in place to combat previous state-sponsored racial discrimi-
nation, such as court-ordered desegregation measures in schools23
and the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act.24
The Court’s postracial orientation limits the pursuit of legal rem-
edies for racial inequality in two substantial ways. First, because the
Constitution does not prohibit implicit, systemic, or societal racism,
constitutional litigation provides little or no recourse as a means to
address racial disparities in outcome that are not demonstrably
19. See infra notes 152–157 and accompanying text (Part II.A.3).
20. Although the Justices are often divided in any given case, the results of the decisions
over the years have been consistently postracial in terms of both doctrinal principals and
factual premises. See infra notes 218–286 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting equal protection chal-
lenge to capital punishment notwithstanding statistical analysis demonstrating that race was a
significant factor in the imposition of the death penalty); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976) (holding that racial discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause based
on disparate impact require proof of intentional discrimination). For further discussion of
the postracial premises of these decisions, see infra notes 222–240 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict
scrutiny to race-based affirmative action programs and concluding that remedying the effects
of past societal discrimination was not a sufficient justification to survive strict scrutiny); see
also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying Croson to federal
affirmative action programs). For further discussion of the postracial premises of these deci-
sions, see infra note 261 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Schs., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (relaxing standards for dissolving injunctions and removing
judicial supervision of desegregation efforts in previously segregated school districts); Free-
man v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (same). For further discussion of the postracial premises of
these decisions, see infra notes 267–275 and accompanying text.
24. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). For further discussion of the pos-
tracial premises of this decision, see infra notes 276–286 and accompanying text.
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caused by intentional governmental racial discrimination. Second,
race-specific remedies by political actors or governmental institu-
tions are unavailable in practice because they face a level of judicial
scrutiny that is difficult to overcome.25 Even remedies originally put
in place to correct intentional discrimination by state actors have
been dismantled.
Although we categorically reject the premises of postracialism
and recognize the ongoing necessity of confronting those premises
with the truth about ongoing discrimination and inequality,26 there
is no denying that the postracial narrative has considerable influ-
ence in our political discourse and constitutional doctrine.27 So, if
we take these obstacles to race-specific remedies seriously, and wish
to find workable solutions to ongoing racial inequality that are po-
litically and legally achievable, we must answer this pressing
question: What can be done to ameliorate racial inequality in a manner
that takes seriously the deep polarization over race matters in America and
that does not run afoul of constitutional limits reflecting the Supreme
Court’s postracial equal protection jurisprudence? We believe that pursu-
ing postracial remedies provide a promising answer.28
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I documents racial dispari-
ties in the United States on various indicators, including income
and wealth, incarceration and criminal justice, educational achieve-
ment, and residential housing segregation. While the disparities are
25. Similarly, nongovernmental actors—such as employers—are also limited by the
Court’s postracial premises to the extent that these premises permeate the construction and
application of civil rights statutes that prohibit private racial discrimination. See infra notes
232–240 and accompanying text.
26. See infra Part V.B.3, notes 426–431 and accompanying text (responding to racial pur-
ists). See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-Race Equal Protection?
98 GEO. L.J. 967 (2010); Ian F. Haney Lo´pez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass
Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023 (2010); Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94
IOWA L. REV. 1589 (2009); Thomas F. Pettigrew, Post-Racism? Putting President Obama’s Victory
in Perspective, 6 DU BOIS REV. 279 (2009).
27. For a discussion of the psychology of postracialism, see infra notes 160–178 and ac-
companying text.
28. It might be objected that our approach is weak, giving away too much to those on
the other side who subscribe to vicious racism and are acting in bad faith. We can show up to
fight them with the “truth” about racial inequality, its history, causes, and consequences, but
if all those who subscribe to the postracial narrative are all hell-bent on keeping blacks down
relative to whites, then nothing short of a miracle or a successful armed struggle will produce
racial progress. We proceed on the premise that this group is the exception rather than the
rule, so that it is possible to build alliances in a collective effort to mitigate a social problem
with which we all live: racial inequality. Our concern with building strategic alliances reso-
nates with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s unifying strategy for addressing economic injustice in
America. During the Civil Rights Era, King recognized both the possibility and necessity of
building interracial alliances to address social problems that disproportionately affected Afri-
can Americans. THOMAS F. JACKSON, FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS: MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR., AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE 365 (2007).
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hardly in dispute, their causes, meaning, and implications are hotly
contested. Part I also elucidates the core premises of the postracial
narrative. Part II considers the philosophical and psychological
roots of ideological polarization over matters of race, discussing the
social-psychological research supporting our pessimism about
bridging this divide any time soon, and our skepticism about plac-
ing all of our faith in race-specific remedies. Part III demonstrates
that the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence closely
tracks the postracial narrative, both in terms of the controlling doc-
trinal principles and the Court’s underlying factual assumptions. In
view of the various barriers to race-specific remedies, Part IV pro-
poses addressing racial inequality through postracial remedies, by
which we mean non race-specific remedies that target the underly-
ing social and economic problems that produce racial disparities.
Then, with very broad strokes, Part IV describes what such remedies
might look like in practice. Part V situates this approach within a
family of equal protection jurisprudential approaches concerned
with addressing racial inequality while minimizing racial resent-
ment and social divisiveness; Part V then responds to three
potential objections. Part VI concludes by summarizing the Article’s
argument.
I. RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Blacks have enjoyed formal legal equality with whites for half a
century, but substantial inequality persists between these racial
groups on leading measures of well-being.29 We start from the pre-
mise that, regardless of its causes, racial inequality is a pressing
social problem that warrants the attention of law and policymakers.
The costs of social and economic inequality, which have been docu-
mented elsewhere,30 are magnified when race is added to the mix.
We will not review these costs here or attempt to persuade those
who believe that racial inequality is not a problem worth address-
ing. Nor will we attend to all of the disparities for which there is
compelling data. Instead, we summarize evidence of racial dispari-
ties in four key areas: economics, criminal justice, education, and
29. Many people, particularly on the Left, conclude from these disparities that
America’s unsteady march to genuine racial equality is unfinished business. PHILIP A.
KLINKNER AND ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF RACIAL
EQUALITY IN AMERICA (1999); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN
STRATIFICATION SYSTEM (2007).
30. See, e.g., RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER
EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER (2011); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY
(2013); DIVIDED: THE PERILS OF OUR GROWING INEQUALITY (David Cay Johnston ed., 2015).
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residential segregation.31 We then consider disagreements about
the causes and implications of these disparities.
A. Representative Data on Racial Disparities
It has been well documented that blacks are worse off than
whites on a variety of measures.32 Economically, blacks as a group
have lower incomes and less wealth, and suffer from higher rates of
poverty and unemployment.33 They are incarcerated at higher rates
than whites,34 and have disproportionately worse outcomes within
the entire criminal justice process from police stops to sentencing.
They underperform relative to whites on measures of educational
achievement and attainment.35 They are more likely to live in com-
munities segregated by race and income that are largely composed
of black and Latino residents living near or below the poverty line.36
1. Economics
Recent data shows scant progress since the civil rights era in clos-
ing racial gaps in poverty, wealth, and income—notwithstanding
increases in national prosperity. Blacks remain three times as likely
to live in poverty as whites, which is more or less the same rate we
saw fifty years ago.37 They are also overrepresented among the
31. We focus here on four areas of racial inequality acknowledging that others may be
equally significant. For example, racial disparities in political participation and representa-
tion are clearly important. Thus, although we reference Shelby County as an example of the
postracial factual assumption that past discrimination no longer causes present disparities in
political participation and representation and that intentional discrimination is no longer a
significant problem, we do not extend our analysis to these disparities. Shelby Cty. v. Holder,
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); see supra note 24; infra notes 121–122 and accompanying text; infra
notes 276–286 and accompanying text.
32. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICA-
TION SYSTEM (2007).
33. See infra notes 37–48 and accompanying text (Part I.A.1).
34. See infra notes 49–68 and accompanying text (Part I.A.2).
35. See infra notes 69–74 and accompanying text (Part I.A.3).
36. See infra notes 75–94 and accompanying text (Part I.A.4).
37. In 2013, 27.2 percent of black households lived in poverty compared to 9.6 percent
of whites. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2013, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 12 (2014), http://www.census.gov/con
tent/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p60-249.pdf. In 1959, the 55.1 percent
black poverty rate was over three times that of whites. Michael A. Fletcher, Fifty Years After
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poorest of the poor: of the nearly twenty million people with family
incomes below fifty percent of their poverty threshold, one-fourth
(4.963 million) are black.38 Put differently, blacks are three times
more likely to have incomes below fifty percent of poverty,39 which
reflects scant progress over the last fifty years.40
Family wealth for both black and white households increased
dramatically between 1983 and 2007 (nearly doubling for both
groups), but the relative gap between whites and blacks has also
increased,41 even more so since the recession ended in 2009.42 In
2007, white households had ten times more wealth than black
ones.43 White median wealth was $192,500 compared to $19,200 for
blacks. After the Great Recession, in 2013, whites had thirteen times
more wealth, $141,900 net worth compared with $11,000 for
blacks.44 Because whites have more assets that appreciate as a result
of economic growth, a rising stock market and increased real estate
values disproportionally benefit whites.45 Accordingly, whites have
greater wealth to pass on to their progeny than do blacks.46
Likewise, there are substantial gaps in other economic indicators.
A 2014 U.S. Census Bureau report estimates that the median house-
hold income for whites in 2013 was $58,270 compared to $34,598
for blacks.47 Similarly, blacks continue to have disproportionately
38. DENAVAS-WALT & PROCTOR, supra note 37, at 17.
39. 4.3 percent of whites (8,373,000 out of 195,167,000) as compared with 12.2 percent
of blacks (4,963,000 out of 40,615,000) fall into this category. DENAVAS-WALT & PROCTOR,
supra note 37, at 17.
40. In 1967, blacks were also overrepresented in one of the poorest categories of citizens
at three times the rate of whites: nine percent of black families earned less that $5,000 per
year compared with three percent of white families. Although the percentages of each group
that fell into this category was reduced by 1976 (perhaps as a result of inflation), the relative
gap between them remained the same: six percent of black families and two percent of white
fell below the threshold. WILLIAM A. DARITY JR. AND SAMUEL L. MYERS JR., PERSISTENT DISPAR-
ITY: RACE AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1945, 17 (1998).
41. Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial, Ethnic




44. Id. This rate approaches that of 1989, when whites had seventeen times the wealth of
blacks.
45. For research documenting racial disparities in home equity and how this contributes
to the racial wealth gap, see Lauren J. Krivo & Robert L. Kaufman, Housing and Wealth Inequal-
ity: Racial-Ethnic Differences in Home Equity in the United States, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 585 (2004).
46. Some researchers also make the crucial point that middle class black families—who
generously provide financial support to poorer family and extended family members—have a
harder time accumulating wealth. Thus, we should expect the adverse effects of their gener-
osity to be substantial during times when poverty is taking its greatest toll on their relatives.
See N. S. Chiteji & Darrick Hamilton, Family Connections and the Black-White Wealth Gap Among
Middle-Class Families, 30 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 9 (2002).
47. DENAVAS-WALT & PROCTOR, supra note 37, at 5.
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higher rates of unemployment. Over the period from 1963–2012,
blacks were unemployed at twice the rate of whites.48
2. Criminal Justice
The criminal justice system is a complex societal institution with
many components. Entry into this system is initiated with police pa-
trols, investigations, and arrests. Judges then decide whether to set
bail, what it will be, and under what terms. Prosecutors have discre-
tion regarding whether or not to press charges, what charges to
press, and whether to offer plea deals and on what terms. Juries and
judges hear evidence and hand down verdicts. Judges set sentences
and parole hearing boards decide whether convicts must serve the
full sentence or can be set free early. After time has been served,
parole officers have discretion to decide whether the terms are be-
ing met or violated by ex-cons.
At virtually every stage of the process, researchers have docu-
mented disparities between the treatment and outcomes for whites
and blacks in which the latter are worse off.49 In the aftermath of
the Michael Brown shooting in Ferguson, Missouri, for example, a
Justice Department report documented ways in which black re-
sidents in Ferguson were rendered worse off within the criminal
justice process than white residents.50 Rather than review evidence
on each aspect of the criminal justice system, we will focus on the
evidence of racial disparities in incarceration.
Rates of incarceration in the United States began to increase in
the mid-seventies, reaching unprecedented proportions by 2003.51
Although the incarceration rate was rather small in absolute terms,
with less than one percent behind bars, rates of incarceration in the
United States were much higher than in Europe,52 and that rate
48. In 1963, five percent of whites were unemployed compared to 10.9 percent of
blacks. The current rate for blacks is 12.6 compared to 6.6 for whites. Brad Plumer, These Ten
Charts Show That Black-White Economic Gap Hasn’t Budged in 50 Years, WASH. POST (Aug. 28,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/08/28/these-seven-
charts-show-the-black-white-economic-gap-hasnt-budged-in-50-years.
49. See, e.g., CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & DONALD P. HAIDER-MARKEL, PUL-
LED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP (2014) (documenting disparities
in police stops).
50. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 15 (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releas
es/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf.
51. BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 13, Fig. 1.1 (2006).
52. In 2001, the United States’s incarceration rate was 686 per hundred thousand com-
pared to the British rate of 126 per hundred thousand. Id. at 14, Fig. 1.2.
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represented a substantial increase over previous decades.53 Nearly
2.1 million persons were behind bars by 2003. By 2007, more than
seven million people were locked up, on probation, or on parole.54
These trends have been aptly described as “mass incarceration.”
Imprisonment affects blacks at much higher rates than whites.
Current data on incarceration rates indicate that black men were
six to eight times more likely to be in prison or jail than whites
during the last two decades of the twentieth century.55 Although
twelve percent of the U.S. population was black, they comprised
more than forty percent of the prison population.56 And not long
into the current century, blacks made up nearly half of the prison
population while representing just below thirteen percent of the
total U.S. population.57 One in three young black men will go to jail
in the course of his life, and more than half of the ones that drop
out of high school will be imprisoned at some point.58 By compari-
son, in 2001, a young white male had only a six percent chance of
being incarcerated at some point in his life.59
One important contributing factor to the high rate of incarcera-
tion among black youth is the war on drugs, which has had a
disproportionate impact on blacks in terms of arrest rates, impris-
onment rates, and the length of sentences.60 Devah Pager reports
that from 1983 to 1997—the height of the war on drugs waged in
urban America—there was a more than twenty-six-fold increase in
black incarceration for drug offenses compared to a mere sevenfold
one for whites. And by 2001, 139,700 blacks were behind bars for
drug crimes with less than half that number of whites (57,300) do-
ing time for drug offenses.61 Michelle Alexander argues that the
war on drugs has contributed to the mass incarceration of people of
color more than any other factor.62 By one estimate there are
53. In 1975, about one-tenth of one percent of the U.S. population was in prison, while
in 2003 seven-tenths of one percent of the population was in jail or in prison. Id. at 13. The
two figures are not directly comparable because the 2003 figure includes jail as well as prison,
the difference nonetheless represents a substantial increase in incarceration rates.
54. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COL-
ORBLINDNESS 60 (2010).
55. WESTERN, supra note 51, at 30.
56. DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCAR-
CERATION 3 (2007).
57. MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE: THE SENTENCING PROJECT 137 (2006).
58. PAGER, supra note 56, at 3.
59. MAUER, supra note 57, at 137.
60. See generally PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 41 (2009)
(discussing the War on Drugs and its far-reaching consequences for African Americans).
61. PAGER, supra note 56, at 31–32, Fig. 1.4.
62. ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 59.
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around a half-million people behind bars for drug offenses now.63 It
is reported that whites comprise seventy-five percent of current
drug users and blacks twelve percent.64 However, blacks and Latinos
represent seventy-five percent of those locked up for drugs.65
Mass incarceration has negative consequences.66 Being labeled a
felon is a social stigma that brings heightened public scrutiny. In-
carceration disrupts family and community life. It diminishes
employment prospects, which affects convicted felons’ ability to
find housing, support dependents, secure health benefits, and reap
the dignity associated with meaningful work.67 Similarly, felon dis-
enfranchisement laws, as well as the stigma associated with black
criminality, impair black political participation and thus curtail the
equal opportunity for blacks to directly advance their interests
within the political process.68
3. Education
There is compelling evidence of persistent racial disparities in
educational achievement and attainment.69 Proficiency in reading
and mathematics is a standard measure of educational achieve-
ment. Since the early 1970s, National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP) tests have measured the reading and math per-
formance of nine-, thirteen-, and seventeen-year-old students, with
average scores aggregated by race and by other background charac-
teristics. Based on 2012 test results, students today score higher
than their 1970s cohort.70 As with other indicators, however, here
too we find racial disparities—commonly referred to as the racial
achievement gap. There has been progress in closing this gap, but
63. Id. at 59.
64. MAUER, supra note 57, at 162.
65. ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 96–97.
66. See generally United States v. Nesbeth, No. 15-CR-18, 2016 WL 3022073 (E.D.N.Y. May
24, 2016) (detailing various negative consequences of criminal convictions as explanation for
giving defendant probation).
67. See generally PAGER, supra note 56; WESTERN, supra note 51; ALEXANDER, supra note
54.
68. David C. Wilson, Michael Leo Owens & Darren W. Davis, How Racial Attitudes and
Ideology Affect Political Rights for Felons, 12 DU BOIS REV. 73, 74 (2015) (explaining how racial
resentment reduces black political engagement and empowerment).
69. See generally Derrick Darby, Educational Inequality and the Science of Diversity in Grutter:
A Lesson for the Reparations Debate in the Age of Obama, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 755 (2009) (summa-
rizing the evidence of black and white disparities in education).
70. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, The Nation’s Report Card: Trends in Academic Progress
2012 (2013) [hereinafter NCES Report]. Except as otherwise indicated, this report is the
source of the comparative statistics discussed in the following paragraphs.
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black children still lag behind white children in both reading and
math test scores.71
Black children have made greater gains in reading than their
white peers over time. For example, between 1971 and 2012, the
average score for nine-year-old black students rose thirty-six points,
compared to a fifteen-point gain for their white peers. As a result,
the racial achievement gap in reading dropped from forty-four to
twenty-three. It has never been narrower for this age cohort.72 For
thirteen-year-old students the gap has narrowed from thirty-nine to
twenty-three points, but this is an increase from the historic low of
eighteen points in 1988. For seventeen-year-olds, the gap has been
cut in half since 1971, down from fifty-three to twenty-six points, but
is currently six points higher than the historic low of twenty in 1988.
So, in every age group measured blacks still lag behind whites in
reading proficiency.
We see a similar trend in math scores, where the gap has nar-
rowed but black students continue to lag behind. As with reading,
nine-year-old black children made greater gains than their white
peers, which narrowed the score gap ten points since 1973 (thirty-
five to twenty-five). In 2004, it was as low as twenty-three points.
Thirteen-year-olds made similar progress, from forty-six points in
1973 to twenty-eight in 2012, which is four points higher than its all-
time low of twenty-four in 1986. Black seventeen-year-old students
raised their scores substantially more than their age cohort (eigh-
teen points) compared to white students who raised their scores
only four points, thus narrowing the gap from forty to twenty-six
points since 1973, but this gap is five points higher than its low
point in 1990. So, while there has been progress in this area, here
too we find that black children continue to lag behind whites.
NAEP test scores are not the only measure of educational
achievement. There is evidence of a racial SAT score gap and a GPA
gap, with blacks scoring lower than whites.73 And with respect to
educational attainment there is evidence that black children have
lower promotion and graduation rates and that they are enrolled in
advance curriculum at lower rates. Conversely, black children are
disproportionately assigned to special education for behavioral
71. See generally THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phil-
lips eds., 1998); STEADY GAINS AND STALLED PROGRESS: INEQUALITY AND THE BLACK-WHITE TEST
SCORE GAP (Katherine Magnuson & Jane Waldfogel eds., 2008).
72. The reading scores for black children rose from 170 to 206, while the scores for
white children rose from 214 to 229. NCES report, supra note 70, at 16.
73. The disparities described in this paragraph are documented in Grace Kao & Jennifer
S. Thompson, Racial and Ethnic Stratification in Educational Achievement and Attainment, 29 ANN.
REV. SOC. 417, 420–22 (2003).
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problems, and are expelled more often and more harshly sanc-
tioned than white children for school misconduct. All of these
disparities are consequential for the life prospects of black chil-
dren, given the impact that education can have on economic and
non-economic welfare, and given that educational achievement and
attainment are factors that can make one more or less competitive
for limited resources and opportunities.74
4. Residential Segregation
Where individuals live and grow up has a profound impact on
their social mobility.75 It is not that certain places (e.g., suburbs) are
inherently better than others (e.g., the inner city).76 Rather, some
neighborhoods offer things like physical safety, quality schools, rec-
reational areas, environmental safety, access to reliable and
convenient transportation, jobs, healthy food options, lower in-
come inequality and rates of poverty, as well as a higher percentage
of neighbors with economic, social, and political capital that make a
positive difference to future life prospects. This makes the racial
neighborhood gap particularly troublesome. There is compelling
evidence that blacks, including middle-income black families, are
much more likely than whites to live in places lacking the ancillary
characteristics that so profoundly contribute to upward social mo-
bility in America. This has been the case in the past and continues
to be so now.77
It is no surprise that blacks and whites were spatially segregated
during the early twentieth century,78 when Jim Crow laws and de
facto discriminatory practices combined to enforce black exclusion
from white residential areas.79 What began as segregation in south-
ern and rural areas shifted to segregation in urban areas as blacks
migrated to northern cities.80 In 1900, in major northern cities,
74. See Harry Brighouse & Adam Swift, Equality, Priority, and Positional Goods, 116 ETHICS
471, 484–85 (2006).
75. Raj Chetty et al., Where is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational
Mobility in the United States, 129 Q. J. ECON. 1553 (2014).
76. See David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser, Are Ghettos Good or Bad?, 112 Q.J. ECON. 827
(1997).
77. See generally DOUGLASS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGA-
TION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
78. See Douglas S. Massey & Zoltan L. Hajnal, The Changing Geographic Structure of Black-
White Segregation in the United States, 76 SOC. SCI. Q. 527, 527–28 (1995) (examining of histori-
cal trends in black residential segregation).
79. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 77, at 26–42.
80. See STANLEY LIEBERSON, A PIECE OF THE PIE: BLACKS AND WHITE IMMIGRANTS SINCE
1880 (1980) (showing that cities became racially segregated with black northern migration).
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blacks were more likely to have a white than a black neighbor. They
lived in neighborhoods that were nearly ninety percent white.81
Thirty years later, most resided in cities that were nearly forty per-
cent black, and by 1970 they occupied areas that were at least sixty-
six percent black.82 By 1990, in cities including Chicago, Cleveland,
Detroit, Gary, New York, and Newark, most blacks resided in wards
that were over eighty percent black. By other estimates, which ex-
amine a larger set of cities, there was a decline in overall black
segregation by 1990, with the average black living in a neighbor-
hood that was fifty-six percent black.83 Nonetheless, neighborhood
segregation by race remains high, albeit not quite as high as it was
decades ago.84
Segregation by income has also increased. When considered
alongside data on racial disparities in income and wealth, this segre-
gation confirms what we already know: black Americans tend to be
concentrated in high poverty, low income, and predominately black
residential neighborhoods.85 Any children—black or white—grow-
ing up in such a place are likely to have less upward social mobility
than children living elsewhere.86
It is natural to assume that blacks with higher incomes will live in
less segregated neighborhoods with a lower percentage of poor
black residents.87 But this is not the case. In major U.S. metropoli-
tan areas, one finds that blacks with higher incomes are more likely
Far less racial segregation existed in the south during the nineteenth century. See MASSEY &
DENTON, supra note 77, at 25.
81. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 77, at 23.
82. See generally Douglas S. Massey, Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Conditions in
U.S. Metropolitan Areas, in 1 AMERICA BECOMING: RACIAL TRENDS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 391
(Neil J. Smelser et al. eds., 2001).
83. David M. Cutler, Edward L. & and Jacob L. Vigdor, The Rise and Decline of the Ameri-
can Ghetto, 107 J. POL. ECON. 455, 456 (1999).
84. See generally Sean F. Reardon, Lindsay Fox & Joseph Townsend, Neighborhood Income
Composition by Household Race and Income, 1990-2009, 660 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
78 (2015).
85. See JOHN R. LOGAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: THE NEIGHBORHOOD GAP FOR BLACKS,
HISPANICS, AND ASIANS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 4-9, 15 (2011).
86. Chetty et al., supra note 75, at 1607.
87. The reasons for continued neighborhood segregation are complex. To some extent,
particularly for higher income blacks, the neighborhood in which they live is a matter of
choice. Nonetheless, various factors shape this choice, including racially discriminatory real
estate and lending practices and fear of isolation, ostracism, or racism that may come with
living in predominantly white, suburban neighborhoods. For further discussion of the causes
of racially segregated neighborhoods, see, e.g., Vicki Been, Residential Segregation: Vouchers and
Local Government Monopolists, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 33 (2005) (discussing the role of gov-
ernment actors in residential segregation); Christopher Berry, Land Use Regulation and
Residential Segregation: Does Zoning Matter?, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 251 (2001) (concluding that
zoning is not a major factor in residential segregation); Rachel Blake, Illegal Steering in
America: Who’s at the Wheel?, 16 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COM. DEV. L. 95 (2007) (discussing
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to live in a poorer neighborhood than much lower income whites.88
Research on the neighborhood gap, which measures both race and
income variables, substantiates this finding. A typical black family
earning $60,000 lives in a neighborhood with an income distribu-
tion comparable to that of a white family making $11,800.89 And
regardless of their economic status—poor or affluent—whites live
in places that are eighty percent white. The average black house-
hold lives in places that are forty to fifty percent white and thirty to
fifty percent black or Hispanic. Affluent blacks live in neighbor-
hoods with less than fifty percent white residents, and between
thirty to forty percent blacks.90 So, in urban areas, higher incomes
are no guarantee that black families can avoid neighborhoods occu-
pied by their less fortunate fellow black citizens.91 This residential
segregation has far-reaching consequences for intergenerational ec-
onomic mobility where we find further evidence of racial disparities
linked to residential segregation.
A recent report presents data on racial disparities in neighbor-
hood poverty rates and their connection with the black-white
mobility gap.92 Patrick Sharkey examines this relationship by track-
ing blacks and whites born between 1955 through 1970 from
childhood into adulthood. His study asks an important question:
Does neighborhood poverty affect their ability as adults to move up
or down in income relative to their parents? A number of glaring
racial disparities emerge from this study. From 1955–1970, sixty-two
percent of blacks compared to only four percent of whites grew up
in neighborhoods with at least twenty percent poverty. And while
three in ten blacks grew up in places with at least thirty percent
poverty, no whites did. Even economically better off blacks were ex-
posed to serious poverty. Almost half of black kids whose family
income was relatively high resided in places where the poverty rate
was at least twenty percent. This was the case for only one percent
the role of “steering” by real estate agents as a major cause of residential segregation);
Camille Zubrinsky Charles, The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation, 29 ANN. REV. SOC.
167 (2003) (concluding that differences in socioeconomic status and problems of accultura-
tion play a major role in residential segregation); Margery Austin Turner, Limits on Housing
and Neighborhood Choice: Discrimination and Segregation in U.S. Housing Markets, 41 IND. L. REV.
797 (2008) (discussing housing discrimination in the forty years since the FHA).
88. See John Iceland & Rima Wilkes, Does Socioeconomic Status Matter? Race, Class, and Resi-
dential Segregation?, 53 SOC. PROBLEMS 248 (2006).
89. Reardon et al., supra note 84, at 90.
90. Id. at 85.
91. To some extent, of course, blacks may choose to live in neighborhoods with a higher
proportion of black residents, but that choice requires the sacrifice of the advantages that
come from living in wealthier areas.
92. See generally PATRICK SHARKEY, ECON. MOBILITY PROJECT, NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE
BLACK-WHITE MOBILITY GAP (2009).
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of whites.93 The numbers look rather similar for children born from
1985 through 2000. In this group, six out of ten whites compared to
one out of ten blacks have grown up in places with less than ten
percent poverty. And thirty percent of blacks live in neighborhoods
with a poverty rate of at least thirty percent. The upshot of
Sharkey’s analysis is that neighborhood poverty leads to greater
downward income mobility for blacks than whites.94
B. Disagreements About Racial Inequality
While the existence of substantial racial inequality is difficult to
deny, Americans remain deeply divided over its causes and implica-
tions. For most blacks and their allies on the Left, racial inequality
is unjust because it is the product of racial discrimination—past
and present, conscious and unconscious, individual and systemic—
that denies blacks a fair opportunity for success. Accordingly, race-
specific remedies such as affirmative action or reparations are nec-
essary and just. The postracial narrative disputes this premise,
attributing racial inequality of outcomes to the failure of blacks, in-
dividually and collectively, to take advantage of the equal
opportunities secured in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of Brown
and civil rights legislation.
1. Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Causes
Divisions about racial inequality often begin with disagreements
about its causes.95 In general terms, the Left and most blacks tend
to attribute racial inequality to agent-neutral causes; i.e., causes that
are external to and independent of individual choices and ac-
tions.96 Most whites, by way of contrast, emphasize agent-relative
explanations that place responsibility for racial inequality on factors
93. Id. at 9.
94. See id. at 3.
95. For general discussion of differing views regarding racial inequality, see JAMES R.
KLUEGEL & ELIOT R. SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT INEQUALITY: AMERICANS’ VIEWS ABOUT WHAT IS
AND WHAT OUGHT TO BE (1986); HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA:
TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS (1997); Lawrence D. Bobo & Camille Z. Charles, Race in the
American Mind: From the Moynihan Report to the Obama Candidacy, 621 AAPSS 243 (2009); Law-
rence D. Bobo et al., The Real Record on Racial Attitudes, in SOCIAL TRENDS IN AMERICAN LIFE:
FINDINGS FROM THE GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY SINCE 1972 38 (Peter V. Marsden ed., 2012).
96. Derrick Darby & Nyla R. Branscombe, Egalitarianism and Perceptions of Inequality, 40
PHIL. TOPICS 7, 9 (2012); Bobo & Charles, supra note 95, at 247.
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related to individual choices and actions.97 Of course, a substantial
number of people take a mixed point of view, attributing racial ine-
qualities to a combination of agent-neutral and agent-relative
causes. It is the existence of this “big middle”—however diverse its
members may be in practice—that gives us hope for postracial rem-
edies as a way to build coalitions around pragmatic solutions that
work to ameliorate racial inequality.
Ideological disagreements on the causes of racial inequality tend
to track broader disagreements regarding the respective roles of in-
dividuals and society in ameliorating inequality. The Left links
racial disparities to agent-neutral societal causes such as the in-
tergenerational effects of past discrimination, ongoing intentional
discrimination, implicit biases, and systemic barriers.98 This type of
explanation takes the spotlight off of blacks—or at least off of them
exclusively—and spreads responsibility for closing enduring racial
gaps across society. Most conservatives attribute racial disparities to
blacks’ failure to take advantage of opportunities afforded to them
in the wake of school desegregation and the civil rights era.99 This
type of explanation puts the spotlight on blacks individually and
collectively and holds them primarily responsible for improving
their own situation. While charity and goodwill can help, using pub-
lic taxpayer dollars, or remedial government action, to support the
97. For example, they might explain high incarceration rates for blacks as a product of
higher rates of criminality among blacks. If blacks commit more crimes, there is nothing
discriminatory about higher incarceration rates. The data, however, do not back up this as-
sumption, however widely held it may be in some circles. Indeed, indications are that whites
use drugs as much or more than blacks, yet blacks are incarcerated for drug offenses at much
higher rates. See generally Arthur H. Garrison, Disproportionate Incarceration of African Americans:
What History and the First Decade of Twenty-First Century Have Brought, 2011 J. INST. JUST. INT’L
STUD. 87, 98 (2011) (discussing disproportionate incarceration of blacks and contrasting ex-
planations based on “differential involvement (African Americans’ disproportionate
commission of crime)” with explanations based on “differential selection (African Americans
are disproportionately treated within the criminal justice system and disproportionately
targeted by policy operations or a combination of both based on race apart from actual
criminal activity)”).
98. We distinguish intentional discrimination from implicit biases and systemic barriers,
which are sometimes referred to as discriminatory or racist. By implicit bias, we refer to un-
conscious biases that we all have but which operate below the level of awareness and often
against our will or beliefs. By systemic barriers, we mean the operation of law, public policy,
and institutions built into the structure of society that we may take for granted but that sys-
tematically disadvantage blacks. Implicit bias and systemic barriers present a special problem
because they are not the product of discriminatory intent, so calling them “racist” is espe-
cially likely to produce a defensive psychological reaction and they are not legally cognizable
as a form of discrimination. See infra note 177 and accompanying text and notes 242–251 and
accompanying text.
99. See generally Darby & Saatcioglu, supra note 15.
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effort is impermissible.100 Political moderates or centrists frequently
merge these points of view by offering mixed explanations of racial
disparities that combine agent-relative and agent-neutral factors.101
Racial polarization on the causes of racial disparities is even more
firmly entrenched.102 For instance, with respect to economic dispar-
ities, whites are more likely than blacks to attribute black poverty or
socioeconomic disadvantage to lack of willpower, poor choices, lazi-
ness, or a culture of poverty than to labor market discrimination,
white privilege, or economic exploitation.103 And when considering
racial disparities in education we find a similar pattern, with whites
more often attributing them to agent-relative factors such as opposi-
tional culture, innate ability, effort, and attitudes to schooling,
rather than to discrimination, teacher or test bias, or to inferior
schools.104 Thus, for many areas of racial inequality, research con-
sistently documents a pattern in which whites are much more likely
than blacks to embrace agent-relative explanations of racial dispari-
ties while blacks attribute them to agent-neutral factors at a much
higher rate.105 To be sure, members of both racial groups also
adopt mixed explanations.106
100. This perspective has been defined as a new, post-Jim Crow racial ideology called
laissez-faire racism, a primary function of which is to legitimize persistent racial disparities. See,
e.g., Lawrence Bobo, James A. Kluegel & Ryan A. Smith, Laissez-Faire Racism: The Crystallization
of a Kinder, Gentler Antiblack Ideology, in RACIAL ATTITUDES IN THE 1990S: CONTINUITIES AND
CHANGE 15 (Steven A. Tuch & Jack K. Martin eds., 1997).
101. Social scientists have invoked a similar typology to distinguish explanations of racial
inequality. See, e.g., James R. Kluegel, Trends in Whites’ Explanations of the Black-White Gap in
Socioeconomic Status, 1977–89, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 512 (1990); Matthew O. Hunt, African-Ameri-
can, Hispanic, and White Beliefs about Black/White Inequality, 1977–2004, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 390
(2007); Bobo, supra note 15. Person-centered (or what we call agent-relative) explanations
appeal to differences in ability, innate characteristics, effort, or willingness to strive. Struc-
turalist (or what we call agent-neutral) explanations appeal to discrimination, opportunity,
and societal institutions or processes. Mixed explanations appeal to both.
102. See, e.g., PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & MICHAEL GRAY HAGEN, RACE AND INEQUALITY: A STUDY
IN AMERICAN VALUES (1985); LEE SIGELMAN & SUSAN WELCH, BLACK AMERICANS’ VIEWS OF RA-
CIAL INEQUALITY: THE DREAM DEFERRED (1991).
103. See generally Bobo, Kluegel & Smith, supra note 100.
104. Id.
105. See generally Kluegel, supra note 101.
106. For discussion of attitudes on poverty, see generally Matthew O. Hunt, The Individ-
ual, Society, or Both? A Comparison of Black, Latino, and White Beliefs about the Causes of Poverty, 75
SOC. FORCES 293 (1996); Shayla C. Nunnally & Niambi M. Carter, Moving from Victims to Vic-
tors: African American Attitudes on the “Culture of Poverty” and Black Blame, 16 J. AFRICAN AM.
STUDIES 423 (2012); Candis Watts Smith, Shifting from Structural to Individual Attributions of
Black Disadvantage: Age, Period, and Cohort Effects on Black Explanations of Racial Disparities, 45 J.
BLACK STUDIES 432 (2014).
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Research on racial attitudes about crime is especially instruc-
tive.107 One survey uses the following statements to represent agent-
relative explanations of causes of criminal conduct: “people be-
come criminals because they do not care about the rights of others
or their responsibility to society,”108 and “people turn to crime be-
cause they are lazy.”109 And it uses these statements for agent-
neutral ones: “poverty and low income in our society are responsi-
ble for much of [the] crime,”110 and “our society does not
guarantee that everyone has regular employment.”111 A greater per-
centage of whites endorsed both the “people don’t care” (88.2
percent to 73.8 percent) and the “people are lazy” explanation
(51.4 percent to thirty-seven percent).112 The reverse is true for
agent-neutral explanations where 67.4 percent of blacks and 61.7
percent of whites attribute criminal behavior to poverty and low in-
come.113 The gap is much greater for “the society doesn’t guarantee
employment” response, with 49.5 percent of blacks endorsing this
explanation compared to 24.8 percent of whites.114
Notwithstanding these ideological and racial divisions, the main
conclusion drawn from this survey is that most respondents em-
brace a mixed view of racial inequality by drawing on both agent-
relative and agent-neutral factors.115 In other words, there is a “big
middle,” however diverse and lacking in cohesion, that can be acti-
vated to support the right kinds of remedies for racial disparities. It
is this possibility that gives us hope for postracial remedies.
2. The Postracial Narrative and the Causes of Inequality
Most would agree that America aspires to become a postracial
society—one in which race no longer determines life prospects or
107. See Victor R. Thompson & Lawrence D. Bobo, Thinking about Crime: Race and Lay
Accounts of Lawbreaking Behavior, 634 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 16, 21 (2011). This








115. Nonetheless, among those persons who do adopt exclusively agent-relative or agent-
neutral explanations of racial disparities, it is expected that whites will comprise the majority
in the former category and blacks will be the majority in the latter. The crime study supports
this point too. It finds that 51.7 percent of whites and 28.8 percent of blacks attribute crime
entirely to agent-relative factors, while 32.6 percent of blacks and only 15.2 percent of whites
attribute it entirely to agent-neutral ones. Id. at 24.
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imposes barriers to equality of opportunity. The racial divide ap-
pears, however, when we ask whites and blacks about whether and
to what extent this aspiration has been realized.116 In view of persis-
tent disparities documented above, the postracial narrative depends
on minimizing agent-neutral explanations for inequality and em-
phasizing agent-relative ones.
Evidence suggests that white Americans generally have a more
optimistic perspective on the existence and achievability of racial
equality.117 In a survey taken after President Obama’s inauguration
in 2009, nearly two thirds of whites (sixty-one percent) professed
that blacks are now equal to whites and another 21.5 percent said
they would be soon.118 Black Americans were not so optimistic. Less
than twenty percent said that racial equality has been realized,
nearly half (46.6 percent) said it never will be, and barely half (53.6
percent) believed that blacks would eventually be equal to whites.119
The belief that we have nearly achieved our postracial ideal de-
pends on several factual premises related to the causes of racial
inequality. First, the postracial narrative assumes that current ine-
qualities are not attributable to past discrimination in the form of
slavery, Jim Crow laws, and other forms of intentional racism. While
the premise that the effects of past discrimination have completely
dissipated in the decades since Brown and the enactment of civil
rights legislation seems to us unrealistic, we simply cannot take for
granted that blacks and whites, or the Left and the Right, will agree
that the ongoing effects of past racial wrongs are a more proximate
cause of racial disparities than differences in individual attributes
such as will, ambition, and effort.120
A second and related premise of postracialism is that intentional
discrimination is no longer a widespread problem that presents a
significant obstacle to equality of opportunity. In Shelby County v.
Holder,121 for example, the liberal and conservative justices differed
over the prevalence and impact of racial vote dilution or other mea-
sures intended to prevent minorities from a realistic chance of
116. Similar disagreements appear along ideological lines. A recent Pew Center survey,
for example, reports that fifty-eight percent of white Republicans compared to forty percent
of white Democrats think that the nation has made significant progress on race matters.
MICHAEL DIMOCK ET AL., KING’S DREAM REMAINS AN ELUSIVE GOAL; MANY AMERICANS SEE RA-
CIAL DISPARITIES 8 (2013).
117. Lawrence D. Bobo, Somewhere Between Jim Crow & Post-Racialism: Reflections on the Ra-
cial Divide in America Today, 140 DAEDALUS 11, 29 (2011).
118. Id. at 30.
119. Id.
120. See generally Hunt, supra note 106.
121. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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getting their preferred candidates in office.122 Similar issues arise in
connection with other areas of racial inequality, for which proof of
intentional discrimination is hard to come by.
A third premise of the postracial narrative relates to the signifi-
cance of implicit biases123 and systemic barriers.124 From the
postracial perspective, even if such problems exist, they do not con-
stitute “racial discrimination” that would justify race-specific
remedies. Every disadvantaged group must overcome implicit bi-
ases, which are endemic and cannot be solved by legal remedies.125
Likewise, postracialists may doubt that implicit biases or structural
barriers—as opposed to agent-relative considerations—are the
proximate cause of racial inequalities.
In sum, whites and conservatives are far more likely than blacks
and progressives to accept the premise that we have achieved (or
have nearly achieved) our postracial aspirations. The core premises
of this postracial narrative include the following: (1) America no
longer practices formal exclusion based on racial membership; (2)
the legacy of past racial exclusion was largely rectified during the
civil rights era and in the aftermath of the Great Society programs;
(3) while overt discrimination in private spaces may still be a reality,
it is not widespread and pervasive enough to cause persistent black
disadvantage; (4) racial disparities are largely the result of agent-
122. Compare id. at 2627 (“Respondents do not deny that there have been improvements
on the ground, but argue that much of this can be attributed to the deterrent effect of § 5,
which dissuades covered jurisdictions from engaging in discrimination that they would re-
sume should § 5 be struck down. Under this theory, however, § 5 would be effectively
immune from scrutiny; no matter how ‘clean’ the record of covered jurisdictions, the argu-
ment could always be made that it was deterrence that accounted for the good behavior.”),
with id. at 2632–33 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Recognizing that large progress has been
made, Congress determined, based on a voluminous record, that the scourge of discrimina-
tion was not yet extirpated. . . . With overwhelming support in both Houses, Congress
concluded that, for two prime reasons, § 5 should continue in force, unabated. First, continu-
ance would facilitate completion of the impressive gains thus far made; and second,
continuance would guard against backsliding. Those assessments were well within Congress’
province to make and should elicit this Court’s unstinting approbation.”).
123. Thus, for example, Justice Kennedy explained that recognition of disparate impact
claims was needed to overcome the effects of “unconscious prejudices and disguised animus”
in relation to housing. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2512; see generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Linda Hamilton Krieger &
Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate
Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997 (2006). For further discussion, see infra notes 241–251.
124. For example, the practice of legacy admissions to elite universities has the effect of
favoring whites, insofar as prior admissions practices and the educational achievement gap
mean that the alumni base of those universities are predominantly white. For further discus-
sion of systemic barriers, see infra notes 241–2251.
125. Insofar as everyone confronts some kinds of implicit biases, being affected by im-
plicit biases is simply a type of bad luck to which everyone is equally susceptible.
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relative rather than agent-neutral factors such as implicit biases and
systemic barriers; and (5) race-specific remedies that may once have
been necessary to deal with discrimination, segregation, and anti-
black animus are no longer acceptable.126
Current events clearly affect public perceptions of racial pro-
gress, and survey numbers may change in ways that suggest the
prevalence of the postracial narrative is on the decline. For exam-
ple, recognition of racial issues increased from the Trayvon Martin
shooting in 2013 to the Michael Brown shooting in 2014.127 The
general trend, however, is still evident: there remains substantial
polarization regarding postracialism. In the aftermath of Ferguson,
we remained deeply divided on issues of race. Where postracialists
tend to see racial progress, and downplay the role of race in social
problems such as police violence, critics reject this. A 2014 survey
shows that an overwhelming majority of African Americans (eighty
percent) believed the Brown shooting raised issues of race com-
pared to thirty-seven percent of whites.128 And nearly twice as many
blacks (sixty-five percent) believed that police had gone too far
compared to whites (thirty-three percent). It also reveals partisan
divisions: sixty-eight percent of Democrats indicated that the shoot-
ing raised issues of race compared to only twenty-two percent of
Republicans; fifty-six percent of Democrats believed the police went
too far compared to twenty percent of Republicans.
Survey polls during the last year indicate that growing numbers
of people now characterize racism as a “big problem.”129 The per-
centage of whites (forty-four percent) holding this view has gone up
seventeen points since 2010. Yet here too there remains stark racial
polarization, as seventy-three percent of African Americans hold
this view. And a sharp partisan divide remains on the question of
126. Postracialists need not endorse all of these premises of course, and they may even
espouse additional ones including premises that contain agent-neutral considerations. For
example, some might deny (2) and add that society must provide greater educational oppor-
tunity to rectify past racial injustice. However, they will unequivocally tilt toward placing the
onus on black Americans to embrace responsibility for their disadvantage and uplift.
127. A recent survey showed that, although Americans remained divided along racial
lines, a higher percentage of both whites and blacks thought that the Michael Brown shoot-
ing raised important issues about race than thought same thing about the Trayvon Martin
shooting and, conversely, a smaller percentage of both whites and blacks thought that race
was getting too much attention. Stark Racial Divisions in Reactions to Ferguson Police Shooting,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. 4 (2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/08/18/stark-racial-divi
sions-in-reactions-to-ferguson-police-shooting/.
128. Id. at 1.
129. Across Racial Lines, More Say Nation Needs to Make Changes to Achieve Racial Equality,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/08/05/across-racial-lines-
more-say-nation-needs-to-make-changes-to-achieve-racial-equality. This poll is the source of
the data throughout the paragraph.
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whether the country should go further in affording blacks equal
rights, with seventy-eight percent of Democrats saying yes, while
fifty-one percent of Republicans say that the nation has done all
that it should. The racial gap on this question is even larger, with
fifty-three percent of whites saying the nation has not done enough
and needs to continue making changes to achieve racial equality,
compared to eighty-six percent of blacks.
Although these numbers may give reason to hope that some peo-
ple can be educated about the extent to which racism remains a
serious problem, they hardly constitute a sea-change in the long-
standing trend of racial and partisan polarization about race
matters and racial progress. The good news is that the increase in
the percentage of whites, Democrats, and Republicans that see race
as an issue that merits attention, and believe that more progress can
be made toward racial equality, creates an opportunity to channel
this energy into constructive solutions that work to address persis-
tent racial disparities. The cautionary advice, which we take
seriously, is that if these solutions prove to be too divisive they can
easily founder on the shoals of polarization. The truth we take seri-
ously in this Article is that many people accept the postracial
narrative notwithstanding evidence to the contrary. So if we are to
move forward in the face of deep polarization about race matters,
we should do so constructively, seeking to find solutions, where we
can, that promise to lift all boats.
As we discuss in the following section, the postracial narrative has
deep philosophical and psychological roots that contribute to its
influence in political discourse and equal protection jurisprudence.
Political or legal advocacy that challenges its premises directly is un-
likely to succeed, at least in the near term. This does not mean that
advocates for racial justice should abandon efforts to challenge the
postracial narrative, but it does suggest that we should also consider
alternative paths to supplement those efforts because race-specific
remedies that fly in the face of postracial premises are unlikely to
gain broad-based political support or survive the Supreme Court’s
postracial equal protection jurisprudence. Part II discusses the phil-
osophical and psychological roots of postracialism; Part III discusses
the Court’s postracial equal protection jurisprudence.
II. PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ROOTS
This Part discusses the philosophical and psychological roots of
the postracial narrative. Philosophically, we note that ideological di-
visions in the United States tend to reflect the tensions between two
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distinct streams of American constitutional thought. One stream of
thought emphasizes personal liberty (and along with it personal re-
sponsibility); the other emphasizes equality, in the sense that every
member of society is entitled to equal rights. In general terms, the
Right tends to emphasize personal liberty, while the Left tends to
emphasize equality. These differences are reflected in two distinct
conceptions of racial injustice, which have differing implications for
the postracial narrative. We then consider how the psychology of
race and racial inequality reinforces the ideological and philosophi-
cal appeal of the postracial narrative and complicates advocacy for
race-specific remedies.
A. Two Conceptions of Racial Injustice
Do racial disparities constitute racial injustice? For some blacks130
and progressives,131 the goal of racial justice is equality of outcomes.
Thus, the very existence of the racial disparities documented above
establishes the existence of pervasive racial injustice that demands
race-specific remedies. But this view of racial justice seems to con-
travene America’s deep commitment to personal responsibility and
individual merit, which requires equality of opportunity but not
equality of results.132 Indeed, those on the Right often maintain that
life is not fair, so there is no societal obligation to prevent or ame-
liorate unequal outcomes that are the result of bad luck or other
factors that make life equally fair or unfair to all.
Accordingly, we begin by distinguishing two conceptions of racial
injustice. The first pertains to the exclusion of blacks from full and
equal participation in civic, political, and social institutions that are
130. See Richard P. Eibach & Joyce Ehrlinger, Keep Your Eyes on the Prize: Reference Points
and Racial Differences in Assessing Progress Toward Equality, 32 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 66 (2006).
131. See, e.g., TIM WISE, COLORBLIND: THE RISE OF POST-RACIAL POLITICS AND THE RETREAT
FROM RACIAL EQUITY (2010) (arguing that “colorblind” policies worsen the problem of racial
inequality and that achieving racial equality requires greater race consciousness).
132. These values are obviously closely related to capitalism and the Protestant work
ethic. Like the commitment to equality, however, these values are not wholly realized in
practice; individuals do not succeed without the help of others. One source of deep ideologi-
cal disagreement is the extent to which individual success is tied to individual merit, as
reflected in the controversy stirred by President Obama’s assertion that “[i]f you were suc-
cessful, somebody along the line gave you some help. There was a great teacher somewhere
in your life. Somebody helped to create this unbelievable American system that we have that
allowed you to thrive. Somebody invested in roads and bridges. If you’ve got a business, you
didn’t build that. Somebody else made that happen.” See Aaron Blake, Obama’s “You Didn’t
Build That” Problem, WASH. POST, (July 18, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
the-fix/post/obamas-you-didnt-build-that-problem/2012/07/18/ gJQAJxyotW_blog.html.
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essential to successful outcomes. We refer to this as participatory ra-
cial injustice (PRI). The second, and more controversial, concerns
the unequal distribution of societal benefits and burdens insofar as
black Americans as a group disproportionately enjoy fewer benefits
and bear greater burdens than their white counterparts. We will call
this distributive racial injustice (DRI).133 There is a broad consensus
that PRI is improper, but there is disagreement about whether and
how much DRI should be legally and morally tolerated, and about
how it should and can be addressed in law and public policy within
our constitutional democracy.134
1. Participatory Racial Injustice
The first form of racial injustice, PRI, pertains to the systemic
state-sponsored exclusion of blacks from full and equal participa-
tion in society. There is no question that the United States has had
a long and unfortunate history of participatory racial injustice—in-
cluding slavery, Jim Crow laws, and other discriminatory practices
that systematically excluded blacks from full participation in the
benefits of society. Nor is there disagreement that any current in-
tentional racial discrimination or barriers to full participation
would constitute racial injustice.135
For well over three centuries, from 1619, when blacks were first
brought to the nation’s shores in shackles and sold on the market
as slaves, through Brown v. Board of Education136 and the Civil Rights
133. The distinction between PRI and DRI is not as sharp as we would like. Suppose that
participation in political life with the right to vote, to take just one example, is understood as
a benefit which society distributes. Political exclusion can then be equally characterized as a
participatory as well as a distributive injustice when the right to vote or otherwise participate
in the political process is burdened. More broadly, PRI will generally manifest itself in DRI.
We do not have a strong investment in the nomenclature here. But we believe that it captures
an important distinction between ways of understanding racial injustice.
134. Moreover, as we will elaborate later, one can also argue that what has been called the
Court’s “New Equal Protection” jurisprudence has evolved, in part, by reacting to this shift
from pre-Brown and pre-Civil Rights era concerns about the exclusion of blacks from Ameri-
can society to current concerns about racial disparities. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal
Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011).
135. For some libertarians on the Right, intentional discrimination by private actors is
not unjust. Thus, for example, few would argue that individuals are not allowed to consider
race in deciding whom they want to marry. Many would extend a similar liberty of association
to other decisions involving private spaces (e.g., decisions about who to adopt or even who to
have as a roommate). For those who place the greatest weight on individual liberty, this sort
of protected personal choice would extend to a broader range of individual choices, includ-
ing, for example, whom to hire. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992).
136. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Movement of the 1960s, the legal, social, and political status of
blacks as subordinate to whites was firmly cemented in law as well as
social practice. The Supreme Court’s infamous 1857 ruling in Dred
Scott v. Sanford137 that blacks were not American citizens and had no
capacity to sue in federal court epitomized this pervasive PRI. Chief
Justice Taney reviewed the history of racial subordination, conclud-
ing that:
[A] perpetual and impassable barrier was intended to be er-
ected between the white race and the one which they had
reduced to slavery, and governed as subjects with absolute and
despotic power, and which they then looked upon as so far
below them in the scale of created beings, that intermarriages
between white persons and negroes or mulattoes were re-
garded as unnatural and immoral, and punished as crimes,
not only in the parties, but in the person who joined them in
marriage.138
After the Civil War, during the occupation of the South by fed-
eral troops, there was some racial progress, particularly in the
political realm, insofar as blacks were able to run for and secure
public offices. But this limited progress evaporated, virtually over-
night, when the troops pulled out of the South in 1877, marking
the end of Reconstruction and the beginning of forcefully imposed
racial apartheid in the United States, which was deemed constitu-
tional in 1896.139 Other practices that subordinated blacks also
flourished, including peonage systems that effectively reintroduced
involuntary servitude,140 the denial of voting rights through voting
practices and requirements applied to disenfranchise blacks,141 and
the tolerance or encouragement of racial violence against blacks.142
The “impassable barrier” formally erected first with black en-
slavement, then with Jim Crow laws, would stand until 1954 when
137. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
138. Id. at 409.
139. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
140. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Peonage and Contractual Liberty, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 351 (2001).
Under this system, minor offenses, including the inability to pay fines or to repay debts, led
to imprisonment and forced labor under conditions that kept people in servitude indefi-
nitely. Although these conditions often ensnared poor and uneducated whites, blacks were
disproportionately victimized.
141. See, e.g., Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in
the Progressive Era. Part 3: Black Disfranchisement from the KKK to the Grandfather Clause, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 835 (1982).
142. See, e.g., UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH: LYNCHING IN THE SOUTH (W. Fitzhugh Brundage
ed., 1997).
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the United States Supreme Court unanimously declared the doc-
trine of “separate but equal” unconstitutional.143 This began a new
chapter in American history, the so-called “Second Reconstruc-
tion,” marked by landmark civil rights legislation and other
measures aimed to secure for blacks full and equal participation in
American society.144 But the significance of this chapter remains a
source of great controversy: some take it to have been the dawn of a
new era of genuine racial equality in America, while others take it
to have been a failure that did not achieve the full promise of
equality.
2. Distributive Racial Injustice
The second conception of racial injustice, DRI, is concerned with
equality of outcomes, i.e., the distribution of resources that individ-
uals and groups of individuals possess. The relative allotment of the
benefits and burdens of social cooperation varies—sometimes quite
substantially. Put simply, some people have more and others have
less. And as we documented above, racial inequality is prevalent
across multiple measures of outcomes.
The identification of racial injustice with racial inequality is in-
formed by what philosopher Timothy Scanlon describes as a moral
imperative of substantive equality, the idea that “people’s lives or
fates should be equal in some substantive way: equal in income, for
example, or in overall welfare.”145 This view reflects a fundamentally
different conception of equality according to which eliminating PRI
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving racial
justice.
The philosophical literature on egalitarianism is vast. And philos-
ophers have taken up numerous questions on this topic, including
what should be equalized.146 Some have also questioned whether
143. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
144. See, e.g., MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECON-
STRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945–1982 (1984).
145. T. M. SCANLON, THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 202
(2003). Of course proponents of DRI are not merely concerned with income. What’s impor-
tant here is the idea of “substantive equality,” or equality of outcomes. There are various ways
of answering the “Equality of What?” question. See generally Norman Daniels, Equality of What:
Welfare, Resources, or Capabilities?, 50 PHIL. AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 273 (1990) (dealing
with the question of substantive equality); G. A. Cohen, Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods
and Capabilities, 56 LOUVAIN ECON. REV. 357 (1990) (dealing with the question of substantive
equality). But that question is not central to our argument and we need not enter this dense
philosophical terrain.
146. See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 145; Cohen, supra note 145.
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substantive inequality is consistent with general egalitarian princi-
ples. Ronald Dworkin famously argued that people have a right to
be treated with equal concern and respect.147 A puzzle that egalitari-
ans face is how to move us from more abstract normative principles
like this one to more concrete claims involving how we should dis-
tribute welfare, resources, capabilities, or benefits and burdens.
Some egalitarians contend that inequalities of outcome are inher-
ently troubling and should be mitigated, but it is unclear that they
can make the case for doing so without relying upon other values
such as fairness or humanitarian concerns.148
Even libertarians can affirm the general normative principle that
all persons are owed equal concern and respect, where for them
this principle means respect for basic individual rights, without
thereby endorsing efforts to achieve the kind of equality of out-
comes that some egalitarians call for. So, for example, affording
black Americans equal concern and respect is entirely compatible
with unequal racial outcomes, so long as those outcomes are not
the product of PRI. This position is also consistent with versions of
egalitarianism, such as Dworkin’s, that seek to reconcile our com-
mitment to equality with our commitment to individual liberty.149
Some political philosophers, rejecting this “conservative” turn in
egalitarian political thought, have tried to defend the demand for
substantive equality in outcomes by shifting our focus to ensuring
that persons can relate to one another as equals.150 From this per-
spective, inequality of outcomes is unacceptable if it stems from,
causes, or perpetuates inegalitarian social relations that leave some
persons subordinate to or dominated by others. It has been argued,
however, that this way of resolving the puzzle, and rescuing equal-
ity, is tantamount to relying upon additional mediating values or
principles and taking equality to be something that we value instru-
mentally not intrinsically.151
147. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xii, 180–83 (1977).
148. See, e.g., SCANLON, supra note 145, at 202–08 (offering various reasons for seeking to
reduce inequalities of outcome).
149. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 283 (1981); G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906 (1989).
150. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 308
(1999); Samuel Scheffler, Choice, Circumstance, and the Value of Equality, 4 POL., PHIL. & ECON.
5, 25–26 (2005).
151. See, e.g., SCANLON, supra note 145, at 212–18 (considering the ways in which even
meritocratic differences in outcome that are not unfair might cause experiential harms that
adversely affect those who are worse off).
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3. The Link Between PRI and DRI?
Given America’s polarization on matters of race, claims for race-
specific remedies are unlikely to succeed if they are premised on
general demands for equal outcomes or on the contention that un-
equal outcomes are inherently inconsistent with egalitarian justice.
Nonetheless, even under a narrower conception focused on PRI,
equality of opportunity is an essential component of racial jus-
tice.152 Thus, mainstream egalitarians view equality of opportunity
as the best approach to reconcile the competing imperatives of in-
dividual liberty and human equality.
Indeed, many liberal egalitarians have associated DRI with the
goal of securing equality of opportunity rather than equality of out-
comes or achievements.153 So, if income is the measure, they
propose not that people have equal or nearly equal income but that
they have the same opportunity to earn income. Hence, from this
perspective, racial justice would be a matter of addressing obstacles
to equal income opportunities for blacks and whites.154
But even on this fairly modest conception, ameliorating racial in-
justice remains controversial. Part of the controversy is
philosophical: it has to do with differences of opinion on what it
means to secure equal opportunity and what counts as an impermis-
sible obstacle to it. The Right often associates equal opportunity
with removing de jure barriers to full and equal participation.155 And
they maintain that Brown, the Civil Rights movement, and Johnson’s
Great Society programs essentially accomplished this goal. The Left
takes equality of opportunity to require providing persons with the
resources and capabilities necessary to take advantage of opportu-
nity.156 To paraphrase a sentiment expressed by Martin Luther
King, Jr.: What good is having the equal opportunity to sit at a ra-
cially integrated lunch counter if a person cannot afford to buy a
cup of coffee because he cannot find work or lacks the necessary
skills for available jobs?
152. See Richard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77
(1989).
153. See, e.g., BERNARD R. BOXILL, BLACKS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 73–88 (1984); Lawrence A.
Blum, Opportunity and Equality of Opportunity, 2 PUB. AFF. Q. 1 (1988).
154. See generally JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
(2014).
155. For an account of equality of opportunity that focuses on the removal of unequal
legal constraints, see Michael E. Levin, Equality of Opportunity, 31 PHIL. Q. 110 (1981).
156. For an account of equality of opportunity that focuses on the resources and capabili-
ties to develop one’s innate abilities, see Charles Frankel, Equality of Opportunity, 81 ETHICS
191 (1971).
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Where we part company with the postracialists relates to the
causes of racial inequality in America today, which we believe are
fairly attributed to unequal opportunities. First, the ongoing effects
of generations of slavery and racial oppression continue to take
their toll on the black community, even if these effects cannot be
directly traced to particular outcomes for particular individuals.
Second, intentional discrimination on the basis of race is a persis-
tent problem, even if it has been driven underground and is no
longer officially sanctioned or overt and commonplace. Third, im-
plicit biases and structural barriers continue to deny blacks equal
opportunities for success, even if that denial is not the product of
intentional discrimination.
Postracialists reject or discount each of these points.157 Current
racial disparities, they say, are no longer attributable to past dis-
crimination, and intentional discrimination is an isolated
phenomenon, while unconscious biases and structural barriers are
not “racism” and are no different from the kinds of obstacles over-
come by other minorities. As discussed in the following section,
these postracial propositions have deep roots in the psychology of
inequality, which concerns how responses to disparities and pur-
ported injustice is grounded in efforts to safeguard positive ingroup
identity. The psychological underpinnings of postracialism make it
especially difficult to change the hearts and minds of those who
oppose race-specific remedies for racial inequality.
B. The Psychology of Disagreement about Racial Inequality
Whether racial disparities are deemed unjust turns in part on
how they are explained.158 As we observed, there is factual disagree-
ment over how to explain them as well as philosophical
disagreement about their meaning and implications. These dis-
agreements have deep psychological roots: how we interpret and
respond to inequality depend in part on how we identify ourselves
through group membership. An additional problem stems from
psychological obstacles to guilt, which include denial, shifting
blame, and differential standards of evidence.159 The psychological
roots of racial polarization give us reason to worry that differences
over the causes, meaning, and implications of racial disparities are
157. See supra note 15.
158. It also turns on the content and application of philosophical norms of justice. But
we will not take up this matter here.
159. Anca M. Miron et al., Motivated Shifting of Justice Standards, 36 PERSONALITY AND SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 768 (2010).
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intractable. Sensitivity to these psychological factors invites us to re-
think our strategy for seeking political and legal remedies.
1. Social Identity, Just World Beliefs, and Group Inequality
Group-based social identities influence our beliefs about justice,
injustice, equality, and inequality. Human beings have long sorted
themselves into “ingroups” (us) and “outgroups” (them) on the ba-
sis of gender, age, kinship, race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, and
other factors.160 For much of United States history, both law and
social practice sanctioned ingroup and outgroup sorting based on
race, with whites being the ingroup and blacks the outgroup.161
Thus, whites have historically enjoyed a disproportionate share of
the benefits of social cooperation (wealth, political power, educa-
tion, and law) while blacks have borne the lion’s share of the
burdens (poverty, political powerlessness, inferior education, and
punishment).
Notwithstanding this dark history, whites, like all individuals and
groups, want to view themselves in a positive light.162 Whether they
are able to do so under circumstances of substantial racial inequal-
ity depends in part on whether whites perceive the world that
brought about this state of affairs as just. People are generally moti-
vated to view the social world as a just and fair place, where
individuals get what they deserve, based on merit and effort, rather
than because of injustice, discrimination, systemic barriers, or im-
plicit bias.163 Sociologists have found that our so-called “just world
160. See generally KENT FLANNERY & JOYCE MARCUS, THE CREATION OF INEQUALITY: HOW
OUR PREHISTORIC ANCESTORS SET THE STAGE FOR MONARCHY, SLAVERY, AND EMPIRE (2012)
(describing the prehistoric roots and historical evolution of social hierarchies).
161. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (showing an obvious example of
this kind of ingroup and outgroup sorting in which the status of citizenship—the ingroup—
was limited to whites while blacks were relegated to the outgroup, noncitizens); see generally
IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE BEGINNING: THE DEFINITE HISTORY OF RACIST IDEAS IN
AMERICA (2016).
162. See Henri Tajfel, Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 33 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 1–4
(1982) (referring to social identity theory, an approach that associates ingroup favoritism
with a desire to view group identity in a positive light. An alternative psychological theoretical
model, which understands ingroup and outgroup relations based on a generalized desired
for group-based dominance, is called social dominance orientation. Although this is a power-
ful model, we do not address it in our exposition of the psychology of disagreement about
racial inequality.); Shana Levin & Jim Sidanius, Social Dominance and Social Identity in the
United States and Israel: Ingroup Favoritism or Outgroup Derogation?, 20 POL. PSYCHOL. 99, 102
(1999) (discussing differences between social dominance orientation and social identity
theory).
163. See MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION vii–viii
(1980).
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beliefs” vary along multiple dimensions related to our social group
identities including race, ethnicity, class, gender, age, and
religion.164
The perception that the world is not a just place can threaten our
ability to view our group in a positive light. So, for example, con-
fronting racial disparities may threaten whites’ positive image of
their ingroup, particularly if these disparities are thought to result
from unjust oppression of blacks or unearned white privilege. Con-
sequently, safeguarding this positive image will require an
understanding of the causes, meaning, and implications of racial
disparities conducive to preserving the belief in a just world. This
imperative can lead advantaged ingroups and disadvantaged out-
groups to adopt very different philosophical conceptions of when
appropriate egalitarian aims have been realized, which allow them
to guard their positive group identity.
This phenomenon is at work with regard to race, so that racial
differences may dictate the reference point used to assess progress
toward racial equality.165 Specifically, researchers find that differ-
ences in white and black Americans’ perceptions of racial progress
are rooted in two distinct reference points for judging racial gaps.
One study found that whites judge racial progress based on how far
we have come relative to our past history of racial injustice.166 Using
this reference point enables whites, as a group, to feel more upbeat
about where the nation stands now. More importantly, it fortifies
their belief that the world is now just, which protects their positive
group identity and justifies their opposition to race-specific reme-
dies.167 Black Americans, in contrast, judge racial progress relative
to an ideal of distributive equality focusing on enduring racial dis-
parities.168 And their belief that the world is not just has concrete
implications for the kinds of law and public policies they typically
favor, including race-specific remedies for inequality such as affirm-
ative action and black reparations.
In short, while whites are more likely to judge racial progress
based on how far the nation has come from slavery, Jim Crow, and
Bloody Sunday (i.e., addressing PRI), blacks are more likely to do
164. Matthew O. Hunt, Status, Religion, and the “Belief in a Just World”: Comparing African
Americans, Latinos, and Whites, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 325 (2000).
165. See, e.g., Eibach & Ehrlinger, supra note 130, at 70–72; Amanda B. Brodish et al., More
Eyes on the Prize: Variability in White Americans’ Perceptions of Progress Toward Racial Equality, 34
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 513, 514 (2008).
166. Id.
167. Joshua L. Rabinowitz et al., Why Do White Americans Oppose Race-Targeted Policies? Clari-
fying the Impact of Symbolic Racism, 30 POL. PSYCHOL. 805, 823–25 (2009).
168. Id.
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so based on an ideal of where the nation needs to be, and for them
genuine progress toward full racial equality must involve mitigating
racial disparities (i.e., addressing DRI). Each assessment seems rea-
sonable when each reference point is taken into account. Yet each
perspective has radically different implications for law and public
policy.
Thus, the philosophical and psychological roots of disagreement
over racial inequality are intertwined: (a) our social identities—and
the desire to view our ingroup in a positive light by believing in a
just world—broadly shape how the nation interprets and responds
to racial disparities and what kind of public policies we support for
addressing them;169 and (b) this psychology predicts that ingroups
and outgroups will not see eye-to-eye on the causes, meaning, or
implications of racial disparities.
2. Guilt, Responsibility, and Defending Identity Threat
Another psychological factor that reinforces the postracial narra-
tive is our desire to avoid feelings of guilt. Although collective guilt
may in some cases generate support for race-specific remedies such
as reparations,170 we believe that, on balance, emphasizing collec-
tive guilt is more likely to generate defensive reactions than to
engender broad support for race-specific remedies among whites.
Some social psychologists argue that engendering collective guilt
among whites for historical injustices against blacks from which
whites continue to benefit can motivate people to restore justice171
and contribute to reducing racist attitudes.172 Critics of this ap-
proach, on the other hand, have condemned the appeal to “white
guilt” to garner support for policies to promote racial equality.173
And some liberal philosophers, most notably Martha Nussbaum,
have argued that engaging positive emotions, such as love, might
169. JAMES R. KLUEGEL & ELIOT R. SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT INEQUALITY 12–14 (1986).
170. See, e.g., Aarti Iyer et al., White Guilt and Racial Compensation: The Benefits and Limits of
Self-Focus, 29 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 128 (2003); Adam A. Powell et al.,
Inequality as Ingroup Privilege or Outgroup Disadvantage: The Impact of Group Focus on Collective
Guilt and Interracial Attitudes, 31 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 508, 518 (2005).
171. See e.g., Bertjan Doosje et al., Guilty by Association: When One’s Group Has a Negative
History, 75 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 873–74 (1998); Janet K. Swim & Deborah L.
Miller, White Guilt: Its Antecedents and Consequences for Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action, 25
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 500, 511–13 (1999).
172. Adam A. Powell et al., supra note 170, at 519.
173. See generally SHELBY STEELE, WHITE GUILT: HOW BLACKS AND WHITES TOGETHER DE-
STROYED THE PROMISE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2006).
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better support efforts to achieve compensatory and egalitarian
goals.174
From our perspective, a critical question is whether a guilt-based
approach will be effective in causing whites to accept collective re-
sponsibility for racial inequalities. The answer to this question
depends on various factors, including whether people strongly or
weakly identify with being white and so are more or less invested in
protecting a positive group image,175 and whether they see repair-
ing historical justices as a zero sum game that may disadvantage
them, those closest to them, or ingroup members.176
The effectiveness of this approach is questionable because many
whites will deploy a range of psychological defenses against feeling
collective guilt and accepting collective responsibility for racial ine-
quality.177 Such defenses include denying responsibility for
inequality, minimizing the harm done by it, derogating blacks or
blaming them for inequality, attributing blacks’ perception that
their situation is unfair to envy, and legitimizing inequality by con-
trasting blacks with other minority groups (e.g., Latinos, Asians,
and Caribbean immigrants) that have allegedly made more out of a
bad, or relatively disadvantaged, situation.
So, various psychological forces contribute to divisions between
whites and blacks (as well as between the Right and the Left)178 over
the causes of racial inequality, the state of progress toward equality,
the link between DRI and PRI, and, consequently, views about
where we go from here. Social psychology suggests that the roots of
racial polarization are deep and unlikely to be amenable to rea-
soned argument or empirical evidence. Accordingly, an effective
174. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POLITICAL EMOTIONS: WHY LOVE MATTERS FOR JUSTICE (2013).
There is some evidence that engaging sympathy, a softer emotion rooted in “a compassionate
concern for the state of the disadvantaged,” may offer a broader basis of white support for
both compensatory and equal opportunity policy. See Iyer et al., supra note 170, at 126.
175. Nyla R. Branscombe et al., Racial Attitudes in Response to Thoughts of White Privilege, 37
EUR. J. PSYCHOL. 203, 204–05 (2007).
176. Richard P. Eibach & Thomas Keegan, Free at Last? Social Dominance, Loss Aversion, and
White and Black Americans’ Differing Assessments of Progress Towards Racial Equality, 90 J. PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 453, 458–60 (2006) (discussing evidence that when whites think that
increasing the welfare of blacks comes at their own expense, they are more inclined to see
anti-white racism as a more serious problem than anti-black racism, fueling charges of unfair
reverse discrimination); Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a Zero-
Sum Game That They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 215, 217 (2011).
177. For a summary of some of these defenses, see Derrick Darby and Nyla R. Brans-
combe, Beyond the Sins of the Fathers: Responsibility for Inequality, 38 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 121,
122–23 (2014).
178. See e.g., Jillian C. Banfield et al., Responding to Historical Injustices: Does Group Member-
ship Trump Liberal-Conservative Ideology, 44 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 30, 35–38 (2014); Sarah
Williams, Left-Right Ideological Differences in Blaming Victims, 5 POL. PSYCHOL. 573, 579–80
(1984).
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strategy to mitigate racial inequality cannot hinge on resolving dif-
ferences about its causes, meaning, and implications.
3. The Limits of Race-Specific Remedies
How do we advocate for measures to mitigate racial inequality in
view of intractable disagreements about the causes, meaning, and
implications of racial disparities? The philosophical and psychologi-
cal underpinnings of the postracial narrative suggest that race-
specific remedies are unlikely to garner broad political support.179
Consider, for example, the case for black reparations, which Ta-
Nehisi Coates brought back into the public discourse through an
influential article in The Atlantic.180
A generic way of making the case for black reparations is to link
PRI and DRI. The strategy is to argue that the racial injustices of the
past (slavery, segregation, and overt discrimination) have had far-
reaching consequences, including the substantial distributive racial
disparities that persist today. Thus, racial disparities in income,
wealth, education, crime, housing, and other areas require repara-
tions because they are the contemporary effects of past racial
wrongs.181
This argument confronts the immediate problem of establishing
the causal linkage between current inequalities and past racial
wrongs; this is harder to do the further back in time the racial
wrongs occurred. Thus, there is some debate among proponents of
reparations whether the case must be made going back to slavery or
can be based on more recent examples of racial injustice.182 Be-
cause of the obvious difficulties with identifying actual perpetrators
of past racial wrongs and linking their wrongdoing to injuries suf-
fered by particular black persons today, some proponents of
reparations have focused on more recent government policies.
179. But see Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1195, 1197–98 (2002) (advancing a powerful defense of affirmative action as a
means of achieving racial integration). While we may agree with the premises and aims of
these arguments, we think they are unlikely to gain much political traction today and are
almost certain to be rejected by the Supreme Court. See generally Parents Involved in Cmty.
Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). Thus, we do not oppose arguments for
race-specific remedies, but we doubt that they will be effective, at least in the near term.
180. Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY (June 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/.
181. See, e.g., David Lyons, Corrective Justice, Equality Opportunity, and the Legacy of Slavery
and Jim Crow, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1375, 1379–80 (2004); Thomas McCarthy, Coming to Terms With
Our Past, Part II: On the Morality and Politics of Reparations for Slavery, 32 POL. THEORY 750,
752–53 (2004).
182. See Darby, supra note 14, at 57.
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One of the most compelling cases, which received considerable
attention, involves the role of the federal government in racial dis-
crimination in housing and lending in the post-World War II era.183
This more recent racial injustice has had enduring adverse conse-
quences for black Americans as a group, including residential
segregation, less wealth, inferior schooling, poorer health, greater
exposure to crime, and inferior employment opportunities.
Even though this argument avoids the controversy involved in
trying to connect contemporary racial disparities to slavery, it re-
mains backward looking as it turns on attributing a causal
connection between this more recent past and the present. Conse-
quently, it will be a difficult sell in today’s highly polarized
society.184 If we as a nation wish to “keep it real” by recognizing the
implications of behavioral realism,185 then we cannot ignore the im-
pact of social group psychology and guilt on how individuals may
respond to this factual premise and the race-specific policies it un-
derwrites. Whatever else being race-sensitive entails, it certainly
demands that we be sensitive to how psychology shapes our under-
standing and approach to racial inequality.
As this example suggests, support for race-specific policies that
redress historical injustice, such as preferential treatment, affirma-
tive action, and reparations, generally depends on accepting a
direct causal link between past racial injustice (PRI) and present
racial disparities (DRI).186 However, the social psychology of race
and collective guilt described above suggests that many whites will
deny that such a link exists. Likewise, conservatives are more likely
than liberals to withhold support from race-specific policies that
aim to rectify past racial injustice.187
183. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 181, at 1; Jonathan Kaplan & Andrew Valls, Housing Dis-
crimination as a Basis for Black Reparations, 21 PUB. AFFS. Q. 255, 259–60 (2007).
184. See generally Darby, supra note 14, at 56–59 (discussing reparations).
185. See generally Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implica-
tions for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1119 (2006) (discussing
generally the implications of behavioral realism for legal and social justice advocacy).
186. Of course, affirmative action may be understood as a forward-looking strategy to
achieve social justice. Even viewed from this perspective, however, the obligation to address
the legacy of the past discrimination acts as the moral justification for providing preferential
treatment for racial minorities. See, e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A
Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 683, 701 (2004). Thus,
although affirmative action need not be remedial in the narrow sense of making specific
victims of past discrimination whole, and while proponents may be primarily concerned with
reducing racial disparities going forward, the moral justification for treating people differ-
ently on account of their race depends on a societal obligation to atone for past racial
wrongs. Id.
187. Indeed, the literature suggests that, by and large, the more conservative people are,
the more likely they are to deny any link between PRI and DRI. We say “by and large” be-
cause there is evidence that, in the case of black conservatives, racial group membership may
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Framing the arguments in ways less likely to provoke defensive
reactions might minimize these difficulties.188 For example, framing
racial disparities in terms of white privilege is more conducive to
gaining white support for policies that assist minorities than fram-
ing them in terms of black disadvantage.189 Focusing on white
privilege may produce support by suggesting that whites’ relatively
more favorable location is unearned, but whites may nonetheless be
motivated to reject this framing because it threatens their positive
self-regard and group image.
Likewise, to the extent that engendering collective guilt can gen-
erate support for race-specific policies, framing the issue matters.190
For example, some researchers find that when past harm is framed
as contributing to ongoing suffering, then collective guilt is height-
ened, and willingness to support making amends for historical
injustice rises.191 While this insight supports locating the harm in
the more recent rather than more distant past to give credence to
the view that suffering is ongoing, it also means that collective guilt
can be avoided, and support for reparations weakened, by framing
trump their conservative ideology—at least when considering their own minority outgroup as
opposed to other ones. Banfield et al., supra note 178, at 30; see Christine Reyna et al., Exam-
ining the Principles in Principled Conservatism: The Role of Responsibility Stereotypes as Cues for
Deservingness in Racial Policy Decisions, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 109, 111 (2005). See
also Jim Sidanius et al., Racism, Conservatism, Affirmative Action, and Intellectual Sophistication: A
Matter of Principled Conservatism or Group Dominance?, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 476
(1996). To be sure, conservatives may sometimes go along with such policies, perhaps seek-
ing to appease their liberal or minority critics, to restore their positive social group identity,
or to protect the social hierarchy or the status quo from which they benefit, but this is hardly
the norm. See generally, Rosalind M. Chow et al., Appeasement: Whites’ Strategic Support for Affirm-
ative Action, 39 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 323, (2013); Geoffrey C. Ho & Miguel M.
Unzueta, Antiegalitarians for Affirmative Action? When Social Dominance Orientation is Positively
Related to Support for Egalitarian Social Policies, 45 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 45, 451, 452 (2015).
188. Heather Golden et al., Reactions to Affirmative Actions: Substance and Semantics, 31 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 73, 75–78 (2001); see generally Brian S. Lowery et al., Paying for Positive
Group Esteem: How Inequity Frames Affect Whites’ Responses to Redistribution Policies, 1 J. PERSONAL-
ITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (2011), http://rosalindchow.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/
lowery-et-al-2012-Paying-for-positive-group-esteem.pdf (concluding that framing issue as one
of white advantage, as opposed to black disadvantage, increases white support for policies
that cause whites economic harm); C. Lausanne Renfro et al., The Role of Threat in Attitudes
Toward Affirmative Action and Its Beneficiaries, 36 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 41 (2006) (analyzing
the relationship between perceived threats and opposition to affirmative action).
189. Brian S. Lowery et al., Framing Inequity Safely: Whites’ Motivated Perceptions of Racial
Privilege, 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1237, 1238 (2007).
190. Adam A. Powell et al., Inequality as Ingroup Privilege or Outgroup Disadvantage: The
Impact of Group Focus on Collective Guilt and Interracial Attitudes, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 508, 517–18 (2005).
191. Roland Imhoff et al., When the Past is Far from Dead: How Ongoing Consequences of
Genocides Committed by the Ingroup Impact Collective Guilt, 69 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 74 (2013), http://
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/josi.12004/epdf.
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the matter differently, which whites may be motivated to do when
attending to racial disparities.
Equally important, to the extent that race-specific remedies are
perceived as a zero-sum game in which gains for blacks represent an
economic loss or decline in social status and political power for
whites, whites may only support rather weak remedies such as sym-
bolic reparations (e.g., a national apology or a slavery museum),
which fall far short of a significant redistribution of wealth.192 All of
these predictions become more complicated if we also factor in
whether whites strongly or weakly identify with their whiteness,193
and whether they are conservatives or liberals.194
As a political matter, then, arguments for race-specific remedies
are bound to run into strong opposition.195 Hence, attempting to
ground our collective responsibility to address racial inequality
through race-specific remedies in atonement for past sins is un-
likely to be successful.196 Non-race-specific strategies that do not
threaten postracial assumptions or positive group identity may
stand a better chance at gaining broader political support because
they are less polarizing. Whatever the merits of pursuing postracial
remedies when dealing with the public at large, this strategy is espe-
cially necessary in view of the Supreme Court’s postracial equal
protection jurisprudence, which imposes formidable legal impedi-
ments to race-specific remedies for racial inequality.
III. POSTRACIAL EQUAL PROTECTION
The United States Supreme Court’s equal protection jurispru-
dence is distinctly and decidedly postracial. Whatever ideological
divisions exist among the Justices on matters of race, the Court’s
precedents consistently adopt postracial doctrinal principles and
factual premises concerning the causes of current racial disparities.
192. Kitty Dumont & Sven Waldzus, Group-Based Guilt and Reparation in the Context of Social
Change, 44 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 331, 339 (2014). Indeed, as discussed further below, see
infra notes 393–400 and accompanying text, one advantage of our approach is that it changes
the nature of the zero sum game in a way that reduces racial tensions. Instead of redistrib-
uting advantage from lower class whites to lower class blacks, postracial remedies tend to
redistribute advantage from the wealthy to the less wealthy.
193. See generally Doosje, supra note 171.
194. Bert Klandermans et al., Redeeming Apartheid’s Legacy: Collective Guilt, Political Ideology,
and Compensation, 29 POL. PSYCHOL. 331, 347–48 (2008).
195. This result reflects the psychological evidence suggesting that our conflicting beliefs
about racial inequality and its causes are intractable. See supra notes 160–178 and accompany-
ing text (Part II.B.1 & 2).
196. See Darby & Branscombe, supra note 177, at 124 (arguing that psychological defen-
sive strategies can be an obstacle to backward-looking shared responsibility).
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The Court’s postracial jurisprudence sharply limits the availability
of race-specific remedies, whether as a court-ordered response to
unconstitutional discrimination or as a political solution for persis-
tent racial disparities. This postracial jurisprudence is deeply rooted
in the Court’s normative conception of equality that runs through
decades of decisions, and is not likely to change dramatically as a
result of changes in the Court’s composition.
A. The Normative Roots of Postracial Equal Protection
The law must classify people and treat them differently to achieve
public policy objectives. So, for example, it cannot be unconstitu-
tional to treat murderers differently from non-murderers. Equality
demands that we treat people who are “similarly situated” the same
way, but we may (or must) treat people differently if there is a rele-
vant difference between them. Today, many people would argue
that race is simply never, or almost never, a morally relevant differ-
ence that warrants treating people differently under the law.197
1. The Meaning of Equal Protection
Unfortunately, for much of the nation’s history, demands of
equal protection were ignored, as ideologies of racial superiority
rationalized treating whites and blacks differently in law and in
practice.198 Thus, as reflected in cases like Dred Scott, racial oppres-
sion was reconciled with equality on the theory that blacks (and
other people of color) were inferior to whites; i.e., race was a rele-
vant difference. Eventually, the United States came around to
accepting that race was indeed an improper classification for deny-
ing equality and equal protection.199 The Court’s recognition that
racial classifications are improper, however, drew on two distinct
conceptions of equal protection that have radically different impli-
cations for race-specific remedies. One conception was focused on
preventing the subordination of politically powerless groups; the
197. BERNARD WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF THE SELF: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 231 (1973). Ex-
ceptions to the general rule might include judicial remedies for unlawful racial
discrimination or choosing undercover officers of the same race to infiltrate racial gangs.
198. See generally DERRICK DARBY, RIGHTS, RACE, AND RECOGNITION 109–32 (2009).
199. Ironically, the Court now voices this pronouncement most loudly when objecting to
so-called reverse discrimination against whites. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (invalidating race-conscious school assignments
designed to alleviate de facto segregation); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989) (invalidating minority preference for government contractors).
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other was based on the right of each individual to be treated fairly
on the basis of his or her merits. Over time, the latter conception
emerged as the Court’s primary normative understanding of equal
protection.200 This approach facilitated the development of the
Court’s postracial jurisprudence.
Left-leaning liberals tend to view the normative demands of
equality and the Equal Protection Clause in terms of an an-
tisubordination principle.201 This approach is grounded in
“political process theory” and focuses on laws that disadvantage dis-
crete and insular minorities who are unable to protect themselves
in the political process.202 The antisubordination perspective fo-
cuses on laws and policies that adversely affect politically powerless
minorities because these groups are not protected by the political
process and so are likely to be the victims of prejudice and oppres-
sion. Conversely, this understanding of equal protection would
suggest a greater tolerance for laws that protect or advance the in-
terests of minorities, which are less likely to be the product of a
political process failure.
The countervailing perspective, emphasized by those on the
Right, views equal protection as an antidiscrimination principle
grounded in individual fairness.203 This perspective is skeptical of
all racial classifications—whether used for ill or good—because
race is not a morally relevant basis for treating people differently.
200. See, e.g., Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 1, 8 (2013) (“Distinctions
between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free
people, and therefore are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect. Be-
cause racial characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment, the
Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications . . . be subjected to the most rigid
scrutiny.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted); see generally Richard E.
Levy, Political Process and Individual Fairness Rationales in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Suspect Classifi-
cation Jurisprudence, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 33 (2010) (discussing the two approaches to equal
protection and highlighting the emergence of the individual fairness rationale as the domi-
nant approach in the Court’s cases).
201. Thus, for example, Owen Fiss (a liberal icon) famously argued that equal protection
should be understood in terms of a “group disadvantaging principle” that focuses on prevent-
ing the subordination of groups See generally Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 107, 108 (1976) (arguing that “the group-disadvantaging princi-
ple . . . has as good, if not better, claim to represent the ideal of equality” than individual
fairness and that it “takes a fuller account of social reality” and “more clearly focuses the
issues that must be decided in equal protection cases”).
202. The classic statement of this approach came in U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144,
152–53, n.4 (1938), which suggested that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition” that justified more exacting scrutiny of legislation.
203. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976) (“[W]e have difficulty under-
standing how a law establishing a racially neutral qualification for employment is nevertheless
racially discriminatory and denies ‘any person . . . equal protection of the laws’ simply be-
cause a greater proportion of Negroes fail to qualify than members of other racial or ethnic
groups.”).
432 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 50:2
From this perspective, laws that disproportionately burden minori-
ties are unfair only if they are the product of discriminatory intent,
while race-specific laws that favor minorities are justified only if they
are narrowly focused remedies for actual victims of discrimination.
While early decisions invalidating discriminatory laws and poli-
cies mixed both rationales, the individual fairness rationale became
dominant in the 1970s and 1980s.204 Thus, for example, in Loving v.
Virginia,205 which invalidated the state’s law prohibiting interracial
marriage, the Court emphasized the way in which the law subordi-
nated blacks and other racial minorities.206 More recent cases,
however, tend to emphasize the right of individuals to be treated
fairly without regard to race, which is a morally irrelevant character-
istic. This point is especially evident in the Court’s affirmative
action cases.207 The emergence of the individual fairness rationale
did not require the Court to repudiate cases like Loving, however,
because the result is also consistent with the individual fairness
rationale.208
These two conceptions of equal protection, antidiscrimination
and antisubordination, are closely linked to PRI and DRI, respec-
tively. The individual fairness rationale, rooted in suspicion toward
all racial classifications, focuses on the denial of full participatory
rights based on the irrelevant consideration of race (PRI). In con-
trast, the political process rationale, grounded by concerns to
safeguard politically vulnerable groups, suggests that inequality of
outcomes (DRI) may be the product of a political process that does
204. See generally Levy, supra note 200.
205. 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
206. See id. at 11 (“The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving
white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justifica-
tion, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”).
207. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (reasoning that “all
governmental action based on race—a group classification long recognized as ‘in most cir-
cumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited,’—should be subjected to detailed judicial
inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been in-
fringed”) (citation omitted); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(“The Richmond Plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete for a fixed percent-
age of public contracts based solely upon their race. To whatever racial group these citizens
belong, their ‘personal rights’ to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by a
rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public decisionmaking.”) (citation
omitted).
208. Ironically, the Court’s equal protection cases at times continue to invoke the an-
tisubordination principle in other contexts, particularly in some of its recent cases involving
same sex marriage and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See, e.g., United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“The Constitution’s guarantee of equality
‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.”) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996) (same).
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not allow full participation by disadvantaged groups (PRI). Thus,
the current dominance of the individual fairness rationale corre-
lates with the postracial understanding that only PRI violates the
principle of equality.209
2. Postracial Implications
The postracial implications of the individual fairness rational are
well illustrated by the following passage from Justice Alito’s dissent-
ing opinion in United States v. Windsor:210
Underlying our equal protection jurisprudence is the cen-
tral notion that “[a] classification ‘must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference hav-
ing a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike.’” The modern tiers of scrutiny—on which Wind-
sor and the United States rely so heavily—are a heuristic to
help judges determine when classifications have that “fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation.”
So, for example, those classifications subject to strict scru-
tiny—i.e., classifications that must be “narrowly tailored” to
achieve a “compelling” government interest—are those that
are “so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate
state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy.”
In contrast, those characteristics subject to so-called inter-
mediate scrutiny—i.e., those classifications that must be
“‘substantially related’” to the achievement of “important gov-
ernmental objective[s]”—are those that are sometimes
relevant considerations to be taken into account by legislators,
but “generally provid[e] no sensible ground for different
treatment,” . . . .
Finally, so-called rational-basis review applies to classifica-
tions based on “distinguishing characteristics relevant to
209. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 493, 559 (2003) (“The individualist impulse in equal protection thus offers an escape
from confronting the depressing degree to which race influences the lives of members of
historically subordinated groups. It invites us instead to bathe in a sunnier worldview in-
formed by ideals of universal human potential.”).
210. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675. Reproducing this lengthy block quotation in its entirety
is necessary to illustrate the basic point that race has been omitted altogether from Justice
Alito’s detailed summary of equal protection doctrine.
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interests the State has the authority to implement.” . . . We
have long recognized that “the equal protection of the laws
must coexist with the practical necessity that most legislation
classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvan-
tages to various groups or persons.”211
Although this passage is taken from a dissenting opinion, Justice
Alito’s conception of the meaning of equal protection aptly summa-
rizes decades of precedents that will be discussed in greater detail
below. The present discussion is meant to highlight the postracial
elements of Justice Alito’s account of equal protection doctrine.
First, the passage itself is, quite literally, postracial in the sense
that Justice Alito does not mention race at all and race is irrelevant
to the exposition of equal protection doctrine. Although the pas-
sage is stripped down—removing citations, parentheticals, and
some text to conserve space—the term “race” (or “racial”) does not
appear in the discussion at all. Justice Alito did quote Parents In-
volved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,212 a case that
involves race, when stating the test for strict scrutiny, but in so do-
ing omitted any mention of race or racial classifications. Justice
Alito also cited Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion in Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,213 including a parenthetical quotation
that references skin color: “ ‘It would be utterly irrational to limit
the franchise on the basis of height or weight; it is equally invalid to
limit it on the basis of skin color.’”214 But this reference to skin
color came in a case involving disabilities, and treats race as func-
tionally equivalent to factors such as height or weight.
While Windsor is not a case about race, accounts of equal protec-
tion doctrine typically acknowledge the central role of race,
especially in relation to strict scrutiny, even when other classifica-
tions are involved.215 Given the importance of race in the history of
the Fourteenth Amendment and in the evolution of equal protec-
tion doctrine, the complete omission of any mention of race or
211. Id. at 2716–17 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
212. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). It is telling, perhaps, that Justice Alito chose a case invalidating
race-specific remedies for segregated schools.
213. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
214. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2717 (quoting 473 U.S. at 452) (Stevens, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Stevens’s use of skin color in this context tracks Justice Alito’s conception of equal
protection as prohibiting arbitrary classifications.
215. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996) (discussing classifica-
tions based on sex in relation to classifications based on race); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440–42 (1985) (discussing race in summary of equal protection
doctrine in case involving discrimination based on disability).
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racial classifications from Justice Alito’s discussion of equal protec-
tion doctrine is striking.
Second, and relatedly, Justice Alito’s description of the doctrine
separates the principle of equal protection from its historical ori-
gins as a means of protecting blacks from racial injustice. There can
be no doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment, including the Equal
Protection Clause, was adopted to secure the basic rights of the
newly freed slaves and confer congressional authority to prevent ra-
cial oppression in the aftermath of the Civil War.216 But in Justice
Alito’s account, race has been demoted from the animating pur-
pose of the Equal Protection Clause to one example of the kind of
irrelevant considerations that will not justify differences in treat-
ment. This profoundly ahistorical understanding of equal
protection is especially striking insofar as Justice Alito is often al-
igned with other conservative Justices in advocating for an historical
approach to constitutional interpretation.217
Third, the discussion closely follows the normative perspective
that differences in treatment under the law violate equal protection
only when they are not justified by differences between people that
are relevant to legitimate public policy objectives. This concept of
equality is closely aligned with the individual fairness rationale for
equal protection and ignores questions of political process or
powerlessness. Accordingly, this account of the doctrine is con-
cerned exclusively with differences in treatment (PRI), so
differences in outcome (DRI) are not relevant to the equal protec-
tion inquiry.
In short, this analysis illustrates the general point, which we de-
velop in the sections that follow, that—whatever ideological
divisions exist among the Justices on matters of race—the Court’s
underlying theory of equal protection is distinctly and decidedly
postracial. From this perspective, racial classifications violate the
216. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“The central purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct
discriminating on the basis of race.”); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT 342 (1985) (labeling “racial justice” as the “central purpose” of the Reconstruction
Amendments).
217. Indeed, in the same dissenting opinion, Justice Alito advanced historical arguments
against recognizing the right of same sex couples to marry as protected by the Due Process
Clause. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2715 (“It is beyond dispute that the right to same-sex marriage
is not deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”). One might have expected con-
servative Justices to argue for a narrow historical understanding of equal protection and
oppose an expansive conceptual approach, as they have in regard to the expansion of sub-
stantive due process. Such an originalist approach, however, would create complications for
other components of equal protection doctrine that conservative Justices favor, such as strict
scrutiny of affirmative action programs.
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principle of equal protection not because our past history of dis-
crimination tells us they are instruments of racial oppression and
injustice, but rather because (in a “postracial world”) race is not a
legitimate consideration in shaping public policy. This postracial
conception of equal protection manifests itself in the Court’s prece-
dents through postracial doctrinal principles and postracial factual
premises.
B. Postracial Doctrinal Principles
In view of the Court’s underlying conception of equal protection,
it is hardly surprising that the resulting doctrinal principles are con-
sistently postracial. Under this doctrine, equal protection prohibits
only a very narrowly defined category of PRI—intentional (de jure)
racial discrimination by the state. As a result, judicial remedies for
racial disparities are seldom available and, conversely, race-specific
political remedies for racial inequality are generally prohibited.
1. The Limited Scope of Equal Protection
From the beginning, the Court construed the Equal Protection
Clause as limited to “state action.”218 Accordingly, the Constitution
itself affords no remedies for private acts of discrimination that are
tolerated by the state, so long as the state itself is not complicit in
some way.219 Indeed, even though the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment makes relatively clear that one of its purposes was to
authorize congressional action to protect the newly freed slaves
from the Ku Klux Klan and other private groups perpetrating racial
violence, the Court held that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
did not empower Congress to prohibit private acts of discrimina-
tion.220 Accordingly, federal civil rights laws prohibiting private acts
218. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24–25 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542, 544–45 (1875). A similar limitation applies when asserting individual rights claims
against the federal government. See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374
(1995) (concluding that Amtrak was an arm of the government for purposes of applying the
First Amendment).
219. E.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 178–79 (1972) (holding that Equal
Protection Clause did not prohibit racial discrimination by state-licensed private club but that
state enforcement of racially restrictive membership rule was invalid).
220. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 53–54 (1883); see also United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that record of domestic violence against women did not sup-
port creation of federal remedies for violence against women because offenses were
committed by private actors, not the state).
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of discrimination have generally been upheld under the commerce
power instead.221
In addition, the Court has held that only explicit or intentional
racial discrimination triggers strict scrutiny. Critically, claims based
on disparate impact are treated as racial classifications only if the
plaintiff can prove that a facially neutral law or policy was adopted
“because of” (not merely “in spite of”) its racially disproportionate
impact.222 Unless discriminatory intent is proved, the rational basis
test applies and state action is ordinarily valid not withstanding its
disparate impact.223 Accordingly, for example, neighborhood
school policies that result in de facto school segregation are not
unconstitutional unless the plaintiffs can prove that the purpose of
the neighborhood school policy was to achieve racial segregation in
the schools.224
While intentional racial discrimination is clearly prohibited, dis-
criminatory intent is especially difficult to prove. Given its illegality,
discriminatory intent is seldom, if ever, explicit. In rare cases, the
disparate impact of a law may itself prove discriminatory intent,225
but only if the result cannot be explained by any nondiscriminatory
motive.226 Although the Court has identified some indirect means
of proving intent, such as substantive or procedural irregularities,227
discriminatory intent is nearly impossible to prove in practice.
Consider the problem of discriminatory exercise of peremptory
challenges, which contributes to the disproportionate punishment
221. E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
222. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987).
223. See id.; Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
224. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 211 (1973). Equally important, the creation
of separate suburban school districts insulates those districts from desegregation with
predominantly black urban districts. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 725 (1974) (hold-
ing that interdistrict remedies for segregated schools are not available unless there was an
interdistrict violation); Cedric Merlin Powell, Milliken, “Neutral Principles,” and Post-Racial De-
terminism, 31 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. ONLINE 1 (2015) (criticizing Milliken as an
early example of postracialism). A related consequence is that reliance on local funding for
schools perpetuates the advantages of wealthier, predominantly white suburban districts.
225. See Gomillon v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347–48 (1960) (concluding that redrawing
of city boundaries into a grotesque, twenty-eight-sided shape that excluded virtually all blacks
was discriminatory); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (concluding that laun-
dry licensure violated equal protection where all applicants of Chinese descent were denied
licenses and virtually all others were granted licenses).
226. See Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (concluding that although veteran’s
preference beneficiaries were over ninety-eight percent male, the statistical pattern did not
establish discrimination based on sex because the desire to benefit veterans was a legitimate
alternative explanation for the disparity).
227. See infra notes 319–322 and accompanying text (discussing proof of discriminatory
intent under Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
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of black crime discussed above. Recognizing the difficulties of prov-
ing discriminatory intent in this context, in Batson v. Kentucky228 the
Court established a special burden-shifting regime for equal protec-
tion challenges to peremptory challenges in jury selection.229 In
practice, however, the Court’s burden-shifting approach has done
little to prevent discrimination in jury selection.230 Indeed, even
when the evidence of racial discrimination is overwhelming, crimi-
nal defendants often face a variety of hurdles in challenging the
racial composition of their juries.231
Federal (and state) civil rights statutes fill in some of the gaps in
constitutional equal protection principles. For example, various
statutes, such as the Civil Rights Acts of 1964232 and 1870,233 pro-
hibit private acts of racial discrimination. To the extent that these
statutes require proof of intentional discrimination, they suffer
from the same problems of proof as constitutional remedies under
the Equal Protection Clause. The Batson regime described above,
for example, is modeled on the burden shifting regime the Court
established for employment discrimination claims under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act.234 Under this regime, black employees can
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that they
were denied a position or promotion for which they were qualified
228. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
229. Under this regime, a criminal defendant can make out a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation if the prosecution’s exercise of peremptory challenges exhibits a pattern of excluding
people of a particular race, in which case the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide a
race-neutral explanation, at which point the party challenging the exercise of the challenge
then must discredit the race-neutral explanation and prove intentional discrimination. See,
e.g., Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328–29 (2003) (“First, a defendant must make a
prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race[;
s]econd, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for
striking the juror in question[; and t]hird, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court
must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.” (emphasis added)
(citations omitted); see also Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2199 (2015) (“The opponent of the
strike bears the burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation . . . .”) (citation omitted).
230. The main problem is that it is easy to come up with race-neutral explanation and
courts defer to those explanations. See generally Nancy S. Marder, Batson Revisited, 97 IOWA L.
REV. 1585, 1588–91 (2012) (describing ineffectiveness of Batson); Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson
in Practice: What We Have Learned about Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 447 (1996) (analyzing data and concluding that Batson has been ineffective).
231. See Foster v. Chapman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1740 (2016) (reversing state court’s denial of
Batson claim based on clear evidence of discriminatory intent).
232. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201(b),78 Stat. 241 (July 2, 1964).
233. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 2, 16 Stat. 140.
234. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishing burden
shifting regime for indirect proof of discrimination under Title VII). This sort of claim
should be distinguished from disparate impact claims, which are based on statistical evidence
that a neutral practice or policy disproportionately burdens a protected class.
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and that a white person filled the position or promotion. The bur-
den then shifts to the employer to come forward with a business
justification for the decision, at which point the plaintiff bears the
ultimate burden of proving that the business justification was a pre-
text for discrimination.235 This burden has proven difficult to
overcome in practice.236
Some statutes go further and provide for claims based upon dis-
parate impact (or discriminatory effects) without proof of
discriminatory intent.237 The recognition of such claims,238 which
are more closely aligned with DRI than PRI, provides some relief
from the rigors of proving intent. Nonetheless, the Court has been
careful to limit the availability of such remedies through various
procedural and other requirements. Thus, for example, although
the Court recently recognized disparate impact claims under the
Fair Housing Act in Texas Department of Housing and Cmty. Affairs v.
The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,239 it also emphasized that “dis-
parate-impact liability has always been properly limited in key
respects,” such as an expansive defense based on business necessity,
the need to specifically identify a policy that causes the disparate
impact, a “robust” causation requirement, and limitations on
remedies.240
More fundamentally, as will be discussed more fully below, dispa-
rate impact claims are constitutionally suspect to the extent that
they entail race-specific remedies that are not narrowly tailored to
remedy past intentional discrimination.
235. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (explaining that
“[t]he plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion” in Title VII cases based on the McDonnell
Douglass framework).
236. See Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 317 (2010) (arguing that
“the courts’ evidentiary dilution and its procedural reinforcement has become a dangerous
force for Title VII plaintiffs to contend against in proving pretext for discrimination”); see
generally. Barbara Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decision-
making, 104 YALE L.J. 2009 (1995) (arguing that proof of intent requirement cannot be
overcome in cases of “transparently white subjective decision making”).
237. Examples include the Voting Rights Act, § 2, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (prohibiting prac-
tices that have the effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race); the Fair Housing
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), 3605(a); and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-2.
238. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (recognizing disparate impact
claims under Title VII).
239. 135 S. Ct. 250, 2522–24 (2015).
240. See also infra notes 291–298 and accompanying text (discussing limitations of dispa-
rate impact claims in the context of remedies for economic disparities).
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2. Implicit Bias and Systemic Barriers
Intentional discrimination is not the only thing that prevents
blacks from full participation in the benefits of society. Of particu-
lar concern for present purposes are implicit biases and systemic
barriers, which impede black success.241 The principles governing
equal protection doctrine provide little or no basis for challenging
these factors that contribute to black inequality and disadvantage.
The effects of implicit biases are well documented by studies
showing, for example, that otherwise identical resumes are treated
less favorably when job applicants’ names appear to be black than
when they appear to be white.242 This sort of bias does not indicate
malicious intent; indeed, our implicit biases affect our judgments
without our awareness and often against our values and desires.243
This sort of implicit bias is the natural byproduct of the way peo-
ple process knowledge and experience. Cognitive science tells us
that we organize and synthesize information into “schemata”—“or-
dered patterns of mental representations that encapsulate all our
knowledge regarding specific objects, concepts, or events.”244 When
confronted with a problem or decision, we match the circumstances
to an appropriate schema and use it to fill in gaps in the available
information. So long as race remains a salient factor, it pervades the
schemata we use to evaluate others.245
241. We focus on these concerns because they are socially constructed, in contrast to
naturally occurring barriers that may be regarded as “acts of God.” As will be discussed below,
implicit biases are to some extent “built in” to our mental processes, and in that sense they
are naturally occurring as well. Nonetheless, the salience of race as a basis for schemata is in
many ways the product of social norms that reinforce it.
242. See, e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 10; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Con-
tent of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (citing studies to argue that current law provides
inadequate protection against cognitive biases); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458 (2001) (discussing second gener-
ation manifestations of workplace bias as a structural, relational, and situational one); see
generally MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLIND SPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD
PEOPLE (2013) (discussing the implications from the Implicit Association Test, a computer-
based assessment that detects unconscious biases); GEOFFREY BEATTIE, OUR RACIST HEART?:
AN EXPLORATION OF UNCONSCIOUS PREJUDICE IN EVERYDAY LIFE (2013) (discussing how im-
plicit biases based around race exist in the psyches of even the most liberal, educated and
fair-minded); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foun-
dations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006) (discussing implicit bias and its bearing on discrimination
law).
243. E.g., Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Compo-
nents, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1989).
244. John Sweller et al., Cognitive Architecture and Instructional Design, 10 EDUC. PSYCHOL.
251, 257 (1998).
245. See generally Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psy-
chology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241 (2002) (discussing recent science developments that suggest
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By definition, however, this sort of unconscious or implicit bias is
unintentional and therefore cannot violate equal protection under
current doctrine. This is true even when statistical analysis demon-
strates that implicit biases are likely at work, as reflected in
McCleskey v. Kemp,246 in which the Supreme Court held that racial
disparities in the imposition of the death penalty did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Although statistical analysis demonstrated
that race was a factor in the imposition of the death penalty, it did
not show that the specific defendant was the victim of intentional
racial discrimination.247
A related problem concerns systemic barriers, meaning struc-
tures and practices that tend to disadvantage blacks, whether or not
they are adopted or maintained with that intent. Examples include
reliance on neighborhood school policies and local funding that
perpetuates inequality in educational opportunities, use of stand-
ardize tests that may be racially biased,248 or legacy admissions
policies at elite institutions of higher education.249 Systemic barriers
and implicit biases may interact, especially when systemic practices
afford broad discretion to individual decision makers whose im-
plicit biases may be at work.250
While such structures and practices may in some cases be chosen
or maintained with discriminatory motives, intentional discrimina-
tion is typically impossible to prove. More fundamentally, even in
implicit bias at work in advocacy situations); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Cate-
gories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1161 (1995) (discussing the biased employment decisions arise from unintentional cog-
nitive bias); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (discussing unconscious nature of racism and
the need for a judicial test reflecting the role of implicit bias).
246. 482 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1987).
247. Id. at 297 (concluding that the study in question was “clearly insufficient to support
an inference that any of the decision makers in McCleskey’s case acted with discriminatory
purpose”).
248. See generally THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phil-
lips eds., 1998) (discussing the role of test bias against minority students as a contributing
factor to the standardized test score gap between black Americans and white Americans). But
see Jennifer C. Braceras, Killing the Messenger: The Misuse of Disparate Impact Theory to Challenge
High-Stakes Educational Tests, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1111 (2002) (arguing against use of disparate
impact theory to challenge standardized tests, because the tests are only tools that have both
costs and benefits to the minority students achievement, and discounting the tests entirely
would be the equivalent of “killing the messenger” by ignoring the educators’ ability to exer-
cise discretion in utilizing the tool).
249. See, e.g., John D. Lamb, The Real Affirmative Action Babies: Legacy Preferences at Harvard
and Yale, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 491 (1993).
250. Thus, for example, the discretion afforded to police officers in regard to traffic stops
may facilitate the influence of implicit biases. See, e.g., EPP, MAYNARD-MOODY & HAIDER-MAR-
KEL, supra note 49.
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the absence of discriminatory intent, policies and practices that per-
petuate the effects of past discrimination or reinforce existing
inequalities erect systemic barriers to full participation by blacks.
Doctrinally, however, they do not violate equal protection. Con-
versely, race-specific responses to these effects may be held invalid
under equal protection doctrine.251
3. Race-Specific Remedies
Equal protection doctrine places severe restrictions on race-spe-
cific judicial remedies to combat implicit bias and systemic barriers.
After some uncertainty about the appropriate level of scrutiny for
affirmative action programs and other race-specific policies in-
tended to mitigate racial disparities, the Supreme Court has held
that “strict scrutiny” applies.252 Accordingly, race-specific remedies
are nearly always constitutionally invalid.253
Strict scrutiny requires that the purposes supporting race-specific
remedies must be compelling.254 As an initial matter, we might con-
sider remedying the effects of racial discrimination to be a
compelling purpose and there is little doubt that courts may order
race-specific remedies in response to findings of explicit discrimina-
tion by state actors.255 However, the Court has held that such
251. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585–87 (2009) (holding that city’s refusal to
certify results of promotion exam based on concern over disparate impact claims was an
insufficient justification for disparate treatment of white firefighters).
252. In Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), the Court upheld an affirmative action
program notwithstanding the purported application of strict scrutiny. Some observers argue
that the level of scrutiny in Grutter was not truly strict. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster,
Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 565–70
(2007) (arguing that Grutter did not properly apply the traditional narrow tailoring require-
ment under strict scrutiny).
253. Professor Gerald Gunther famously described strict scrutiny as “strict in theory and
fatal in fact.” See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
Although this characterization has been challenged as an empirical matter, even this study
concluded that race-based affirmative action programs survived strict scrutiny only about
twenty-seven percent of the time, and many of those cases involved judicial remedies for
government action found to be intentional discriminatory. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory
and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV.
793, 839, 836–37 (2006).
254. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720
(2007) (“[I]n order to satisfy this searching standard of review, the school districts must
demonstrate that the use of individual racial classifications in the assignment plans here
under review is ‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a ‘compelling’ government interest.”) (citation
omitted).
255. Thus, for example, race-specific remedies for de jure school segregation are consti-
tutionally valid. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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purposes are only compelling when the state itself is guilty of inten-
tional discrimination,256 and few state actors are willing to concede
to a constitutional violation to justify their use of affirmative ac-
tion.257 Critically, moreover, affirmative action cannot be used as a
means to overcome implicit biases or systemic barriers.
Under Grutter v. Bollinger,258 affirmative action programs may be a
constitutionally permissible means of achieving diversity in higher
education, but this possibility is quite limited.259 As an initial matter,
higher education is a narrow field, and Grutter does not extend even
to educational opportunities in elementary or secondary schools.260
More broadly, race-specific remedies are largely off the table in
other key areas, particularly employment discrimination.261
Even if there is a compelling purpose because of past discrimina-
tion by state actors or because diversity in higher education is at
issue, the requirement that race-specific remedies be narrowly tai-
lored makes it very difficult to sustain them. Such remedies cannot
be over or under inclusive and can only be used if there are no non
256. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498–506 (1989) (holding that
remedying the past societal discrimination was not a compelling governmental interest that
could support an affirmative action program, and that such a remedial purpose was compel-
ling only if the state itself was guilty of discrimination or at least a passive participant in it).
257. Nonetheless, race-specific remedies for past discrimination by state actors are some-
times at issue as a result of litigation, in which case the judicial order or consent decree must
still meet the narrow tailoring requirement. See, e.g., In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimina-
tion Emp’t Litig., 20 F.3d 1525, 1539–43 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that remedying past
racial discrimination in employment by city was a compelling interest to support consent
decree, but that decree was not narrowly tailored because it unduly trammeled on rights of
white workers and did not pursue less discriminatory alternatives).
258. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
259. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (remanding for
consideration of whether affirmative action program was narrowly tailored to meet the state’s
compelling interest in educational diversity); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (up-
holding consideration of race as a factor in admissions as narrowly tailored to meet the state’s
compelling interest in educational diversity).
260. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 724–25
(2007) (emphasizing that Grutter “relied upon considerations unique to institutions of higher
education” and criticizing the lower courts for ignoring this “limitation[ ] on its holding”).
261. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating state
municipal policy favoring minority contractors); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a,
515 U.S. 200 (1995) (remanding federal preference for minority contractors for application
of strict scrutiny). Although these cases set aside race-specific remedies for government con-
tractors, they are equally applicable in employment cases. See, e.g., Kohlbek v. City of Omaha,
447 F.3d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Because Omaha employs the use of racial classifications
in situations where there is no identified past discrimination, we hold that its affirmative
action plan, as it applies to promotional decisions, is not narrowly tailored to further the goal
of remedying past discrimination.”).
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race-specific alternatives.262 Accordingly, race-specific remedies are
seldom available as a means of combating racial inequality.
Indeed, the Court’s treatment of race-specific remedies threatens
to undermine statutory remedies based on disparate impact, insofar
as combatting disparate impact necessarily entails some effort to
achieve racially balanced results. Because this sort of effort typically
requires explicit consideration of race, such remedies may them-
selves run afoul of statutory and constitutional limits, as reflected in
Ricci v. DeStefano.263 More broadly, Justice Scalia suggested that stat-
utory disparate impact remedies are unconstitutional insofar as
they effectively require race-specific responses.264
C. Postracial Factual Premises
Although the postracial doctrinal principles of the Supreme
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence limit its scope, they would
permit narrowly tailored race-specific remedies for racial inequality
that is the result of intentional discrimination. Even accepting this
limitation, many blacks and their allies on the Left believe that race-
specific remedies are justified because they attribute racial inequali-
ties such as those we have documented to intentional
discrimination, including both the continuing effects of past dis-
crimination and current intentional discrimination. The Supreme
262. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420–21 (2013) (emphasizing that, on remand, affirmative
action in admissions could be upheld only if less discriminatory alternatives were ineffective).
Although Grutter suggested a somewhat more lenient version of this requirement, Fisher
seemed to reassert the strict version of the narrow tailoring requirement. Compare Grutter, 539
U.S. at 339 (“Narrow tailoring does, however, require serious, good faith consideration of
workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks.”); with
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420–21 (rejecting district court’s application of strict scrutiny in part
because it “deferr[ed] to the University’s good faith in its use of racial classifications”).
263. 557 U.S. 557, 585–93 (2009) (holding that city’s refusal to certify results of promo-
tion exam based on concern over disparate impact claims was an insufficient justification for
disparate treatment of white firefighters).
264. See id. at 594–96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); Richard Primus, The Future of Dispa-
rate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010) (discussing implications of Ricci for the
constitutional validity of disparate impact); Wencong Fa, The Trouble with Racial Quotas in
Disparate Impact Remedial Orders, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1169, 1190 (2015) (arguing that
judicially imposed quotas as remedies for Title VII disparate impact claims must satisfy strict
scrutiny); Eang L. Ngov, When “The Evil Day” Comes, Will Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provision Be
Narrowly Tailored to Survive an Equal Protection Challenge?, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 541 (2011)
(concluding that “the disparate impact provision [of Title VII] is unlikely to pass the nar-
rowly tailored requirement and risks being invalidated”). Although the Court recently
interpreted the Fair Housing Act as providing for disparate impact claims in Texas Dep’t of
Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015), it did so by a slim
5-4 majority.
WINTER 2017] Postracial Remedies 445
Court has recognized this point in principle,265 but has in practice
rejected the factual premises that would justify broad use of race-
specific remedies. To illustrate this point, we discuss the Court’s
treatment of school desegregation and the Voting Rights Act.
1. The End of School Desegregation
The need for race-specific remedies for legally segregated
schools in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education was evident, and
the Court approved broad remedial authority for federal district
courts overseeing school desegregation lawsuits.266 These efforts
were hampered by resistance from local officials and the inability of
courts to order interdistrict remedies (which facilitated “white
flight”), but did lead to the end of legally mandated segregation
and some progress integrating the schools. In the 1990s, however, a
series of decisions made it easier for school districts to end judicial
desegregation orders, even though the likely consequence would
be the resegregation of schools as a result of segregated housing
patterns.267
First, in Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Public Schools, Independent
School Dist. No. 89 v. Dowell,268 the Court adopted a relatively lenient
standard for dissolving desegregation decrees. Under this standard,
“[t]he District Court should address itself to whether the Board had
complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was
entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been
265. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992) (concluding that adoption of race-
neutral university admissions policies was insufficient to eliminate the effects of past discrimi-
nation and identifying neutral practices that had been retained even though their original
purpose was discriminatory).
266. Resisting the retreat from desegregation is also a hard sell politically, insofar as many
people, not just some members of the Court, believe that agent-relative factors having to do
with blacks themselves rather than racial discrimination or anti-black prejudice best account
for racial disparities in education, residential racial segregation, and in other areas. See Der-
rick Darby & Argun Saatcioglu, Race, Justice, and Desegregation, 11 DU BOIS REV. 87 (2014).
267. The Governmental Accountability Office has documented the resegregation of
schools in a recent study. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-345, K–12 EDUCA-
TION: BETTER USE OF INFORMATION COULD HELP AGENCIES IDENTIFY DISPARITIES AND ADDRESS
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (2016), www.gao.gov/assets/680/676745.pdf (discussing recent data
showing that from 2000–01 to 2013–14 “the percentage of all K–12 public schools that had
high percentages of poor and Black or Hispanic students grew from nine to sixteen percent”
and that ”[t]hese schools were the most racially and economically concentrated: seventy-five
to one hundred percent of the students were Black or Hispanic and eligible for free or re-
duced-price lunch . . .”); see also id. (finding that “compared with other schools, these schools
offered disproportionately fewer math, science, and college preparatory courses and had dis-
proportionately higher rates of students who were held back in 9th grade, suspended, or
expelled”).
268. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
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eliminated to the extent practicable.”269 Moreover, this test does
not have to be applied to the system as a whole, but rather requires
relinquishment of judicial oversight as to those parts of a previously
segregated district that have achieved unitary status.270
Second, in applying this test to determine whether a district has
achieved partial unitary status, the Court has made clear that good
faith compliance and the elimination of the vestiges of past discrim-
ination does not mean that schools have to be desegregated in fact
or that predominantly minority schools have to produce equal edu-
cational outcomes. Thus, in Freeman v. Pitts,271 the Court held that
resegregation of schools as a result of segregated housing patterns
was not a reason to maintain judicial supervision of a school system
under the Dowell standard.272 Equally important, in Missouri v. Jen-
kins,273 the Court held that lack of academic progress in
predominantly minority schools was not a relevant consideration in
determining whether a district had achieved partial unitary sta-
tus.274 The Court’s analysis in these cases reflects the underlying
factual assumption that “demographic forces” and “external fac-
tors” are unrelated to past or present intentional discrimination.
This postracial factual premise is analogous to the concept of
proximate cause in torts, and places the burden on parties seeking
to maintain judicial oversight to prove that current racial disparities
are caused by past intentional racial discrimination. Given the com-
plex factors at work in such matters, this burden is impossible to
carry in practice. In addition to limiting the ongoing availability of
judicial remedies for past racial discrimination,  this premise means
that voluntary efforts to desegregate schools are constitutionally sus-
pect, as reflected in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School Dist. No. 1.275
269. Id. at 249–50. The Court rejected the traditional standard for dissolving injunctions,
which permitted the dissolution of an injunction only upon a showing of a “grievous wrong
evoked by new and unforeseen conditions.” Id. at 246–47 (citing the standard established in
United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)). That standard was too restrictive for
the school desegregation context in view of “[c]onsiderations based on the allocation of
powers within our federal system . . . .” Id. at 248.
270. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
271. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
272. Id. at 495–96.
273. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
274. Id. at 102.
275. 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (invalidating race-based school assignment policy intended to
overcome de facto school segregation).
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2. Voting Rights
Another case in which postracial factual premises were promi-
nently on display is Shelby County v. Holder,276 in which the Supreme
Court invalidated the formula for determining the applicability of
the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act.277 These pro-
visions were put in place as a remedy for discriminatory voting
procedures and practices that were used to suppress black voting.
The provisions were race-specific in the sense that they focused on
particular jurisdictions with a history of suppressing black voters.
The preclearance procedure required changes in voting prac-
tices to be approved by the Justice Department before they could
take effect. This statutory procedure provided enhanced protection
against the suppression of black voters in two ways. First, it allowed
the federal government to block measures that had the effect of
diluting or suppressing black voters without any proof that those
measures were intentionally discriminatory. Second, it was a proac-
tive remedy that prevented suppression before it happened, rather
than relying on lawsuits challenging the validity of measures after
they were adopted.
The Court’s reasoning in Shelby County began with the postracial
factual premise that although “voting discrimination still exists . . . ,
‘the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current
needs.’”278 The coverage formula of the Act failed to meet that re-
quirement because:
Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically . . . . In
the covered jurisdictions, “[v]oter turnout and registration
rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of
federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office
at unprecedented levels.” Northwest Austin, 557 U.S., at 202.
The tests and devices that blocked access to the ballot have
been forbidden nationwide for over 40 years.279
276. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
277. These provisions, which are found in § 5 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a), apply to
covered jurisdictions as defined in § 4 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b). By invalidating the
coverage formula, the Court prevented the implementation of the preclearance provision as
well, although that provision might be reanimated if Congress could craft a coverage formula
that would satisfy the Court, which we consider to be an unlikely sequence of events.
278. 133 S. Ct. at 2619 (quoting Northwest Austin Muni. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557
U.S. 193, 203 (2009)). In other words: “That was then; this is now.”
279. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625; see also id. at 2627–28 (citations omitted):
The formula captures States by reference to literacy tests and low voter registration
and turnout in the 1960s and early 1970s. But such tests have been banned nationwide
for over 40 years. And voter registration and turnout numbers in the covered States
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Because the preclearance requirement treated some states differ-
ently from others with respect to matters traditionally within the
states’ sovereign authority, moreover, the Court placed a high bur-
den on Congress to justify the scope of the preclearance
requirement under the coverage formula.280
The impact of Shelby County is substantial even though § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act was amended in 1982 to incorporate an “effects”
test that would not require proof of discriminatory intent. Under
the current provision, no voting practice or procedure “shall be im-
posed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right . . . to vote on
account of race or color . . . .”281 Subsection (b) then specified that
a violation of subsection (a) is established “if, based on the totality
of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens . . . in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect repre-
sentatives of their choice.”282
While these provisions ease the burden of proving intentional
discrimination, § 2 has not prevented states from adopting voter ID
laws or engaging in political gerrymanders that disproportionately
burden black voters. Soon after the decision in Shelby County, for
example, Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas all im-
plemented or adopted strict voter ID laws that had previously been
blocked by § 5.283 To be sure, some or all of these laws may be even-
tually ruled invalid under § 2, as in the case of the Texas voter ID
law.284 Nonetheless, the invalidation of § 4, which prevents the en-
forcement of § 5’s preclearance requirement, puts the expense and
have risen dramatically in the years since. Racial disparity in those numbers was com-
pelling evidence justifying the preclearance remedy and the coverage formula. There
is no longer such a disparity.
280. See id. at 2827–31 (rejecting government’s and dissent’s arguments that evidence
supported the reauthorization of the preclearance provisions and related coverage formula).
281. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (previously codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)).
282. Id. § 10301(b). This subsection, however, contains a proviso specifying that “nothing
in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers
equal to their proportion in the population.” Id. The extent to which members of a protected
class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance that
may be considered.
283. See, e.g., Tomas Lopez, ‘Shelby County’: One Year Later, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE
(June 24, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/shelby-county-one-year-later. The
same article details examples of local redistricting efforts that tended to dilute black voting.
284. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (2015). Although Veasey concluded that the voter ID
law had a discriminatory effect in violation of § 2, the Court of Appeals indicated that such a
finding would not necessarily require invalidation of the law:
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burden of proving a violation on those who argue against a law,
which may remain in effect for a period of time even if eventually
invalidated.285
The key point for present purposes is that the Court regarded
the passage of time and progress towards eliminating racially dis-
criminatory voting practices and procedures as sufficient to require
that race-specific remedies for discriminatory voting practices and
procedures be justified on the basis of current discrimination.286
This is a distinctly postracial factual premise.
D. Postracial Equal Protection and
Remedies for Racial Inequality
The postracial principles and factual premises of the Supreme
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence have critical implications
for efforts to redress racial inequality. First, and most fundamen-
tally, racial disparities in outcome (DRI) are not regarded as racial
discrimination unless there is proof of discriminatory intent. Sec-
ond, proving intentional discrimination is ordinarily difficult, as it
requires either proof that past racial discrimination is the proxi-
mate cause of current racial inequality or proof of current intent,
which is hard to come by because people now know better than to
leave a proverbial “smoking gun.” Third, because equal protection
is limited to intentional discrimination, implicit biases and systemic
barriers that contribute to current racial disparities and black disad-
vantage do not provide the basis for an equal protection claim.
After finding that SB 14 was enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose, the district
court fully enjoined SB 14’s implementation, with the exception of several sections of
the law that do not relate to photo identification. . . . That remedy is potentially
broader than the one to which Plaintiffs would be entitled if, on remand, the district
court only found that [the law] has a discriminatory effect in violation of Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act.
Id. at 517 (citing Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 200, 203 (2008) (noting
that, in the Section 2 context, “petitioners have not demonstrated that the proper remedy—
even assuming an unjustified burden on some voters—would be to invalidate the entire
statute”)).
285. In Veasey v. Abbott, for example, although the district court enjoined enforcement of
the Texas voter ID law shortly before the November 2014 election, the court of appeals
stayed that order and allowed the law to be applied for that election. See id. at 496 (explain-
ing that “this court granted the State’s emergency motion for stay pending appeal,
grounding its decision primarily in ‘the importance of maintaining the status quo on the eve
of an election’”).
286. See, e.g., Derrick Darby, Uncovering the Voting Rights Act: The Racial Progress Argument in
Shelby County, 25 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 329 (2015) (documenting the Court’s racial progress
argument for invalidating the coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act).
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Fourth, even if proponents are able to convince politicians or other
policymakers that race-specific measures are needed to address the
ongoing effects of past discrimination, counterbalance implicit bi-
ases, or break down systemic barriers, such remedies are subject to
strict scrutiny and likely to be declared unconstitutional.287
Given that the Court is narrowly divided,288 proponents of race-
specific remedies might have been tempted to hold out for a
change in the Court’s composition. But even President Obama’s
nomination of a moderately liberal Justice to replace Justice Scalia
faced obstruction in the Senate and the prospect that the Court will
become more liberal any time soon seems increasingly remote,
given the results of the most recent election.289 In any event, a
change in the composition of the Court would not be likely to pro-
duce a dramatic repudiation of the Court’s postracial equal
protection jurisprudence. As reflected in the previous discussion,
that jurisprudence is grounded in a normative vision of individual
fairness that has been developed through a series of precedents
that have accumulated since the 1970s. Thus, while a change in the
composition of the Court might make it somewhat more receptive
to race-specific remedies in marginal cases, a broad based repudia-
tion of postracial equal protection is unlikely. The Court’s
postracial equal protection jurisprudence is likely to remain a sub-
stantial obstacle to the implementation of race-specific remedies to
address the racial disparities discussed in Part I.
287. Under strict scrutiny, however, the only compelling purposes that can sustain such
measures are (1) remedying specific acts of intentional discrimination by the state, or (2)
diversity in higher education. Even if such purposes exist, moreover, proponents must prove
that such measures are necessary in the sense that there are no race-neutral alternatives and
that the particular remedy is narrowly tailored in the sense that they are neither over nor
under inclusive. See supra notes 252–264 and accompanying text.
288. As in many other ideologically charged areas of constitutional law, the key vote
seems to be Justice Kennedy. The four “liberal” Justices (Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and
Sotomayor) are more receptive to remedies for racial inequality, while the three “conserva-
tive” Justices (Alito, Roberts, and Thomas) are not. One advantage of our approach, though
not the aim of it, is that it may appeal to Justice Kennedy, who has taken a moderate position
that is consistent with what Reva Siegel has called the “antibalkanization” principle. See infra
notes 420–424 and accompanying text. In view of the election results, Justice Scalia’s replace-
ment is likely to be a conservative as well, reinforcing Justice Kennedy’s role as the crucial
swing vote.
289. See Carol E. Lee & Kristina Peterson, Republican Leaders Stand Firm on Vow to Block
Obama’s Supreme Court Pick, WALL STREET J. (March 16, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
obama-to-pick-merrick-garland-to-fill-supreme-court-seat-sources-say-1458136919.
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1. Economics
Postracial equal protection limits the available judicial and politi-
cal remedies for economic inequality. To illustrate this point, we
will focus on employment as a key requirement for and indicator of
economic success.
Judicial remedies for racial disparities in employment are lim-
ited. The Constitution itself provides no remedies at all for private
employment discrimination and prohibits only intentional discrimi-
nation by government actors. Insofar as intentional discrimination
is ordinarily impossible to prove and implicit biases and systemic
barriers are constitutionally irrelevant, constitutional litigation pro-
vides little or no recourse for economic inequality.290 Although
statutory provisions, particularly Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
prohibit racial discrimination by private employers and permit
some disparate impact claims,291 these statutory remedies are lim-
ited in critical ways.292 Thus, for example, it is especially difficult to
challenge discretionary hiring practices,293 even though studies
show that implicit biases adversely affect blacks during hiring
decisions.294
Conversely, race-specific political remedies for economic ine-
quality are generally unconstitutional. Affirmative action in
290. See supra notes 218–227 and accompanying text.
291. Individual claims based on specific hiring decisions follow the framework from Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801–03 (1973), and Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Under this framework, the plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case by showing that he or she is a member of a protected class, that the plaintiff was quali-
fied or performing to expectations, or that the employer took an adverse employment action.
If so, then the burden shifts to the employer to produce evidence of a legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the action, in which case the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion in
establishing that supposedly race-neutral explanation is a pretext. In addition, plaintiffs may
rely on statistical evidence of disproportionate impact, if they can identify a specific practice
with exclusionary effects.
292. See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69
(2011) (arguing that the reliance on frameworks to analyze discrimination claims has be-
come a rote sorting process that screens out potentially valid claims); George Rutherglen,
Abolition in a Different Voice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1476 (1992) (observing that usefulness of
disparate impact remedies was limited by Supreme Court decisions “that imposed procedural
barriers in the way of class actions, eliminated seniority systems from the scope of the theory,
and made the plaintiff’s initial showing of adverse impact much more complicated”); see
generally MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., 1 EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.29, 567 (5th ed. 2014) (discussing
various procedural requirements that “are complex and sometimes seem to thwart the overall
purpose of federal antidiscrimination laws”).
293. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (holding that class certifica-
tion was inappropriate when employment decisions were made pursuant to discretion of
local managers); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989) superseded by
statute on other grounds, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (concluding that racial imbalance in workforce
was insufficient evidence to establish prima facie case).
294. See supra notes 242–245 and accompanying text.
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government employment must survive strict scrutiny, and is uncon-
stitutional unless the government concedes that it was guilty of
racial discrimination and links the remedy to the victims of that
discrimination.295 Voluntary affirmative action by private employers
may be permissible under Title VII, but only as a temporary mea-
sure “designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in
traditionally segregated job categories,”296 which limits the ability to
adopt race-based hiring practices to counter disparate impact
problems.297 Indeed, the tension between the effective prohibition
of affirmative action and the recognition of disparate impact claims
has placed statutory disparate impact remedies under a constitu-
tional cloud.298
2. Criminal Justice
Likewise, postracial equal protection limits the available judicial
and political remedies for racial inequality in the criminal justice
system. Difficulty proving discriminatory intent makes it nearly im-
possible to challenge practices that contribute to policing,
prosecution, and punishments that disproportionately burden
blacks. Many of these problems are a product of the war on drugs,
which has taken a particular toll on blacks.299
The criminal justice system is replete with discretionary decisions
that allow implicit biases and hidden discrimination to flourish.300
This begins with racial profiling in policing, which has been docu-
mented in interventions such as traffic stops, which all too
295. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to
federal affirmative action program); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate affirmative action program by state actor); see
supra notes 252–262 and accompanying text.
296. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979). In
addition, such a program may not unduly trammel the rights of the majority. See also Johnson
v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). See generally ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 292, at
§ 2.19.
297. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594–96 (2009) (invalidating decision to ignore
test results so as to hire racial minorities); see supra notes 263–264 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 263–264 and accompanying text.
299. See Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 27 (“The War
on Drugs foreseeably and unnecessarily blighted the lives of hundreds of thousands of young,
disadvantaged Americans, especially black Americans, and undermined decades of effort to
improve the life chances of members of the urban black underclass.”); see also supra notes
60–68 and accompanying text.
300. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position”:
Social Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, and Race, 46 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23, 23–33
(2014).
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frequently turn violent and even deadly.301 Likewise, prosecutorial
discretion, the exercise of peremptory challenges, and other discre-
tionary actions contribute to the disproportionate incarceration
and execution of blacks. Even legislative actions, such as especially
harsh penalties for “crack cocaine”—which fall almost exclusively
on blacks—contribute to the problem.302
As a constitutional matter, it is difficult, if not impossible, to chal-
lenge such actions. Policies that are not explicitly racial, such as
harsh sentences for crack, are not subjected to heightened scrutiny
absent proof of discriminatory intent. Statistical analysis of discre-
tionary actions is insufficient to prove intentional discrimination
under McCleskey v. Kemp.303 And although Batson v. Kentucky304
adopted a kind of indirect proof framework for analyzing peremp-
tory challenges under which a pattern of excluding blacks would
require the prosecution to articulate race-neutral justifications, the
Court’s broad acceptance of subjective justifications as race-neutral
and its refusal to find pretext has made this remedy ineffective.305
3. Education
Education is a paradigmatic example of postracial equal protec-
tion in action. Once de jure racial segregation was prohibited in
Brown v. Board of Education, the focus was on remedying those viola-
tions without regard to other factors that impaired educational
301. See EPP, MAYNARD-MOODY & HAIDER-MARKEL, supra note 49.
302. Originally, Congress adopted a 100-to-1 ratio, in which one gram of crack cocaine
was treated as the equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine, which led to disproportion-
ately higher sentences for black drug defendants. See Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of
Guidelines Sentencing; No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 205–06 (1991) (arguing
that disproportionately higher sentences for black offenders was caused in part by the
100–to–1 ratio between crack and powder cocaine). Some argued that high mandatory mini-
mum sentences for crack were attributable to racism. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Cocaine,
Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995); but see Randall Kennedy, The State,
Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1268–69 (1994)
(arguing that because “blacks as a class are disproportionately victimized” by traffic in crack
cocaine, “blacks as a class may be helped by measures reasonably thought to discourage such
conduct”). Although the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–220, 124 Stat. 2372
(2010), reduced this disparity, crack was still punished at an 18-to-1 ratio, and even this
change came too late for those convicted and sentenced under the 100-to-1 ratio.
303. 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987).
304. 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986); see supra notes 228–231 (describing test). The Batson test is
based on the McDonnell Douglas test from Title VII. See supra notes 234–235 and accompany-
ing text.
305. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More
Than the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075
(2011); Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court’s Utter Failure To Meet the
Challenge of Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 501 (1999).
454 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 50:2
equality. Equally important, having decided that the vestiges of de
jure discrimination have been removed to the extent practicable,306
the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence now stands as a barrier
to race-specific efforts to integrate schools or mitigate racial dispari-
ties in education achievement and attainment.
As a practical matter, for example, the interaction between segre-
gated housing patterns, on the one hand, and policies favoring
neighborhood schools and local funding of school districts, on the
other, mean that black school children are often concentrated in
underfunded and underperforming schools.307 But under Milliken
v. Bradley,308 even de jure discrimination does not ordinarily permit
interdistrict remedies that respond to white flight.309 Equally impor-
tant, interdistrict funding disparities are generally permissible,
insofar as the rational basis test applies unless racial discriminatory
intent has been shown.310 Accordingly, the Court’s postracial equal
protection jurisprudence provides little recourse against the un-
derfunding of schools that serve predominantly black students.311
Likewise, as discussed above, voluntary efforts to combat de facto seg-
regation through race-based school assignments are impermissible
under Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No.
1.312
To be sure, underfunded and underperforming schools are but
one of many factors that contribute to the educational achievement
gap. Some of these factors are internal to the educational system,
insofar as implicit biases also affect the progress of black school
children.313 Thus, for example, the imposition of discipline tends to
fall more heavily on black school children and interfere with their
306. See supra notes 268–275 and accompanying text.
307. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public
Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597 (2003).
308. 418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974) (holding that interdistrict remedies for segregated
schools are not available unless there was an interdistrict violation).
309. See supra notes 266–267 and accompanying text.
310. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973); Kadrmas v.
Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 462–63 (1988).
311. Some state courts have been more receptive to claims based on unequal funding in
light of their own constitution’s provisions regarding the funding of public schools, which
have been interpreted to require equitable and adequate funding. See generally Derrick Darby
& Richard E. Levy, Slaying the Inequality Villain in School Finance: Is the Right to Education the
Silver Bullet?, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351 (2011).
312. 551 U.S. 701, 723 (2007) (invalidating race based school assignment policy intended
to overcome de facto school segregation); see supra notes 252–264 and accompanying text
(discussing application of strict scrutiny to race-specific remedies).
313. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism and the Conversation about the
Racial Achievement Gap, in IMPLICIT BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 115 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J.
Smith eds., 2012).
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educational progress.314 Other factors, of course, are extrinsic to
the educational system, such as family background and educational
levels (which correlate strongly to education achievement), health
and nutrition, and neighborhood resources.315 As with other areas
of inequality, the Court’s postracial equal protection jurisprudence
stands as a barrier to race-specific remedies for such problems.
4. Neighborhoods
As reflected in the previous discussion, neighborhood segrega-
tion is connected to and has much in common with racial
inequality in public schools. Hence the limits of postracial equal
protection in the two areas are similar as well. There are few judicial
remedies available for housing segregation, and race-specific politi-
cal remedies are virtually nonexistent in this field.
As a constitutional matter, equal protection prohibits intentional
discrimination by public officials, but does not apply to private
housing decisions in the absence of state action. Thus, for example,
legally mandated neighborhood segregation is clearly unconstitu-
tional.316 In addition, although the Constitution does not prohibit
racially restrictive covenants, it does prevent the state from enforc-
ing them.317 As in other areas, however, proof of intentional
discrimination is difficult to obtain.318
Indeed, the leading Supreme Court decision describing the
kinds of proof that may support a finding of discriminatory intent is
314. See, e.g., Janel A. George, Stereotype and School Pushout: Race, Gender, and Discipline
Disparities, 68 ARK. L. REV. 101, 104 (2015) (describing factors that make “African American
girls the fastest-growing segment of the juvenile justice system”); David Simson, Exclusion,
Punishment, Racism, and Our Schools: A Critical Race Theory Perspective on School Discipline, 61
UCLA L. REV. 506 (2014).
315. See, e.g., Darby & Levy, supra note 311, at 374–76 (discussing various factors that con-
tribute to unequal educational outcomes).
316. Ironically, the Court invalidated a residential segregation law in the height of the
Jim Crow era. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). We say “ironically” because the
Court did not rule that the ordinance in question (which prohibited blacks from moving into
predominantly white neighborhoods and whites from moving into predominantly black
ones) violated equal protection. Instead, the Court concluded that the law violated the prop-
erty rights of the white owner. Id. at 78 (asking, rhetorically, “can a white man be denied,
consistently with due process of law, the right to dispose of his property to a purchaser by
prohibiting the occupation of it for the sole reason that the purchaser is a person of color
intending to occupy the premises as a place of residence?”).
317. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
318. Thus, notwithstanding the FHA, racial discrimination in housing remains a serious
problem. See Florence Roisman, Keeping the Promise: Ending Racial Discrimination and Segrega-
tion in Federally Financed Housing, 48 HOW. L. J. 913, 916 (2005) (citing study in 2000 showing
substantial discrimination against blacks and hispanics in the rental and sale of housing).
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Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.,319 in which the Court concluded that a city’s denial of a re-
zoning permit for public housing did not violate equal protection.
Under Arlington Heights, disparate impact is a “starting point” but
does not itself prove intentional discrimination in the absence of a
“clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race . . . .”320
In the absence of such a pattern, courts may consider the historical
background of a decision, which may “reveal[ ] a series of official
actions taken for invidious purposes” in light of the sequence of
events or procedural and substantive irregularities.321 Finally, the
legislative or administrative record may contain explicitly discrimi-
natory statements.322
The Fair Housing Act prohibits racial discrimination in many pri-
vate real estate transactions323 and, in light of Texas Department of
Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project,
Inc.,324 permits disparate impact claims. Nonetheless, as the Court
emphasized, “disparate-impact liability has always been properly
limited in key respects that avoid the serious constitutional ques-
tions that might arise under the FHA, for instance, if such liability
were imposed based solely on a showing of a statistical disparity.”325
Among other things, “[j]ust as an employer may maintain a work-
place requirement that causes a disparate impact if that
requirement is a ‘reasonable measure[ment] of job performance,’
so too must housing authorities and private developers be allowed
319. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
320. Id. at 266.
321. Id. at 267.
322. Id. at 268.
323. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (prohibiting discrimination). The scope of the prohibition is
defined by 42 U.S.C. § 3603 to include all dwellings except specified exemptions, which are
generally limited to sale or lease of single-family residences or rooms in owner-occupied resi-
dences without the use of real estate brokers or agencies. To some extent, these limits reflect
the need to ground the FHA in the commerce power by linking it to economic activity with
interstate dimensions, because under the state action doctrine the Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power is not available to support regulation of private activity. See United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that record of domestic violence against women
did not support creation of federal remedies for violence against women because offenses
were committed by private actors, not the state).
324. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). The Court concluded that the text and history of the statute
indicated that its prohibition on housing discrimination should be construed in the same way
that Title VII and the ADEA had been construed. An earlier per curiam decision, Town of
Huntington, N.Y. v. Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P., 488 U.S. 15 (1988), upheld a circuit
court decision finding a violation, based on a disparate impact theory, that the city’s only
explanation for a zoning requirement was inadequate. In Huntington, however, the city con-
ceded the applicability of disparate impact under the statute and the Court did not reach the
question whether disparate impact was the proper test. Id.
325. Id. at 2522 (citation omitted).
WINTER 2017] Postracial Remedies 457
to maintain a policy if they can prove it is necessary to achieve a
valid interest.”326
Conversely, the Court’s jurisprudence limits the validity of race-
specific remedies for discrimination in residential housing, insofar
as such remedies must survive strict scrutiny. Thus, for example, in
Walker v. City of Mesquite,327 the Fifth Circuit invalidated a lower
court remedial order directing that public housing be located in a
predominantly white neighborhood.328 Achieving residential inte-
gration through race-specific measures is especially problematic
insofar as it may require preferences for whites in black neighbor-
hoods as well as blacks in white neighborhoods.329 Nonetheless,
lower courts appear to be receptive to race-specific outreach and
marketing efforts designed to promote integration.330
IV. POSTRACIAL REMEDIES FOR RACIAL INEQUALITY
In view of the foregoing considerations, “progressives must retool
and think creatively about different approaches to racial justice.”331
Taking this call for action seriously, we argue that postracial reme-
dies, which focus on the manifestations of racial inequality and seek
politically feasible and constitutionally sound solutions, offer prom-
ise.332 This is not to say that postracial remedies should replace
326. Id. at 2523.
327. 169 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. 1999).
328. But see United States v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 239 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir.
2001) (upholding the use of credits against housing goals when future housing credits would
be awarded to city only when tenants were moved to areas with specified ethnic percentages).
329. See, e.g., United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding
that preference for whites could not be justified by duty to integrate housing); United States
v. Charlottesville Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 718 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. Va. 1989) (same);
Burney v. Hous. Auth., 551 F. Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (invalidating placements of whites
and blacks designed to maintain integration); see generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, Color-
blind Segregation: Equal Protection as a Bar to Neighborhood Integration, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 841
(2004).
330. See South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater South Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d
868 (7th Cir. 1991); Reese v. Miami–Dade County, No. 01-3766-CIV, 2009 WL 3762994, *11
(S.D. Fla. 2009); Raso v. Lago, 958 F. Supp. 686 (D. Mass. 1997), aff’d 135 F.3d 11 (1st Cir.
1998); Tyus v. Robin Constr. Corp., No. 92-C-2423, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16736 (N.D. Ill.
1992). Indeed, federal regulations now require federally subsidized housing programs to em-
ploy affirmative marketing plans. See 24 C.F.R. § 200.620 (providing that all FHA programs to
“[c]arry out an affirmative program to attract buyers or tenants” which “shall typically involve
publicizing to minority persons the availability of housing opportunities regardless of race,
color, religion, sex, handicap or familial status or national origin, through the type of media
customarily utilized by the applicant, including minority publications or other minority out-
lets which are available in the housing market area”).
331. Barnes, Chemerinsky & Jones, supra note 26, at 1001.
332. Samuel Bagenstos has examined a similar approach that he calls “universalism,” rec-
ognizing its potential value while noting its limitations as well. See generally Bagenstos, supra
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other strategies for ameliorating racial inequalities, but rather that
they are an essential means to achieve near-term benefits for real
people in the here and now. Because postracial remedies are not
race specific, they take the philosophical, psychological, and juris-
prudential reality of the postracial narrative seriously. Nonetheless,
building coalitions will require advocacy that is sensitive to the psy-
chology of race, as well as the legal constraints that limit the use of
nominally neutral measures as a pretext for racial preferences.
A. Pragmatic Postracial Remedies
The search for postracial remedies is, at bottom, a pragmatic
one, in the sense that it seeks to build consensus around solutions
that work. This pragmatism has both a methodological and a sub-
stantive component.333 Methodologically, pragmatism begins by
identifying the problem to be addressed (in this case black disad-
vantage), and then takes an incremental, experimental, and
evidence-based approach to finding solutions.334 Substantively, this
approach shares pragmatism’s commitment to working together to
solve problems in pursuit of a common good.
1. Methodological Pragmatism
Methodologically, postracial remedies begin with the problems
that plague the black community—such as economic disadvantage
and poverty, mass incarceration, lagging educational achievement,
note 6; see also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987) (arguing for policies that benefit the underclass of all
races).
333. There is a rich philosophical tradition of pragmatist thought with both methodologi-
cal and substantive elements. Reviewing this tradition and staking out a detailed version of
pragmatism is not necessary to our project, which is consistent with the general principles of
pragmatism and need not conform to any particular version of it. To be sure, there have
been many players on this terrain. See generally WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR
SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING (1907); JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927);
JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION (1935). For an application of pragmatism to
race matters, see CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF
PRAGMATISM (1989). Most pragmatists, even those like West whose left-leaning politics take
them outside the mainstream of American politics, nonetheless recognize the virtue of prag-
matism in building consensus and coalitions to solve problems that advance the cause of
justice.
334. This is typically the focus of legal pragmatism. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003) (articulating pragmatic approach to public policy); SYD-
NEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ACHIEVING DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE
REGULATION (2014) (same).
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and residential segregation—and seek to find solutions that will
work in the real world. Thus, for example, programs that focus on
improving outcomes in underperforming schools hold the poten-
tial for helping individual children and, in the process, helping to
close the achievement gap, which would tend to increase upward
economic mobility.335
The causes of racial inequality are complex, interconnected, and
disputed. Accordingly, postracial remedies must be multifaceted
and address a variety of factors. In keeping with methodological
pragmatism, we are agnostic as to the ideological premises of any
given remedy, provided that the remedy works in practice.
Here, one oft-cited advantage of our decentralized system of gov-
ernance is the ability of different jurisdictions to experiment with
different policy solutions for social and economic problems.336 It is
expected that conservative states and localities will try conservative
solutions premised on agent-relative explanations, focused on per-
sonal responsibility, and implemented through the private sector.
Conversely, we might expect liberal or progressive states to try pro-
gressive solutions that focus on combating discrimination,
countering implicit biases, and removing systemic barriers.
This process makes it possible to identify programs and ap-
proaches that work, build coalitions to support them, and
encourage their adoption in other jurisdictions. Finding postracial
remedies will not be easy. Neither ideological nor racial disagree-
ments will magically disappear and postracial remedies cannot
eliminate racial inequality overnight. Nonetheless, the pursuit of
postracial remedies can provide an effective means for addressing
racial inequalities and can provide tangible benefits in the near
term for those who bear the brunt of racial inequality.
2. Intentional Discrimination, Implicit Biases, and
Structural Barriers
While postracial remedies are not race specific, they do not re-
quire society to ignore race or racial inequalities. Thus, postracial
335. See, e.g., PA. ASS’N OF SCH. BDS., EDUC. RESEARCH & POLICY CTR., RAISING ACHIEVE-
MENT IN UNDERPERFORMING SCHOOLS (2011), https://www.psba.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/09/raising_achievement_in_underperforming_schools-10102011.pdf (identifying a va-
riety of “research-grounded school improvement strategies” for underperforming schools).
336. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (observing that a “state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country”).
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remedies include remedies that focus on ways to combat inten-
tional discrimination, ameliorate implicit biases, and dismantle
systemic barriers. The critical factor is to address these problems in
ways that do not treat people differently based on race and that are
cognizant of the philosophical and psychological roots of racial
polarization.
Insofar as implicit biases are deeply ingrained and, by definition,
unknown to those who hold them, it is unclear whether and to what
extent they can be eliminated.337 Nonetheless, research has shown
that some strategies may be effective at reducing implicit bias, such
as increasing awareness, self-checking, and the adoption of more
concrete standards.338 These approaches might be extended to vari-
ous areas in which discretionary decisions may be affected by
implicit bias, such as employment decisions or disciplinary actions
in public education.
A related strategy is to reform traditional policies and structures
that operate as systemic barriers to black progress. This approach
requires that we identify those policies and structures and offer al-
ternative means to accomplishing the objectives nominally served
by those policies and structures. Thus, for example, if the standard-
ized tests relied on for admission to elite universities and law
schools tend to be racially biased, the focus might be on alternative
measures that provide a more accurate and racially neutral measure
of merit.339
337. See generally Calvin K. Lai et al., Reducing Implicit Racial Preferences: I. A Comparative
Investigation of 17 Interventions, J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. (January, 2014) (examining various
strategies for reducing unconscious racial biases and identifying characteristics of effective
and ineffective strategies).
338. For example, the National Center for State Courts has suggested seven strategies for
reducing implicit bias in the courts, including (1) “[r]aise awareness of implicit bias”; (2)
“identify and consciously acknowledge real group and individual differences”; (3) “check
thought processes and decisions for possible bias”; (4) “[i]dentify distractions and sources of
stress in the decision-making environment and remove or reduce them”; (5) ”[i]dentify
sources of ambiguity in the decisionmaking context and establish more concrete standards
before engaging in the decision-making process”; (6) “[i]nstitute feedback mechanisms”; and
(7) “[i]ncrease exposure to stigmatized group members and counter-stereotypes and reduce
exposure to stereotypes.” NAT’L CTR. OF STATE COURTS, STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE INFLUENCE
OF IMPLICIT BIAS, http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%20and%20Ra
cial%20Fairness/IB_Strategies_033012.ashx. This undated document summarizes the results
of a more comprehensive report, PAMELA M. CASEY, ROGER K. WARREN, FRED L. CHEESMAN II
& JENNIFER K. ELEK, HELPING COURTS ADDRESS IMPLICIT BIAS: RESOURCES FOR EDUCATION
(2012), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20
Fairness/IB_report_033012.ashx.
339. See, e.g., Kimberly West-Faulcon, More Intelligent Design: Testing Measures of Merit, 13 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1235 (2011) (discussing shortcomings of traditional standardized tests and
describing innovative testing designs based on modern research on the nature of
intelligence).
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To a certain extent, implicit biases and systemic barriers are in-
terrelated, in the sense that decisional structures that rely on
individual discretion may increase the impact of implicit biases.
Thus, for example, police and prosecutorial discretion plays a ma-
jor role in the racial disparities within the criminal justice system.
To the extent that this discretion is influenced by unconscious bi-
ases, the result is the disproportionate arrest, prosecution, and
incarceration of black defendants, as well as the problem of vio-
lence against black suspects. Constraining discretion through the
adoption of clear (and non race-specific) policies may be one way
to combat this problem.340
Nonetheless,  the psychology of race means that how these issues
are framed is critically important.341 Thus, for example, if the prob-
lem is police violence against blacks, rather than accusing police of
racism, which produces a defensive reaction, postracial remedies
might ask “how can we avoid being the next Ferguson?” This is not
to suggest that blacks or the Left should remain silent about racism
or cease to advocate for other kinds of remedies. But—given the
psychology of race and the Supreme Court’s postracial equal pro-
tection jurisprudence—those who seek to reduce racial inequalities
cannot afford to ignore opportunities to build coalitions for pos-
tracial remedies.342
B. Postracial Political Remedies
By “political” remedies, we mean measures voluntarily adopted
by policymakers at any level, whether federal or state legislatures,
administrative agencies, or private actors (in contrast to those
achieved as the result of litigation in the courts, which we address in
340. See supra note 338 (outlining strategies for reducing implicit biases).
341. See generally Germine H. Awad, Does Policy Name Matter? The Effect of Framing on the
Evaluations of African American Applicants, 42 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 379 (2013) (docu-
menting impact of calling hiring policy diversity-related as opposed to affirmative action on
hiring decisions); see also supra note 188–191 and accompanying text (discussing the psycho-
logical effects of framing arguments).
342. The specific coalition partners would vary depending on context. In some cases,
they might include economically disadvantaged blacks and whites along with progressive
whites and blacks concerned about economic inequality. In other cases, strategies might pro-
duce unexpected coalition partners. For example, people in crime ridden neighborhoods
and police departments might have a mutual interest in improving relationships and cooper-
ation, and so they may form productive coalitions. Thus, we do not have a preconceived and
inflexible view about what prospective coalitions for postracial remedies might look like. In-
deed, we are as pragmatic about these as we are about the remedies. We support coalitions
that work to address the underlying problems.
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the next section). Political remedies may take the form of laws, pro-
grams, or practices that address problems such as poverty, mass
incarceration, poor educational achievement, or failing neighbor-
hoods. Political remedies require that proponents convince
responsible policymakers, which in turn requires them to build po-
litical support so as to influence outcomes. The pursuit of postracial
political remedies has two principal advantages—broader appeal
and lower risk of constitutional invalidity.
1. Broader Appeal
To be sure, in our ideologically polarized society, the causes of
and solutions for problems like poverty, mass incarceration, un-
derperforming schools, or blighted neighborhoods are likely to be
contested. Nonetheless, those divisions are exacerbated by argu-
ments that focus on race and solutions that incorporate racial
preferences, because such an approach brings additional psycho-
logical factors into play. In view of the problem of “ingroup” and
“outgroup” thinking,343 focusing on race may encourage members
of the ingroup (whites) to place the responsibility for these
problems on the outgroup. Equally important, focusing on race is
more likely to produce a defensive reaction from well-intentioned
whites.344
This is not to say that all postracial political remedies will be ac-
ceptable across the range of the ideological spectrum, or even that
a large majority will embrace them.345 Nonetheless, postracial politi-
cal remedies are more likely to appeal to the broad middle—
citizens who may be amenable to practical solutions for real
problems. On this point we believe that most Americans see persis-
tent poverty, mass incarceration, failing schools, and disadvantaged
neighborhoods as real problems that warrant constructive
solutions.346
Ultimately, the pursuit of postracial political remedies must be
incremental, focusing on what is achievable and initially targeting
343. See supra notes 160–169 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 170–178 and accompanying text.
345. See Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 2851–55 (arguing that compassion fatigue and the
“coding” of arguments as serving particular groups limit the tactical advantages of universalist
approaches).
346. A key point here is that people may support efforts to ameliorate these problems
without regard to whether they see the problems as the product of racial discrimination or
are motivated by a desire to reduce racial inequalities. Addressing the underlying problem
will benefit blacks who are disproportionately burdened by it. To the extent that whites per-
ceive a problem as a “black” issue, they might be less motivated to address it.
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receptive audiences and communities to build a record of success.
These successes, in turn, can be used to make the case for solutions
that work, taking them to a broader audience based on solid evi-
dence that the solutions are practical and workable.
Pursuit of remedies that break down implicit biases and systemic
barriers may be a particularly sensitive and difficult undertaking.
Programs designed to alleviate implicit biases, for example, require
that political actors and the target audience accept the existence of
such biases and the need to address them. Without such a recogni-
tion, implicit bias training may produce a backlash and be
counterproductive.347 Likewise, tackling systemic barriers may be
problematic because doing so requires recognition that longstand-
ing and familiar practices operate as a barrier, and a willingness to
seek alternatives that are less exclusionary.
Accordingly, advocating for solutions to implicit biases and sys-
temic barriers cannot be undertaken in a wholly race-blind fashion,
which implicates the psychological factors that lead to resistance.
Nonetheless, such efforts have already made some headway (as in
the case of police departments that have undertaken implicit bias
training or the development of more neutral forms of standardized
testing). Strategically, it makes sense to focus on receptive commu-
nities and policymakers first, so as to build a track record of success
that can, over time, help to convince skeptics.
2. Constitutionality
A critical difference between postracial and race-specific political
remedies is that postracial political remedies would be less constitu-
tionally vulnerable under the Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence. So long as the solutions are not race-specific (i.e., do
not treat or intend to treat people differently based on race), the
postracial remedies would be subject to rational basis scrutiny.348
The purposes of ameliorating poverty, improving the criminal jus-
tice system, improving educational outcomes, revitalizing
neighborhoods, and increasing political participation are clearly le-
gitimate. Likewise, political remedies based on what works are easily
347. See, e.g., Destiny Peery, Implicit Bias Training for Police May Help, but It’s Not Enough,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 14, 2016, 9:29 PM) (“Mandatory diversity trainings can lead to back-
lash effects that increase, rather than decrease, bias and sour participants on diversity as a
goal.”).
348. See supra notes 222–231 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of proof of
intent in constitutional disparate impact cases).
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defended as rational means to achieve these ends, especially insofar
as they are evidence based.
To the extent that the problems identified are disproportionately
concentrated in the black community, solving those problems will
tend to disproportionately benefit blacks and thus ameliorate racial
disparities. Under the Court’s postracial equal protection jurispru-
dence, this sort of disproportionate impact would not trigger strict
scrutiny in the absence of proof of racially discriminatory intent.
Thus, the primary vulnerability would arise only if there is evidence
that the non race-specific approach is a mere pretext for racial pref-
erences or if they are implemented in a race-based manner. In this
regard, it is important to distinguish between the permissible and
legitimate purpose of redressing racial inequality and the constitu-
tionally suspect purpose of establishing race-based preferences.
Consider the problem of admissions in higher education. The
Court recently reaffirmed the consideration of race as a factor in
higher education admissions (by a slim 4-3 majority) in Fisher v.
Texas,349 but satisfying strict scrutiny remains a difficult task. As an
alternative, institutions of higher education might consider poverty,
the applicant’s family’s level of education, and other socio-eco-
nomic burdens the applicant has overcome as positive factors in
deciding on admission.350 To the extent that a higher proportion of
the black community bears such burdens, these preferences would
disproportionately benefit black applicants. Nonetheless, because
these factors are race-neutral on their face, they would only have to
survive the rational basis test—unless the record shows that these
considerations were merely a pretext for racial preferences.351
Postracial remedies may be vulnerable to this sort of challenge if
they simply substitute class for race in an effort to get around limits
on affirmative action, especially if their implementation in practice
effectively confines the program to racial minorities.352 On the
349. 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (upholding lower court finding that University had a suffi-
cient basis for concluding that race-neutral alternatives were not effective).
350. See Daria Roithmayr, Direct Measures: An Alternative Form of Affirmative Action, 7 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 1 (2001) (arguing for race–neutral law school admissions policies that would
tend to promote diversity). Note that this approach is similar to the pilot program adopted
by the New York City public schools that we discussed in the introduction.
351. This may be one problem with Professor Roithmayr’s suggestion that admissions
policies focus on whether (1) applicants or their families have experienced discrimination;
(2) applicants would offer underrepresented perspectives on racial injustice; and (3) appli-
cants are likely to serve underserved populations. See id. at 8–9. To the extent that these
criteria are self-consciously adopted to achieve the goals of affirmative action without ex-
pressly incorporating race and might tend to overwhelmingly favor blacks and other racial
minorities, they might be vulnerable to the argument that these nominally race-neutral crite-
ria are a pretext for racial preferences.
352. For further discussion, see infra notes 407–410 and accompanying text.
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other hand, solutions like improved early childhood education,
technical job training programs, or other problem-oriented solu-
tions are not invalid simply because one argument to support them
is that they will help redress racial disparities. Likewise, a jurisdic-
tion’s decision to use implicit bias training or to alter its hiring
structures to prevent unconscious discrimination is not constitu-
tionally invalid just because it is intended to benefit blacks by
combatting racial inequality.353
C. Postracial Judicial Remedies
We also believe that it may be possible for the Left to use the
Court’s postracial equal protection jurisprudence more effectively
to advocate for judicial remedies for racial inequality, particularly in
respect to systemic barriers and implicit biases. The key on this
front is to leverage a more searching review under the rational basis
test (i.e., rational basis “with bite”) that has emerged in cases like
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,354 Romer v. Evans,355 and United
States v. Windsor.356 Again, this approach is not a panacea, but it may
be useful in some contexts, especially when efforts to secure politi-
cal remedies are unsuccessful.
The essential feature of this heightened form of rational basis
scrutiny is a receptiveness to arguments that the means are not ra-
tionally related to the purported ends, which raises an inference
that those ends are a mere pretext for invidious discrimination.
Thus, for example, in Cleburne the Court concluded that the denial
of a zoning variance for a group home for developmentally disabled
adults was not rationally related to the city’s asserted reasons be-
cause the city granted variances to other, similarly situated group
living arrangements.357 This inconsistency indicated that these rea-
sons were a mere pretext for animus. Similarly, in Romer and
353. If that were true, then the civil rights laws prohibiting racial discrimination would be
invalid because they were intended to help blacks and other racial minorities.
354. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
355. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
356. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
357. See, e.g., 473 U.S. at 448 (observing that the differences between developmentally
disabled and other adults are “largely irrelevant unless the . . . home and those who would
occupy it would threaten legitimate interests of the city in a way that other permitted uses
such as boarding houses and hospitals would not”); see also id. at 449 (dismissing the city’s
objection to the home on the ground that it was located in a flood plain because that con-
cern “can hardly be based on a distinction between the . . . home and, for example, nursing
homes, homes for convalescents or the aged, or sanitariums or hospitals, any of which could
be located on the . . . site without obtaining a special use permit”).
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Windsor, the Court concluded that laws targeting the LGBT commu-
nity for unfavorable treatment were not rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose and therefore must have been the
product of animus.358
The emergence of more searching rational basis review has been
well-recognized in the literature, but little attention has been paid
to its potential implications for challenging race-neutral measures
that disproportionately burden blacks. These developments offer
two interrelated opportunities for challenging facially neutral poli-
cies—challenging the ends-means fit and raising inferences of
pretext. Thus, for example, it may be possible to challenge systemic
barriers by building a record demonstrating that they are not a
good fit for their stated ends. At a minimum, this approach puts
policymakers to the burden of justifying their decision to maintain
practices that operate as barriers.
A useful example might be challenges to voter ID requirements
and related policies that may impair voting by the poor and racial
minorities. Although these measures have a disproportionate im-
pact on blacks, it may be difficult to prove discriminatory intent or
satisfy the effects test under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. A comple-
mentary strategy suggested by the Court’s postracial equal
protection jurisprudence would be to challenge the ends asserted
to support such measures.
Although preventing voter fraud is clearly a legitimate purpose,
voter ID requirements are a poor fit for this problem because (1)
the documented evidence of fraud that would be prevented by such
requirements is minimal at best (and other forms of fraud may be a
more serious problem), and (2) the exclusionary effects of such
measures far exceed the scope of any such problems.359 In view of
358. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–95 (concluding that purpose of DOMA’s denial of
recognition to valid same-sex marriages was motivated by the improper purpose of denying
equal dignity to same sex marriages); Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–32 (concluding that Colorado
constitutional amendment prohibiting adoption of antidiscrimination laws based on sexual
orientation failed the rational basis test).
359. Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc) (arguing that Wisconsin voter ID law should be invalidated because
strict voter ID laws suppress minority turn out and there was no evidence that in-person
voting fraud was a problem). A similar argument can be made against other laws that combat
nonexistent forms of voter fraud by suppressing turn out. In a recent debate at the University
of Kansas Law School, for example, the Secretary of State for the State of Kansas defended
recent voter ID and proof of citizenship requirements by citing 220 instances of suspected
voter fraud from 1997 through 2010, which averages less than twenty cases per year. Peter
Hancock, Kobach Debates Voter ID Laws with K.U. Law Professor, LAWRENCE J. WORLD, (Sept. 10,
2015), http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2015/sep/10/kobach-debates-voter-id-laws-ku-law-
professor/. As a result of the strict proof of citizenship requirements imposed by Kansas law,
over 35,000 prospective voters’ registration have been suspended. Kelsey Ryan & Bryan
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the disjunction between the need for such laws and their impact on
voting rights, it may be possible to challenge them under the ra-
tional basis test, without regard to whether the burden on voting
rights is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny360 or whether there is a
racially discriminatory intent.361 Although preventing fraud would
probably satisfy the most deferential forms of rational basis scrutiny,
the rational basis “with bite” cases provide at least a plausible basis
for challenging voter ID laws.362
A related point is the use of a bad fit between the state’s asserted
purposes and the means as evidence of discriminatory intent. A use-
ful illustration of this approach can be found in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,363 in which the Supreme
Court concluded that an ostensibly neutral law was motivated by
religious discrimination. Although the case involved religious
rather than racial discrimination, the essential question in the case
was identical for analytical purposes. The Free Exercise Clause pro-
hibits religious discrimination in much the same way as the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits racial discrimination.364 Under the Free
Exercise Clause, facially neutral laws that burden religious practices
Lowry, Young Voters, Wichitans Top Kansas’ Suspended Voter List, WICHITA EAGLE (Sept. 26,
2015), http://www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/article36705666.html. Such a dis-
junction between the problem and the solution suggests that the justification for the law is a
mere pretext.
360. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
361. Compare Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (holding that plaintiffs had failed to
prove that at large voting in municipal elections was maintained for a racially discriminatory
purpose), with Rodgers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (holding that plaintiffs had successfully
proved that municipality maintained at large voting for a discriminatory purpose).
362. While this article was in the editorial process, several lower courts struck down voter
ID laws or other restrictions as unconstitutional or in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. See N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, No. 16-1468, 2016 WL 4053033 (4th
Cir. July 29, 2016) (concluding that North Carolina voting restrictions reflected a racially
discriminatory intent and therefore violated the VRA, the Equal Protection Clause, and the
Fifteenth Amendment); Veasey v. Abbott, No. 14-41127, 2016 WL 3923868 (5th Cir. July 20,
2016) (upholding district court finding that measures had a racially discriminatory effect
under § 2 of the VRA, but remanding for further consideration on § 2 claims of discrimina-
tory intent and avoiding constitutional issues); One Wisconsin Institute, Inc. v. Thomsen, 15-
cv-324-jdp, 2016 WL 4059222 (W.D. Wi. July 29, 2016) (concluding that Wisconsin voter re-
strictions violated § 2 of the VRA, the Fifteenth Amendment, and the First and Fourteenth
Amendment).
363. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
364. Indeed, religion is sometimes treated as a suspect classification under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. See, e.g., Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651 (1992) (“Because
the Montana venue rules neither deprive Burlington of a fundamental right nor classify
along suspect lines like race or religion, they do not deny equal protection to Burlington
unless they fail in rationally furthering legitimate state ends.”); New Orleans v. Dukes, La.
Concessions, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (listing suspect “distinctions” for equal protection
purposes as “race, religion, or alienage”).
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do not trigger strict scrutiny unless they have the purpose of dis-
criminating against religions or religious beliefs.365 Thus, the
question in Babalu Aye was identical to the question in disparate
impact cases, and the same logic would apply to the determination
of discriminatory intent.366
In Babalu Aye, the Court relied on various considerations to con-
clude that a law banning the slaughter of animals within the city was
motivated by a discriminatory intent. Critically, the Court empha-
sized, among other things, the poor fit between the provisions of
the law and its purported purposes. For example, the law was de-
fended as an animal cruelty measure, but included many
exceptions so that “although Santeria sacrifice is prohibited, kill-
ings that are no more necessary or humane in almost all other
circumstances are unpunished.”367 Likewise, insofar as the ordi-
nance was defended as a means to combat the health problems
arising from improper disposal, “the city could have imposed a gen-
eral regulation on the disposal of organic garbage.”368
These sorts of arguments may be especially powerful in the con-
text of statutory disparate impact claims, in which racially disparate
impact may be countered by proffering legitimate justifications for
practices that disproportionately burden blacks and other minori-
ties. Producing evidence that the measures in question do not serve
the asserted purposes may be a means of exposing those justifica-
tions as pretext.
D. Application to Racial Inequalities
In this section we consider how postracial political and judicial
remedies might be brought to bear on persistent racial inequalities
365. Compare Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (re-
quiring proof of discriminatory intent to trigger strict scrutiny of neutral laws burdening
religious practices), with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring proof of dis-
criminatory intent to trigger strict scrutiny of neutral laws disproportionately burdening
racial minorities). Under Smith, neutral laws that burden “hybrid rights” combining free exer-
cise with other fundamental rights also receive strict scrutiny, in much the same way that even
nonsuspect classification that burden fundamental rights will trigger strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535
(1942).
366. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“The breadth of the amendment is so
far removed from [the state’s] particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit
them.”); McCrory, 2016 WL 4053033, at *19–21 (4th Cir. 2016) (relying on bad fit between
state’s asserted interests to support voting restrictions to conclude that racial discrimination
was the “but for cause” of their enactment).
367. Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 536.
368. Id. at 538.
WINTER 2017] Postracial Remedies 469
in the areas of economics, criminal justice, education, and neigh-
borhoods. These examples are meant to be illustrative rather than
exhaustive, and are at this point provisional. We have also at-
tempted to give examples from both conservative and liberal
perspectives. Conservative perspectives tend to focus on self-help,
personal responsibility, and the private sector, while liberal or pro-
gressive programs emphasize government benefits and other
interventions to ameliorate inequality. From a pragmatic perspec-
tive, the critical question is whether these approaches work to solve
the underlying problems, and if not, what other options might work
better.369
1. Economics
There are a variety of postracial approaches that might improve
racial disparities in income and wealth by addressing the plight of
the poor. In general terms, we might address high rates of unem-
ployment and underemployment by expanding job training
programs or initiating comprehensive national service require-
ments.370 Both approaches would tend to improve the employability
of those with limited credentials and experience, and a national
service program would also increase demand for workers and re-
duce the supply of workers competing for available jobs.
Some of these programs appear to enjoy support among conserv-
atives.371 For example, conservatives have advocated in support of
New York City’s WeCARE program, which addresses barriers to em-
ployment by providing assistance and services to help clients
369. As noted previously, see NYC DEPT. OF EDUC., supra note 5, and discussed further
infra notes 411–412, our premise is that tackling the underlying social and economic
problems that disproportionately burden blacks will ameliorate racial inequality. Here, the
focus is on whether the remedy addresses the underlying social problem.
370. See, e.g., Sharon L. Harlan & Edward J. Hackett, Federal Job Training Programs and
Employment Outcomes—Effects by Sex and Race of Participants, 4 POP. RESEARCH AND POL. REV. 235
(1985) (stressing the importance of work programs for minorities to gain employment); Pe-
ter Z. Schochet et al., Does Job Corps Work? Impact Findings from the National Job Corps Study, 98
AM. ECON. REV. 1864 (2008) (concluding that Jobs Corps is a successful federal job training
program for disadvantaged youth).
371. There is some evidence of increased interest by some conservatives in the economic
plight of the lower classes. See Jackie Calmes, They Want Trump to Make the G.O.P. a Workers’
Party, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/06/us/politics/as-
trump-rises-reformocons-see-chance-to-update-gops-economic-views.html?_r=0. These efforts
could provide the basis for postracial remedies, such as tax breaks for “low- and middle-
income workers through tax credits for children, the earned-income tax credit or a new wage
subsidy,” or “help[ing] displaced workers” affected by free trade agreements. Id.
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achieve their highest levels of self-sufficiency,372 as a potential
model for reform of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Pro-
gram (SNAP).373 This approach has garnered attention in the
House Committee on Agriculture, where the Republican Commit-
tee Chair, J. Michael Conaway, touted it.374 Another approach that
might enjoy some conservative support would be to promote entre-
preneurship through programs that provide “micro loans” and
other encouragement for small businesses.375
From a more progressive perspective, it might be possible to
change the terms and conditions of employment in ways that pro-
tect all vulnerable workers.376 For example, Katie Eyer has
suggested that a just cause requirement for termination of employ-
ees (i.e., elimination of at-will employment) would tend to protect
black workers against hidden or unconscious racism in disciplinary
actions.377 It might also be possible to reform hiring practices in
ways that reduce the effects of systemic barriers and implicit biases,
perhaps by promoting tests that have been adjusted for racial
bias,378 adopting policies that constrain individual discretion, or
372. For an overview of the program, see WeCARE, FEDCAP, http://www.fedcap.org/con-
tent/wecare (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
373. WeCARE has been touted by the American Conservative Union because “[it] is
unique among TANF programs in its laser focus on workforce readiness training and job
placement.” Grant Collins Testifies About the Future of SNAP, THE ACU FOUNDATION, (Aug. 29,
2015), http://acufoundation.conservative.org/2015/08/29/grant-collins-testifies-about-the-
future-of-snap/. Although WeCARE is focused on clients with disabilities, it could be adapted
to address other barriers to employment.
374. Cf. Opening Statement of J. Michael Conaway, House Committee on Agriculture
Public Hearing: Past, Present, & Future of SNAP (June 10, 2015), http://agricul-
ture.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1087 (observing that “it is
important to have a realistic view of what it takes for many Americans to get back on their
feet,” that “[s]teady employment makes it possible to climb the economic ladder and rise out
of poverty,” and that “a greater level of engagement is needed between SNAP and
recipients”).
375. For example, the Republican Party Platform proclaims, “We will encourage invest-
ments in small businesses.” See Republican Platform: Restoring the American Dream: Economy &
Jobs, https://www.gop.com/platform/restoring-the-american-dream/ (last visited Nov. 19,
2016) [https://web.archive.org/web/20160806223918/https://www.gop.com/platform/re-
storing-the-american-dream/].
376. Thus, for example, greater pay transparency might deter pay discrimination. See
Gowri Racmachandran, Pay Transparency, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1043 (2012) (proposing pay
transparency as a defense to pay discrimination claims).
377. Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimi-
nation Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2012); see also Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and
Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443 (1996)
(advancing a similar argument).
378. See Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in “General Ability” Job Testing, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 1157 (1991) (discussing discrimination in job testing).
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promoting interventions to combat implicit bias among those who
make employment decisions.379
2. Criminal Justice
Reforming the criminal justice system represents one of the most
important and difficult tasks for the amelioration of racial dispari-
ties. As a threshold matter, the de-escalation of the war on drugs is
an important starting point.380 Notwithstanding the popularity of
the war on drugs in some circles, we think it is an area where liber-
tarian conservatives and progressives may find common ground, as
reflected in the legalization of marijuana in some states.381 Insofar
as the war on drugs is disproportionately harming blacks, de-escala-
tion would disproportionately benefit them.382
Of course, the criminal justice system necessarily entails many
discretionary judgments by police, prosecutors, judges, and juries.
Given the prevalence of negative images and stereotypes of
blacks—especially young black men—as dangerous, violent law-
breakers, implicit biases in the criminal justice system will be
especially difficult to overcome. Training may help to reduce im-
plicit biases, but the effectiveness of interventions is unclear.383
379. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach As Antidiscrimination Mandate Locating
Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849 (2007) (arguing for a “structural approach” to address
implicit biases in the workplace); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination—A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) (advancing a similar structural approach).
But see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2006) (critiquing the structural approach).
380. See, e.g., Mona Lynch, Institutionalizing Bias: The Death Penalty, Federal Drug Prosecu-
tions, and Mechanisms of Disparate Punishment, 41 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91 (2013) (discussing the war
on drugs and the disparate impact on blacks caused by the differences in sentences for crack
cocaine versus other drugs); Jonathan Simon, Ending Mass Incarceration is a Moral Imperative,
26 FED. SENTENCING REPORTER 271 (2014) (arguing for ending the war on crime and drugs as
a means of ending mass incarceration); Cassia Spohn, Race, Crime, and Punishment in the Twen-
tieth and Twenty-First Centuries, 44 CRIME AND JUSTICE 49 (2015) (arguing for ending the war on
drugs); see generally supra notes 299–305 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the
war on drugs in the mass incarceration of blacks).
381. Another area of potential common ground would be the abuse of drug forfeiture
statutes.
382. More broadly, needless violence against black suspects might be reduced if police
methods were reformed to reduce confrontational and militaristic approaches.
383. See, e.g., Jonathan Feingold & Karen Lorang, Defusing Implicit Bias, 59 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 210 (2012) (proposing “gun training focused on mitigating the effect of implicit
biases”); Brian R. Jones, Bias-Based Policing in Vermont, 35 VT. L. REV. 925 (2011) (arguing for
enhanced police training to reduce “bias-based policing”); Robert J. Smith, Reducing Racially
Disparate Policing Outcomes: Is Implicit Bias Training the Answer?, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 295 (2015)
(discussing implicit bias training for police officers); see generally Samuel Walker, Institutional-
izing Police Accountability Reforms: The Problem of Making Police Reforms Endure, 32 ST. LOUIS U.
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Another approach would be to limit the role of discretionary judg-
ments. Here, for example, articulating clearer policies that limit
discretion in police stops or reducing the number and use of per-
emptory challenges might be useful illustrations.384
One reform that has received the support of the conservative
CATO Institute is the use of body cameras by police.385 It is interest-
ing to note that this report concludes that “[r]educing incidents of
police misconduct will require reforms of use-of-force policy and
training, and changes to how police misconduct is investigated, in
addition to the increased use of body cameras.”386 This conclusion
suggests that there may be room for a broader coalition between
conservatives and progressives on a variety of police reforms.
3. Education
Educational achievement gaps are among the most critical
problems to address. Education is not only a critical factor in em-
ployment and economic success, but also an essential means of
empowerment that enables us to participate in civil society and de-
fend our interests. Brown assumed that eliminating de jure
segregation would produce integrated schools and that integrated
schools would equalize educational outcomes, but the problem is
more complex. For example, integration is difficult to achieve in
light of housing segregation. Put simply, the achievement gap is a
PUB. L. REV. 57 (2012) (discussing history of police reform and the problems such reform
faces).
384. See Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (2010) (proposing solutions for implicit biases in voir dire); see also Sarah
Jane Forman, The Ferguson Effect: Opening The Pandora’s Box of Implicit Racial Bias in Jury Selec-
tion, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 71 (2015) (arguing for educating lawyers and juries to
overcome implicit biases). To be sure, many defense attorneys might object on the basis that
the availability of peremptory challenges is a necessary safeguard for criminal defendants. See,
e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No! A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremp-
tory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099, 1100 (1994) (recommending “new restrictions on
the use of the challenges, restrictions which should make prosecutorial racist challenges
much more difficult while not denying the benefits that well-exercised challenges continue to
present for criminal defendants”). The point here is not to advocate for elimination of per-
emptory challenges, but rather to identify it as one possible pragmatic response to the
problem of racial bias in jury selection.
385. See Matthew Feeney, Watching the Watchmen: Best Practices for Police Body Cameras,
CATO INST. POL. ANALYSIS, No. 782, Oct. 27, 2015.
386. Id. at 17.
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complex problem that cannot be alleviated by the educational sys-
tem alone.387
Liberals and conservatives have different ideas about what steps
to take to improve educational achievement. Conservatives often
propose school choice—in the form of charter schools and voucher
programs—as a means of improving education. From a pragmatic
perspective, such programs would be desirable if they work, but the
evidence to this point suggests that they do not improve student
performance.388 Liberals, by way of contrast, focus on solutions such
as early childhood education, investments in quality schools, and
the use of complementary efforts (e.g., before and after school pro-
grams) to promote student success.389
Education is also an area in which implicit biases and systemic
barriers may be important factors. Teachers may unwittingly perpet-
uate underachievement as a result of implicit biases that attach low
expectations to black school children and often result in more ag-
gressive disciplinary actions when black children act out.390 Equally
important, to the extent that black children come from families
that lack education, are unstable, and lack resources, they must
overcome a variety of barriers to succeed. In view of the complexity
of the problem, it is especially important to determine what works
in the area of education.
4. Residential Segregation
Residential segregation has also proven to be an especially diffi-
cult problem to overcome because there is a natural tendency to
387. See generally DERRICK DARBY & JOHN L. RURY, THE COLOR OF MIND: WHY THE ORIGINS
OF THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP MATTER FOR JUSTICE, forthcoming (arguing that racial ideology has
also contributed to the achievement gap, historically, and so must be tackled along with
structural matters to address this complex problem).
388. See, e.g., Cecilia E. Rouse & Lisa Barrow, Student Vouchers and Student Achievement:
Recent Evidence and Remaining Questions, 2009 ANN. REV. ECON., No. 1, at 17 (reviewing evi-
dence and concluding that voucher programs do not improve student achievement);
Christopher Lubienski & Peter Weitzel, The Effects of Vouchers and Private Schools in Improving
Academic Achievement: A Critique of Advocacy Research, 2008 BYU L. REV. 447 (same).
389. See, e.g., Michael A. Rebella, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the Nec-
essary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1467 (2007) (arguing for “a commitment to
‘meaningful educational opportunity’ that, in essence, would require school districts and
local public and nonprofit agencies to provide a comprehensive range of specific in-school
and coordinated out-of-school services to children from backgrounds of concentrated
poverty”).
390. See, e.g., Douglas B. Downey & Shana Pribesh, When Race Matters: Teachers’ Evaluations
of Students’ Classroom Behavior, 77 SOC. EDUC. 267 (2004) (discussing role of race in student
discipline); Michael Rocque, Office Discipline and Student Behavior: Does Race Matter?, 116 AM. J.
EDUC. 557 (2010) (same).
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want to live around those who are “like” you. Thus, in many large
cities there are distinctive ethnic communities that are concen-
trated in particular parts of the city. Eliminating these ethnic
neighborhoods is not necessarily a good thing, but even if it is, it is
likely impossible. The more important problem is ensuring that the
particular neighborhood in which people live does not unduly their
opportunities, and some postracial approaches might help in this
regard.
As an initial matter, the traditional model for low income hous-
ing, which often involves large complexes, proved to be disastrous
on multiple fronts. Low-income housing projects, whose occupants
were disproportionately minorities, tended to attract crime and vio-
lence and contributed to the deterioration of surrounding
neighborhoods.391 Accordingly, they reinforced negative racial ste-
reotypes and provoked a NIMBY (“not-in-my-back-yard”) reaction,
especially in white suburban communities. Alternative approaches
that disperse low-income housing across communities and into
more prosperous neighborhoods are a possible response, although
the impact and effectiveness of such programs has also been
criticized.392
More broadly, just as investment in our schools will be needed to
promote high levels of educational achievement among all chil-
dren, investment in neighborhoods and neighborhood
development is a key to reducing segregation and, equally impor-
tant, ensuring that all neighborhoods have the necessary resources
for their residents, regardless of race. One especially complex as-
pect of this problem is that revitalizing neighborhoods may tend to
drive out the people who live there by increasing housing costs.393
Thus, neighborhood revitalization efforts must incorporate mea-
sures to protect the interests of current residents.394
391. See Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and
Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285 (1995); see also supra notes
316–330 and accompanying text (discussing litigation surrounding racial discrimination in
public housing).
392. John O. Calmore, Fair Housing vs. Fair Housing: The Problems with Providing Increased
Housing Opportunities Through Spatial Deconcentration, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 7 (1980) (argu-
ing that these efforts are too tokenistic to achieve any true integration of neighborhoods,
that they undermine the social and political integrity of poor neighborhoods, and reduce the
available housing opportunities for the poor).
393. See, e.g., Michael Henry Adams, The End of Black Harlem, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/29/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-black-harlem.html.
394. Lynn E. Cunningham, Islands of Affordability in a Sea of Gentrification: Lessons Learned
from the D.C. Housing Authority’s HOPE VI Projects, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY
DEV. L. 353 (2001) (discussing the success of D.C. housing program, but citing the need for
modification due to the new housing market in D.C.); Diane K. Levy, et al., In the Face Of
Gentrification: Case Studies of Local Efforts to Mitigate Displacement, 16 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
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V. VINDICATING POSTRACIAL REMEDIES
This Article addressed the philosophical, psychological, political,
and jurisprudential challenges that racial inequality poses in a po-
larized nation by taking up the standpoint of the race moderate.
This approach, which draws on both methodological and substan-
tive pragmatism, has much in common with some other recent
scholarship on race and racial inequality, although it also has some
distinctive features. Like other moderate approaches, criticism of
this approach is likely to be forthcoming from both the Left and
the Right. After situating postracial remedies in the literature and
highlighting its distinctive features, this Part addresses likely objec-
tions to this approach.
A. Situating Postracial Remedies
The search for postracial remedies draws on methodological and
substantive pragmatism because it seeks to build consensus around
workable solutions to common problems. In this sense, our ap-
proach fits comfortably within an emerging body of scholarship
emphasizing what Reva Siegel has termed the “antibalkanization”
principle, under which remedies should “ameliorate racial wrongs
without unduly aggravating racial resentments.”395
When postracial premises prevail, race-specific remedies invite
racial resentments and thus violate the antibalkanization principle.
However, postracial remedies that are not race specific will not have
this shortcoming, precisely because they do not turn on racial classi-
fications.396 Thus, whether race-specific remedies would, in a
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 238 (2007) (discussing case studies of efforts to combat housing
displacement).
395. Siegel argues that the jurisprudence of swing Justices such as Justice Kennedy—who
she characterizes as a race moderate—reflects this principle, which she regards as a sound
basis to guide societal efforts to mitigate racial inequality. Siegel, supra note 8, at 1302; see also
Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate Impact, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2157 (2013) (arguing that
strict scrutiny of all racial classifications, including so-called benign ones, is the best way to
link antibalkanization concerns with the normative imperative to treat all persons with equal
concern and respect, which undergirds the equal protection principle).
396. To be sure, a commitment to antibalkanization is not incompatible with race-specific
remedies, which might be justified when the requirements of strict scrutiny are met. In this
regard, Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence is no different from racial conservatives like Justices
Scalia and Thomas. Where they part company, however, is in regard to what remedies might
satisfy strict scrutiny, as reflected in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). This difference is
of limited practical significance, since very few race-specific remedies would satisfy even Jus-
tice Kennedy’s somewhat less restrictive form of strict scrutiny.
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perfect world, be the most desirable or direct approach to overcom-
ing racial inequality—an issue some critics will certainly raise—is
somewhat beside the point. Such remedies are constitutionally sus-
pect and often politically infeasible in the real world.
Other scholars have also responded to the postracial ethos en-
trenched in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence by focusing on
remedies that are not race specific. As noted above, some have sug-
gested that we should replace race with class or “place” as a means
of accomplishing the goals of affirmative action or race-based mea-
sures to desegregation schools or neighborhoods.397 Another
approach is to promote what Samuel Bagenstos calls “universalistic”
remedies that do not “seek to protect any particular group against
discrimination, [but rather] provide uniform protections to every-
one (at least as a formal matter).”398
Although both of these approaches are examples of postracial
remedies, the approach outlined in this Article is distinctive in two
ways. First, it is sensitive to race, both in terms of the problem of
racial inequality and the psychology of race. Targeting implicit ra-
cial bias and systemic barriers need not run afoul of postracial
doctrinal and factual premises, provided that we do so in ways that
are not race specific and are sensitive to the psychology of race.399
Second, this approach is not confined to a particular kind of rem-
edy, but rather embraces a broad array of possible remedies—so
long as they work. In this regard, it is important to note that we do
not argue that postracial remedies should be the exclusive means of
combating racial disparities.400
397. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
398. Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 2840. For examples of universalistic approaches in other
contexts including voting, disability and employment law see Richard H. Pildes, The Future of
Voting Rights Policy: From Anti-Discrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 HOW. L.J. 741 (2006); Sa-
muel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95 (2013);
SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT
51–54, 145 (2009) (proposing that universal health insurance and workplace accommoda-
tions can address disability inequality); Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs
and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2012) (arguing for extra-
discrimination remedies to address discriminatory conduct in workplace); Samuel R. Bagen-
stos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225 (2013) (arguing that universal
provisions of employment law can serve equality interests). And for a universalistic approach
to equal protection in general, see Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV.
747 (2011).
399. See supra notes 337–342 and accompanying text.
400. Thus, our defense of race neutral remedies is compatible with believing that some
combination of non-race-specific and race-conscious remedies may, in the final analysis, con-
stitute the best strategy for mitigating racial inequalities. See Bagenstos, supra note 6
(concluding that race-specific rules and approaches, along with universalistic rules, remain
essential to addressing persistent race discrimination and civil rights problems).
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Thus, our argument is not that postracial remedies are sufficient
for mitigating racial inequality. Rather, it is that they are necessary,
in view of the influence of the postracial narrative on our political
discourse and the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. Many on
the Left have been exclusively preoccupied with arguing that race-
specific remedies for racial inequality are still necessary in today’s
post-civil rights era. We do not argue against such efforts, but rather
suggest that non race-specific remedies are also necessary to miti-
gate racial inequality.
Postracial remedies share certain strengths with universalistic ap-
proaches. Because they are not race specific they stand a better
chance of gaining political support and surviving judicial scrutiny.
They allow us to focus on systemic barriers to equality that impact
the life prospects of citizens regardless of racial membership. They
do not invoke worries about identity fatigue that have troubled
race-specific remedies. And they hold promise to minimize racial
resentment and backlash and to promote greater social cohesion,
which is vital for securing the social cooperation necessary to ad-
dress racial disparities.
Postracial remedies can be embraced for different reasons. One
can be motivated by the belief that all racial classifications are invid-
ious and thus should be prohibited or viewed with the highest
suspicion (anticlassification). One can also be fully invested in the
normative ideal of colorblindness and so believe that the way to
realize postracialism in practice is simply to stop treating people
differently based on race (colorblindness). Or, one can be moti-
vated to avoid or minimize divisions that undermine the social
cohesion needed to achieve democracy in a society with a legacy of
historical injustice (antibalkanization).
This last motivation, striving for social cohesion, best captures
why we pursue postracial remedies, and also connects it with an-
tibalkanization approaches, which similarly embody not just a
methodological but also a substantive or principled commitment to
pragmatism.401 We cannot claim the strengths of this family of equal
protection approaches without also taking on board similar
objections.
B. Three Objections
Insofar as postracial remedies proceed from the standpoint of
the race moderate, objections are expected from both ends of the
401. See infra notes 420–422 and accompanying text.
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political spectrum. These objections might take various forms and
focus on various aspects of our approach. For convenience, these
potential objections are divided into three categories: pragmatic,
principle, and purity. This Part responds to those criticisms, in the
process explicating this Article’s position in connection with various
strands in the literature on racial inequality.402
1. Pragmatic
Part of the case for postracial remedies turns on the premise that
they have practical value—that is, they allow us to achieve consen-
sus for programs that work. Critics may object that this premise is
overly optimistic, both in terms of the prospects of building coali-
tions for postracial remedies and in terms of those remedies’ ability
to deliver real progress. This section addresses each of these prag-
matic objections in turn.
The first pragmatic objection is that it will not be possible in
practice to build coalitions or consensus to support postracial reme-
dies. This objection could take various forms. Given the polarized
state of our society, it may be unrealistic to think of a “big middle”
or to suppose that the Left and the Right or blacks and whites can
agree on anything. Thus, for example, there is little evidence that
our currently dysfunctional Congress could ever reach consensus
on anything, much less postracial remedies. Although polarized
voices seem to dominate our political processes, especially political
primaries, the public opinion research cited above indicates that a
substantial proportion of the population accept mixed explanations
for racial inequalities, and so are potentially amenable to compro-
mise solutions.403
Critically, postracial remedies avoid pitting blacks and whites
against each other in a zero-sum game in which remedies for racial
inequality require redistribution from whites to blacks. Of course,
postracial remedies would have redistributional consequences (as
do all social programs), insofar as they devote resources to amelio-
rating poverty, improving schools, or revitalizing neighborhoods,
but such redistribution would tend to be from the wealthy (includ-
ing wealthy blacks) to the less wealthy (including less wealthy
whites). Because this sort of redistribution is class based rather than
402. One objection we will not address is the objection that racial inequality is not a
problem worth addressing. As noted above, we take this premise as a given. Conversely, we
doubt that we could ever persuade those who do not accept this premise and will not burden
an already long article in a fruitless attempt to do so. See supra, text following note 30.
403. See supra notes 95–106 and accompanying text.
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race based, it provides an opportunity for alliances between poor or
lower class blacks and whites.404 To be sure, this sort of class-based
redistribution is likely to meet opposition and may be ideologically
contested, but postracial remedies take race out of the equation
and so are less divisive than race-specific remedies. More broadly,
ideological divisions and upper class resistance can be minimized if
the remedies actually work.
A somewhat different objection is to suggest that the big middle
is unwilling or unlikely to support such proposals. Bagenstos, for
one, doubts the premise that people are generally willing to back
civil rights causes, expressing concern that casting too broad a net
for civil rights protections and extending them beyond concrete
and urgent cases of need may undermine rather than enhance po-
litical support (perhaps due to “compassion fatigue”).405 From this
perspective, postracial remedies may undermine rather than build
support for efforts to ameliorate racial inequality.
Using voting rights as an example, Bagenstos argues that focus-
ing on removal of restrictions that burden all citizens will trivialize,
and take support away from, efforts to eradicate laws that discrimi-
nate against and have a disproportionate impact on blacks in
particular.406 A similar objection might be made against remedies
that aim to remove barriers to the educational achievement of all
students at risk, which may diminish the importance of removing
ones that target or have disparate impact on black students in
particular.
Conversely, others might object that postracial remedies are sim-
ply a pretext for benefitting racial minorities.407 This point has both
a political and a judicial dimension. Politically, it suggests that pos-
tracial remedies may come to be seen as “code” for racial
404. See supra note 7 (giving examples).
405. Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 2852.
406. Bagenstos also suggests that race-specific remedies capitalize on the powerful cachet
of “civil rights” discourse in American politics, while universalistic approaches will “lose the
support that comes with the civil rights label.” Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 2853. Given current
polarization on matters of race, however, we doubt that the “civil rights” label continues to
carry the powerful cachet that Bagenstos attributes to it. Nowadays, under conditions of deep
polarization, when civil rights are invoked in ways that highlight black inequality and disad-
vantage, they are more likely to invoke the sentiment that we are dealing with another case of
black grievance or special pleading. In view of the psychology of race, many will respond that
these claims are best addressed not by government policies, handouts of more “free stuff,” or
penalizing the conduct of private businesses, but by blacks taking greater personal responsi-
bility for their successes and failures. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 747, 748 (2011) (“Many Americans view civil rights as an endless parade of groups
clamoring for state and social solicitude.”).
407. Bagenstos notes this objection as well. Bagenstos, supra note 6.
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preferences, thus undermining support for them.408 The judicial di-
mension of this objection is based on the concern that judges may
conclude that although these remedies are not race specific “on
their face,” that facial neutrality is merely a pretext for programs
adopted with the intent to favor blacks.409
Insofar as postracial remedies are race sensitive and seek to ame-
liorate racial inequalities, this is a real concern that highlights the
need to be careful about advocacy, design, and implementation so
that remedies really are not race specific. Simply recasting affirma-
tive action programs in terms of class, rather than race, for
example, and implementing them in ways that correlate strongly
with race, is unlikely to persuade policymakers who do not already
support affirmative action or to withstand a legal challenge based
on pretext. But programs that focus on addressing underlying
problems like poverty, mass incarceration, failing schools, and dis-
advantaged neighborhoods, based on evidence that they actually
work, are less likely to be viewed as a pretext—even if they are pro-
moted in part as a response to the problems that plague the black
community.
In this regard, there is an important difference between pro-
grams to ameliorate racial inequalities that are a result of ongoing
effects of past discrimination, implicit bias, and systemic barriers,
and adopting policies with the intent to discriminate against whites
and in favor of blacks. If the remedies actually work—that is, if the
rising tide does lift all boats—then the worry about coding or pre-
text is less likely to be problem. These responses highlight the
virtues of methodological pragmatism in the design and implemen-
tation of remedies, and the importance of showing that there is no
tension between being race sensitive and not being race specific.410
A second type of pragmatic objection to postracial remedies is
that, even if it is possible to generate political support for their
adoption, they will not achieve the real world benefits that we claim
408. The extent to which this sort of result is a cause for concern is unclear. In practice,
for example, programs to promote “diversity” are often perceived as “code” for affirmative
action. Notwithstanding this phenomenon, employment programs to promote diversity have
proven to be more effective in practice than affirmative action programs. See Awad, supra
note 327.
409. See Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 2849.
410. Legally, the former is a legitimate government purpose in the way the latter is not.
Consider, for example, the civil rights laws of the 1960s, all of which were adopted in an
effort to prevent racial discrimination. These purposes were clearly legitimate.
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for them.411 Critics from the Left might argue, for example, that a
rising tide will not lift all boats. Given the problems of ongoing in-
tentional discrimination, implicit biases, and systemic barriers, this
argument posits that postracial remedies are likely to help whites
while leaving blacks behind.
This sort of objection challenges the basic premise that solving
the underlying problems that disproportionately affect blacks will
ameliorate racial inequalities. As an initial matter, this strategy is
incremental and involves tackling social and economic issues from
a variety of angles, including measures to address implicit biases
and structural barriers. In addition, even if gaps between blacks and
whites remain, ensuring that blacks have some minimal level of op-
portunity is an essential step toward promoting more equal
outcomes.412 Put differently, the marginal impact of relative ine-
quality decreases as the overall level of opportunity and prosperity
rises. Postracial remedies will not magically resolve racial inequali-
ties, but improving outcomes for some substantial number of
people in the near term is no small accomplishment.
A related objection is that it is inefficient to try to lift all boats to
deal with problems that disproportionately harm blacks—this is
simply too expensive and society is better off targeting blacks
alone.413 But postracial remedies need not be expensive, especially
if viewed in the longer term, because they are investments that will
411. Another general worry about universalistic approaches, which speculates that they
may not be as workable as race-specific ones, pertains to efficiency. Bagenstos raises this ob-
jection as well, noting that targeted laws are more efficient and that the political process may
reward this efficiency. Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 2854.
412. For example, if minority schools are failing, then black students have no chance at
success. Raising the quality of education for all may mean that white schools are still better
than minority schools, but improving minority schools will at least provide the opportunity
for black children to succeed and possibly gain ground, as a whole, on whites.
413. Thus, for example, a recent article examines the practical effect of pursuing univer-
salistic remedies under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as opposed to remedies for
racial discrimination under Title VII. Zev J. Eigen, Camille Gear Rich & Charlotte S. Alexan-
der, Post-Racial Hydraulics: The Hidden Dangers of the Universal Turn, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1. The
authors argue that this turn to universalistic remedies has unfortunate side effects that in-
clude the ossification of Title VII law, reinforcing the courts’ acceptance of the postracial
narrative, lack of attorney availability for race-based claims that do not implicate the FLSA,
and suppression of the clients’ ability to voice their claims in terms of racial discrimination.
Id. While such concerns cannot be completely discounted, the side-effects of particular litiga-
tion strategies are not necessarily transferable to other contexts. More broadly, these
criticisms help to highlight the differences between our approach and universalism: our ap-
proach does not demand the acceptance of postracial assumptions or the abandonment of
racial discrimination claims, and the remedies we advocate are race sensitive and not limited
to universalistic ones. See supra notes 395–401 and accompanying text (situating postracial
remedies in relation to other, similar approaches).
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pay off later on.414 More fundamentally, one reason that race-spe-
cific remedies are so divisive is precisely because resources are
limited and providing remedies for blacks means that those re-
sources are not available for other disadvantaged groups.
Ultimately, it is not clear that race-specific remedies are more
effectively targeted at racial inequality than postracial ones. From a
pragmatic perspective, solutions that target the manifestations of
racial inequality are at least as likely to solve them as solutions that
target race.415 Likewise, the postracial approach does not foreclose
efforts to address ongoing barriers to black success, and may even
provide more effective means to address ongoing problems of in-
tentional discrimination, implicit biases, and structural barriers.416
At bottom, it is important to bear in mind the limits of the argu-
ment. Postracial remedies will not eliminate racial and ideological
polarization or completely solve the problem of racial inequality.
Moreover, given the current political climate, seeking major legisla-
tion or new initiatives at a national level may be unrealistic.
Postracial remedies are most likely to succeed incrementally
through local efforts aimed at particular policies and practices.
Such incremental efforts can produce immediate gains for some
people and help to build momentum for expansion of programs
that have a proven record of success.
2. Principle
A second objection that might be raised to the postracial ap-
proach is that it is unprincipled. From this perspective, by targeting
the race moderate, postracial remedies try to be all things to all
people, and so lack any normative foundation in either conservative
or progressive thought. In other words, this approach is merely a
strategic approach to racial inequality, focusing exclusively on what
will work more effectively to mitigate it and not on a substantive
normative commitment.
Objections based on the lack of principle emphasize the tension
between promoting remedies that are race sensitive and asserting
414. Thus, for example, investments in early childhood education, public schools, and
wrap around programs may seem expensive, now, but those costs may be offset down the
road through declining demands for welfare benefits, reduced law enforcement costs, and
increased productivity. Of course, this sort of long-term thinking is not always influential in
our current political discourse.
415. We note, for example, that affirmative action programs did not necessarily help the
truly disadvantaged blacks, including those who lived in poverty, attended failing schools in
impoverished neighborhoods, and were embroiled in the criminal justice system.
416. See supra notes 335–342 and accompanying text.
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that such remedies should not be race specific. From the perspec-
tive of the Left, if we believe that intentional discrimination,
implicit biases, and structural barriers cause racial disparities, it fol-
lows as a matter of principle that race-specific remedies are
essential to achieve racial justice. Conversely, from the perspective
of the Right, if society wants to claim race neutrality, it follows that
decisions about what problems to address must be colorblind and
cannot be race sensitive.
Accordingly, this criticism would continue, our approach lacks a
substantive commitment to any normative principle. For example,
describing such opportunism as “post-racial pragmatism,” Kimberle´
Williams Crenshaw writes:
In the new post-racial moment, the pragmatist may be agnostic
about the conservative erasure of race as a contemporary phe-
nomenon but may still march under the same premise that
significant progress can be made without race consciousness.
This re-alignment brings liberals and some civil rights advo-
cates on board so that a variety of individuals and groups who
may have been staunch opponents of colorblindness can be
loosely allied in post-racialism.417
Crenshaw’s point is an important one. It compels pragmatists to
explain why they are motivated not merely by what works at moving a
polarized society forward but also by substantive normative
principles.
This objection, however, ignores the principled normative foun-
dations of pragmatism—a commitment to the democratic ideal of
social cooperation to achieve common ends. We reject this objec-
tion because we reject the premise that pragmatism is unprincipled.
As expressed by pragmatic idealists such as Cornel West, the link
between methodological and substantive pragmatism expresses
hopefulness in the power of strategic thinking for social
transformation:
American pragmatism is a diverse and heterogeneous tradi-
tion. But its common denominator consists of a future-
oriented instrumentalism that tries to deploy thought as a
weapon to enable more effective action. Its basic impulse is a
417. Kimberle´ Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to Move
Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1314 (2011). We will address Crenshaw’s broader concern
that our approach would concede victory to the postracial narrative and undermine advocacy
for racial justice below. See infra notes 426–431 and accompanying text.
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plebeian radicalism that fuels an antipatrician rebelliousness
for the moral aim of enriching individuals and expanding
democracy.418
Thus, postracial remedies are grounded in principled pragmatism
because they are rooted in a normative concern to make us better
individually as well as collectively by realizing our common aims as a
community. The normative underpinnings of a pragmatic strategic
instrumentalism might be further developed—though we will not
pursue this here—by tethering this democratic impulse to a con-
cern with affirming the dignity of persons.419
So pragmatism is not unprincipled simply because it contem-
plates strategic action in pursuit of what works, whether viewed
from the philosophical perspective or as a means of appealing to
the equal protection jurisprudence of race moderate Justices. In
this regard, our approach builds on Reva Siegel’s argument that
racial conflict and division must be taken seriously given the com-
position of the Court.420 She argues that swing Justices on issues of
race-conscious civil rights policies embrace an antibalkanization
perspective that aims for social cohesion.421 Siegel argues, and we
agree, that the pragmatism reflected in race moderates is a princi-
pled normative commitment to social cohesion, not merely a
strategic one of negotiating a middle path between conservatives
and progressives. This is also a key ingredient in the pragmatic
democratic impulse, figuring out how, given that we must live and
die together, we can work together to solve problems with which we
all live. Postracial remedies take up the standpoint of the race
moderates, who are willing to set polarizing commitments about
race to one side in the interests of realizing the common good in a
democratic society. If social cohesion is a mediating principle, it is
best viewed as a democratic one. Similarly, postracial remedies can
cultivate social bonds that all members of a democratic society re-
late to each other as equals.
An essential common ground for social cohesion is the pursuit of
equal opportunity for all—a principle uniting the libertarian and
egalitarian themes that underlie our political and constitutional dis-
course. To be sure this commitment cannot be a one-way
418. WEST, supra note 333, at 5.
419. See Cornel West, PROPHESY DELIVERANCE! AN AFRO-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY CHRIS-
TIANITY (2002).
420. Siegel, supra note 8.
421. Siegel distinguishes the antibalkanization approach from the competing extremes of
a colorblind anticlassification principle and a race-conscious antisubordination principle. See
id.
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proposition, attending to white resentment without equal regard to
black claims for justice.422 Indeed, insofar as racial discrimination
occupies an infamously privileged place in American history, race-
sensitive remedies for intentional discrimination, implicit biases,
and structural barriers are essential parts of the solution. Indeed, as
Justice Kennedy rightly observes: “The enduring hope is that race
should not matter; the reality is that too often it does.”423
But focusing only on equality for blacks (or other racial groups)
will most certainly divide us.424 Thus, as Siegel argues, race-sensitive
policies should work from what binds, rather than what divides,
us.425 Hence, our approach should be situated alongside other
forms of pragmatism that are motivated by a deep commitment to
democracy and that seek to build the social cohesion necessary to
sustain it in a highly polarized America where race still matters.
Race matters not only when we consider evidence of overt and
implicit anti-black discrimination, systemic barriers to success, and
gross racial disparities, but also when we consider how it shapes our
psychological responses to inequality and injustice. It is this basic
reality, and the obstacles it poses to addressing racial inequality
through race-specific means, that motivates our support for pos-
tracial remedies.
3. Purity
A further criticism takes the question of principle to another
level, arguing that postracial remedies are a form of appeasement
422. For whites, race-specific remedies seem like they are being unfairly burdened to rec-
tify past wrongs, as Justice Powell explained in his Bakke concurrence:
All state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and benefits on the basis of
race are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by the individuals burdened. The
denial to innocent persons of equal rights and opportunities may outrage those so
deprived and therefore may be perceived as invidious. These individuals are likely to
find little comfort in the notion that the deprivation they are asked to endure is
merely the price of membership in the dominant majority and that its imposition is
inspired by the supposedly benign purpose of aiding others. One should not lightly
dismiss the inherent unfairness of, and the perception of mistreatment that accompa-
nies, a system of allocating benefits and privileges on the basis of skin color and ethnic
origin.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 n.34 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring). To blacks, colorblindness ignores the peculiarity of the black plight and
the difference between racial classifications that entrench racial subordination and
racial classifications intended to end subordination.
423. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 787 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
424. See Siegel, supra note 8, at 1294.
425. Id. at 1308 (observing that Justice Kennedy seems mindful of this principle).
486 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 50:2
that concedes too much to the other side. Although this objection
might be made from either end of the political spectrum, it would
likely be raised most forcefully and consistently from the Left.426 As
with the pragmatism and principle objection, the purity objection
may come in various forms.
At its core, the purity objection criticism argues that we, in effect,
“reify” the postracial narrative and thereby undermine efforts to ad-
vocate for true racial justice. Crenshaw makes this point forcefully:
[T]he bargain that post-racial pragmatists strike is silence
about the racial barriers that continue to shape the life
chances of many people of color. This failure to engage racial
power jeopardizes racial justice agendas by giving license to
those who seek to stigmatize all discourse pertaining to ongo-
ing inequalities.427
Accordingly, postracial remedies proceed from a weak-negotiating
position by ceding the issue of race-specific remedies and radical
change and asking only for incremental changes that will produce
modest gains at best. In political science terms, our approach allows
the “Overton window” of the politically feasible to be pushed to-
ward the postracial narrative without a countervailing demand for
racial justice.428
The purity objection does not allege that race moderates actually
endorse the postracial narrative. Rather it contends that by cashing
in on “the opportunity to re-align this conservative discourse [pos-
tracialism] to more progressive visions of the future,”429
postracialists relegate race consciousness to the back of the pos-
tracial bus and stigmatize advocates of race-specific remedies.430
426. Coming from the Right, the criticism would argue that any attention to racial ine-
quality is unnecessary and counterproductive. As we stated above, however, we start from a
different premise—that racial inequality is a problem that must be addressed. See supra note
28 and accompanying text. Because we doubt the possibility of building coalitions with those
who deny that racial inequality is a problem, but regard the Left as a necessary partner in
these efforts, we will focus on the purity objection as it would be advanced from that
perspective.
427. Crenshaw, supra note 417, at 1333.
428. The Overton window describes the range of polices that the public regards as politi-
cally acceptable. See generally Joseph G. Lehman, An Introduction to the Overton Window of
Political Possibility, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY (Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.mackinac.org/
12481.
429. Crenshaw, supra note 417, at 1314.
430. The concern about stigma clearly cuts both ways. If it is problematic to stigmatize
race-consciousness, it is equally problematic to stigmatize pragmatists as sellouts or capitu-
lators to racial inequality and injustice.
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While the hearts of race moderates might be in the right place, the
politics of appeasement is wrongheaded.
We are not unmoved by these considerations, insofar as we reject
the premises of the postracial narrative and have no desire to si-
lence or undermine demands for racial justice. Indeed, it is critical
that demands for racial justice be taken seriously if we are to bring
people to the table to address ongoing racial inequalities. In this
regard, several aspects of the postracial remedies approach must be
underscored.
First, as we have repeatedly emphasized, we do not view the pur-
suit of racial justice as one that forces us to choose between the two
approaches and do not argue that postracial remedies should be
the exclusive approach to the problem of racial inequality. Pos-
tracial remedies are a necessary supplement to, not a replacement
for, race-specific approaches. Both are vital for rooting out racial
inequality.
Second, this approach to postracial remedies takes the realities
of race and racism seriously. We do not ignore or discount ongoing
discrimination, implicit bias, or systemic barriers. Whatever other
forms of postracial pragmatism may have to say about these
problems, advocates of racial justice should not be silent about
them. However, there may be practical advantages to addressing
them without race-specific remedies, which are both politically and
legally unrealistic at the moment.431
Finally, given what is known about human psychology, we must
not be overconfident in this postracial moment that race conscious-
ness alone can take us to the Promised Land. Indeed, whatever else
“taking race and racism seriously” means, it most certainly involves
taking the reality of resistance to race-specific remedies seriously.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that pursuing postracial remedies is nec-
essary for mitigating racial inequality in the United States—a nation
that many people proclaim to be postracial and in which this ethos
is entrenched in the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurispru-
dence. Postracial remedies that are sensitive to the realities of race
but are not race specific hold promise as a pragmatic solution that
can bring us together around solutions that work to lift all boats.
431. In this regard, the critical factor may be how these issues are framed. See supra notes
188–194 and accompanying text.
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From a political and psychological perspective, such remedies
can avoid the deeply rooted racial and partisan polarization sur-
rounding race-specific remedies. Accordingly, they fall within the
emerging strand of equal protection theory in which concerns
about balkanization loom large, particularly among race moderates
who do not wish to aggravate racial resentments.
From a constitutional perspective, postracial remedies can target
the factors that contribute to racial inequality, including implicit
bias and systemic barriers, without running afoul of constitutional
doctrine. Indeed, as we have argued, it is possible to seek judicial
remedies for these problems using the rational basis “with bite” ap-
proach that has figured prominently in the Court’s postracial equal
protection jurisprudence dealing with other minorities.432
From a normative standpoint, insofar as postracial remedies are
motivated by sensitivity to the psychological roots of racial and ideo-
logical polarization, they minimize social divisiveness. Accordingly,
they serve substantive democratic values as well as racial justice by
encouraging us to work together to solve underlying social
problems that disproportionately burden blacks.
In short, postracial remedies to ameliorate racial disparities con-
stitute a principled pragmatic commitment to what works. And such
a commitment is sorely needed in our deeply polarized society in
which race and racism remain significant barriers to living the
American Dream.
432. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (applying rational basis test to inval-
idate federal statute excluding valid same sex marriages from statutory provisions regarding
married couples); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (applying rational basis test to invali-
date Colorado constitutional amendment prohibiting antidiscrimination laws protecting
homosexuals); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (applying rational basis
“with bite” to invalidate special use permit requirement for group home for adults with devel-
opmental disabilities); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (invalidating state
constitutional ban on same sex marriage without specifying level of scrutiny).
